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1 Introduction 
 
The primary motivation behind this research is the need to accelerate the supply of 
renewable energy because of the important role that it plays in mitigating climate change 
and in fostering sustainable development. 
 
Understanding past drivers for low-carbon investment can help us identify those for the 
future, and what could accelerate such investment. Investment in renewable energy can be 
modelled as a problem of technical asset allocation or optimisation at the firm or sectoral 
level, but is not entirely explained by this approach – the context in which actors are 
involved, their motivations and the wider systems in which they operate must also be taken 
into account. The interactions between actors may sometimes accelerate investment and 
sometimes prevent it; however, understanding the dynamics of these processes is crucial if 
we are to shape them. This study, which focuses on the wind and solar power sectors in 
India and China, aims to find and compare drivers for investment in renewable energy.  
 
Why China and India? Firstly, China and India are now among the world’s highest emitters of 
carbon (although India emits far less than China and the United States (US), Olivier et al. 
2013), and most of their emissions come from the power sector which is heavily reliant on 
thermal power generation for energy (for India’s case, see Planning Commission 2012). 
According to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA’s) World Energy Outlook 2011 (IEA 
2011), India’s energy demand is set to increase by a compound annual growth rate of 3.1 
per cent from 2009 to 2035 (which is more than double the world’s energy demand growth at 
a compound annual growth rate of 1.3 per cent for the same period). The IEA predicts that 
India’s share of world energy demand will increase from 5.5 per cent in 2009 to 8.6 per cent 
in 2035. Indeed, in 2012/13, 90 per cent of the growth in energy demand came from 
emerging economies, led by India and China (IEA 2013). Thus, any significant shift and low-
carbon intervention undertaken by these countries is likely to have a significant global 
impact. 
 
Globally, the IEA estimates that US$45tn of investments are required between 2012 and 
2050 to reduce global carbon emissions by 50 per cent, and that 85 per cent of this 
investment will need to come from the private sector. Annually, this averages at a little over 
US$1tn, half of which will fund the replacement of existing technologies, largely in developed 
countries. The remaining US$530bn is for investment in new capacity, the bulk of which 
(US$400bn pa) will be in developing countries (IEA 2008). Given their relative weight in the 
global economy, a large proportion of this will be needed in China and India. This investment 
becomes doubly important given that more developed countries are still reeling from the 
effects of the global financial crisis and continue to struggle with policy paralysis and political 
deadlock. 
 
Our point of entry for this piece of the study is that India is already seeing significant 
investment activity in renewable energy. During 2010/11, investment in renewables grew by 
62 per cent to US$13bn (although it slowed drastically in 2011/12 to US$6.5bn – see 
UNEP/BNEF 2013). In 2010 the Indian government announced a National Solar Mission 
(NSM)1 that aimed to add 20 gigawatts (GW)2 of solar power generation capacity by 2020; 
wind power capacity has grown steadily at a compound annual growth rate of 17.9 per cent 
since 2007 (Ernst & Young 2013) and now contributes more than 20GW (Indian Wind 
Turbine Manufacturers Association 2013), or just over 70 per cent, of total renewable energy 
capacity. Almost all of this is private investment. However, these levels will need to increase 
sharply in the coming years and decades if India is to reach China’s levels (who, in 2013, 
                                                     
1 Also known as the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission. 
2 The abbreviations kW, MW, GW and TW refer to kilowatt, megawatt, gigawatt and terawatt respectively. The relationship 
between them is: 1 TW = 103GW = 106 MW = 109 kW = 1012 watts. 
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became the world leader with US$67bn invested in renewables) and make a greater 
contribution to the US$1tn needed. 
1.1 Core idea and primary research question 
Given the time-crucial nature of the climate question, many have assumed that a binding 
global deal is a necessary precursor to achieving the level of investment needed. This, 
however, remains elusive, and the political class in most countries continues to struggle with 
prioritising climate concerns above wider issues of welfare, development and 
competitiveness. More developed economies continue to press for the inclusion of emerging 
economies from the start, whereas the latter, citing the developed economies’ historical 
responsibility for emissions and their greater capacity for change, make the ethical and 
practical argument that developed nations must take the first and greatest steps.  
However, this deadlock aside, another dynamic of climate action has been suggested that 
offers a more optimistic alternative, which does not rely on a global deal and follows a far 
more bottom-up approach (Rayner 2010). It is clear that renewable energy in many countries 
– both developing and more developed economies (such as the US) – is now attracting 
significant investment and may continue to grow. As countries invest in becoming low-
carbon economies, they will have less to lose as global emissions cuts are agreed upon, 
making them more feasible. This process is already unfolding as a multiplicity of pressures 
from international and local regimes spurs modes of climate action (Keohane and Victor 
2010). However, the precise drivers of this transformation are far from straightforward, for 
example, the policy regimes of both India and China do not show clear goals to mitigate 
climate change. Indeed, in India the development of renewables long predated talk of 
climate change and has been tied to questions of energy security, sufficiency and access. 
The question we pose is: what exactly drives the investment in renewable energy? 
 
For investors to commit large sums of money into projects whose timelines run into decades, 
they will need to be certain of the viability of the low-carbon sector – a certainty, which, as 
we have seen in the case of the European Union, even the most committed governments 
may struggle to provide through policy measures alone. This research suggests that an 
alignment of interests of the various actors involved is required to keep the politico-economic 
dynamic of policy, policy implementation and investment on track. Hence, an understanding 
of the full range of actors (federal, state-level, private and civic), their motivations and 
strategies is required. We focus on wind and solar power as they make up the bulk of new 
capacity added to renewable energy in India (UNEP/BNEF 2012, 2013), and we expect 
these two industries to provide fertile ground for our exploration. 
1.2 Methodology 
To investigate this question we rely on a mixed methods approach using desk research and 
semi-structured interviews to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. The information 
for our case studies was collected on the basis of desk research complemented by face-to-
face ‘snowballing’ interviews with key informants (actors involved as well as observers). In 
particular, the determinants of investment decisions, the role of policy, and the factors that 
supported/opposed the various actors’ interests and motivations were detailed and 
triangulated by confirming the facts through multiple sources. 
1.3 Structure 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the overall context of 
India’s renewable energy endowments, and the power sector’s governance and structural 
ecosystem pertinent to our investigation, including an overview of the state of the 
technology, the wind and solar sectors, and characteristics of sector growth in the past ten 
years.  
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Sections 3 and 4 present the case studies. Firstly, in Section 3, the authors outline their 
analysis of the investment patterns and identification of the case studies that form the basis 
of their investigation. The sets of case studies are then laid out in detail – those for the wind 
sector in Section 3 and for the solar sector in Section 4. Section 5 contains insights drawn 
from the analytical sections in the case studies. 
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2 India: the context 
 
This section provides an overview of the Indian economy pertinent to renewable energy, the 
policy and institutional framework relevant to both the wind and solar power sectors, and the 
sectoral landscape that will provide a useful background to consider the political economy of 
investments. 
2.1 India’s energy scenario  
India’s energy scenario is currently one of vast, unmet demand and demand growth. Nearly 
300 million people in India lack access to basic energy services (World Bank 2014), and 
even electrified segments and areas experience intermittent supply with significant power 
shortages. The peak deficit in 2012 was nearly ten per cent nationally, and in southern India, 
16.6 per cent. The current installed generation capacity of 283GW is expected to fall further 
short in the future as growth in demand outstrips growth in supply. The annual average 
demand for energy is estimated to grow at 5.1 per cent until 2017 and at 5.4 per cent 
between 2017 and 2022; most of this growth in demand is expected to be met by fossil fuels 
(Planning Commission 2012). 
 
India has the third largest known reserves of coal (at 10 per cent of the world’s reserves, 
behind China and the US), and just 0.4 per cent of the world’s known hydrocarbon reserves. 
It relies on coal for nearly 54 per cent of its primary electricity supply. Together, coal, oil and 
natural gas constitute nearly 93 per cent of its total energy supply and are expected to be the 
primary sources for meeting future demand. However, production has always lagged behind 
demand and India is a net importer of fossil fuels, and as such, a pricetaker in global oil 
markets facing significant supply risks. Import bills also form a large part of the national 
budget – in 2012 the amount was US$140bn while the BP Statistical Review 2013 (BP 2013) 
suggests that this figure is likely to reach US$300bn by 2030. Furthermore, domestic prices 
(particularly for the general public) are insulated from global prices by the use of significant 
untargeted subsidies which are beginning to be seen as unsustainable and have been 
eroding over the course of the most recent National Five-Year Plan.  
 
In this scenario, renewables are, potentially, an important tool to achieve self-sufficiency and 
to reduce both carbon emissions and imports. The share of renewable energy (which 
includes wind, solar, biomass and small hydropower) is currently approximately 5 to 6 per 
cent of the total energy produced (wind power contributes approximately 1 per cent) and 
under current projections the installed capacity is expected to more than double by the end 
of 2017 to 54,000MW. Although this share is comparable to other countries (both developed 
and developing), studies have shown that renewables can contribute much more (Planning 
Commission 2012). 
2.2 Renewable energy resources 
Renewable energy in India, as defined within the scope of the Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy (MNRE), includes wind, solar, small hydropower and biomass (this study 
focuses on the former two). Of these, wind power has been assessed for its potential by 
multiple experts, including the government body the Centre for Wind Energy Technology,3 
and apart from large hydropower, it is the oldest utility-scale renewable energy source in 
India. 
 
 
 
                                                     
3 Historically a research, certification and analysis body responsible for resource assessments, standardisation and 
fundamental research and development in the wind sector, and now also a nodal agency for solar power technology. 
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Table 2.1 Assessments of India’s potential for wind energy 
Study Potential 
Centre for Wind Energy Technology (2008–10) First assessment: 49GW 
 Revised estimate: 103GW at 80 metre hub 
heights (based on the identification of specific 
sites which are accessible and amenable to 
wind farm development) 
Phadke, Bharvirkar and Khangura (2012) 1,006GW at 80 metre hub heights and 
3,000GW at 120 metre hub heights (using 
geographic information systems (GIS) and 
computational methods) 
Hossain, Sinha and Kishore (2011) 4,250GW at 80 metre hub heights (using GIS 
and computational methods) 
 
Officially, the country’s wind energy potential is 103GW and even at this number, it is 
comparable to India’s total installed generation capacity from all sources. Good quality sites, 
however, are concentrated in a few states, namely Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Maharashtra, 
Rajasthan, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. Of these, by far the best 
quality sites exist in Tamil Nadu (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Moreover, wind power in India is 
fairly seasonal and windy days are typically limited to seven months per year. As of 2012, 
wind power contributed 0.6 per cent of the total energy produced, although it constitutes 
approximately 7 per cent of the total installed capacity and, of all renewables, wind power is 
also responsible for the greatest portion of installed capacity as well as energy production 
from renewable sources, apart from large hydropower plants (Planning Commission 2012). 
 
India’s solar power potential is even greater. With approximately 300 sunny days per year, 
most land area receives an average insolation of 4–6kWh/m2, which one official study has 
translated to equal roughly 600TW per year – one thousand times more than the projected 
energy demand over the next three decades (Ministry of New and Renewable Energy 2014). 
Utility-scale solar power installations, however, require large swathes of land, making some 
states more suitable than others: some of the best sites for utility-scale systems are in 
Rajasthan in the Thar Desert, which alone could provide over 600GW; the Rann of Kutch 
Lake in Gujarat; followed by particular areas in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh and most 
parts of the southern states of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, where solar 
irradiance is high throughout the year. Particular information about the direct normal 
irradiance and land use is compiled by the Centre for Wind Energy Technology. 
 
Strategically, these two resources – wind and sun – hold significant importance through their 
potential role in helping India achieve energy sufficiency, energy security and to expand 
energy access because of the wide distribution of the resources and their suitability for 
decentralised systems.  
 
To date, however, wind power technologies have been deployed primarily for utility-scale 
applications (off-grid, and small- and medium-scale installations account for less than 2MW), 
as is also the case for solar power applications. (Decentralised applications currently 
account for 500–600MW in heating systems, cookers, lighting systems and mini-grids). This 
report focuses on private investment in the wind and solar power sectors in utility-scale 
projects and capacity. Firstly, to analyse this investment a greater understanding of the 
overall power sector, principles of policymaking, the governance structure and overall 
institutional arrangement is necessary. 
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Figure 2.1  Map of India’s wind resource showing concentration across 
states 
Note: AGL: altitude above ground level. 
Source: Centre for Wind Energy Technology (2010). 
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Figure 2.2  Map of India’s solar resource showing concentration across 
states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Renewable Energy Laboratory (2013). 
2.3 Institutions  
India is a federated union of 28 states and seven union territories, with an executive, 
judiciary and legislature at each level. Legislative powers are split between the central and 
state government on a variety of subjects. Pertinent to the infrastructure sector, the 
governance of physical assets such as land and water bodies fall under the state 
government’s jurisdiction, whereas the central government is in charge of national reserves, 
forests and sustaining ecosystems. There are, however, some subjects on which laws can 
be passed by both the state and federal (union/central) level executives specified in the 
Constitution under the ‘concurrent list’, of which electricity is a part. While taxation, sale and 
governance of power at the local level are the responsibilities of state governments, the 
central government is responsible for ensuring interstate integration and power markets. 
This activity is complemented by agencies such as the Planning Commission, which 
formulates policy recommendations and reviews various sectors from a macroeconomic 
standpoint, and may provide guidelines to various actors (including at the state level). In all 
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such sectors, the Ministry of Finance is a strong ‘veto’ player and its decision-making is 
constrained within the deliberations of the Cabinet, though individual ministries can and do 
appeal directly to the Ministry of Finance to allocate funds for their activities. 
 
In addition, policymaking in India is highly fragmented, with the power sector and renewable 
energy sub-sectors also characterised by a number of governing bodies at various levels, 
and the level of coordination between various agencies varying greatly with the time and 
context. Although there is a strong bias toward the federal government in terms of taxes, 
provisions and laws, individual states have considerable freedom to implement policies on 
various subjects and may act quite contrary to plans or recommendations at the centre.  
2.3.1 Policymaking institutions in the power sector 
Legislation for the power sector (which is the sector arena for renewable energy) at the 
federal level falls largely under the purview of the Ministry of Power, which is the key nodal 
body responsible for thermal and (large) hydroelectric power generation, transmission and 
distribution, and maintains the national grid infrastructure. Following a central planning 
model it functions through several publicly-owned firms (public sector undertakings) to 
discharge its duties. Historically, all service provision in the power sector has been 
dominated by government bodies – a legacy of India’s socialist, centralised planning 
principles. Prior to 1991, private sector participation in the power sector was at a minimum, 
and any investment was in captive generation (Dubash and Chella Rajan 2001).4 Despite a 
move toward deregulation and private participation in the power sector since the late 1990s, 
the Ministry of Power-owned firms and state government-owned firms continue to enjoy 
market monopolies. In 2010, 82 per cent of the power generated was by state-owned 
(central and state-level) firms (D&B 2011). This monopolisation also extends to distribution 
and transmission. However, renewable energy generation capacity is mostly owned by 
private players (see Sections 2.6 and 2.7). 
 
State-level markets match this structure closely. At the state level, legislative powers rest 
with the state department of energy, which carries out power generation, transmission and 
distribution through state electricity boards, in parallel to the Ministry of Power. Each state 
typically also has a local grid connected to the larger regional grid maintained by state-
owned utilities, although these are of inferior quality to the national grid.  
 
The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) was set up in 1996 (formed from the 
Committee on Alternative Sources of Energy, which had been in existence since the 1980s) 
and works as an independent ministry alongside the Ministry of Power. Its mandated role is 
to develop and deploy new and renewable energy for supplementing the energy 
requirements of the country. It also acts as a nodal agency coordinating with other ministerial 
bodies such as the Ministry of Finance and Department of Commerce to extend subsidies, 
tax breaks and other provisions for renewables. At the state level, the MNRE is helped by 
Energy Development Agencies which are responsible for technical assistance in developing 
renewable energy policies and disbursing federal funds in the form of the aforementioned 
incentives. Their decisions may be closely guided by the ministry.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that the electricity markets in India are highly illiquid. Nearly 89 
per cent of the power generated is sold under long-term procurement contracts of up to 25 
years, i.e. power purchase agreements and power supply agreements. Intraday trading 
accounts for less than 3 per cent of total power while a remaining 6 to 8 per cent of the 
power is traded over a period of three months to three years. These practices have found 
relevance in renewable energy as well. 
                                                     
4 Captive generation means a power plant set up primarily to generate power for one’s own use. 
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Figure 2.3  Overview of government bodies involved in the power sector 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
For renewable energy this means that although the incentive structures may be extended by 
both federal and state-level governments, the state government entities have a significant 
level of interaction at the project level. 
2.3.2 Regulation in the power sector (post-1998) 
Apart from these bodies, a series of reforms in the power sector that began in the late 1990s 
set up a two-tiered regulatory system to oversee the functioning of state electricity boards, 
effect liberalisation of the sector, improve competition, draw investment and ensure greater 
transparency. Many of the recommended changes were still being implemented by the 
various states in the late 2000s.  
 
These bodies include the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and one State 
Electricity Regulatory Commission per state, which is appointed by the respective state 
government on the advice of an independent selection committee. Together, these bodies 
are responsible for:  
 
 tariff regulation (both at the consumers’ end as well as the procurement end) 
 policy management for grid infrastructure (in conjunction with the state electricity 
board) through grid codes, etc. 
 promotion of environmentally-benign policies and alternative forms of energy5 
 dispute resolution between stakeholders 
 overseeing licensing and interstate operations 
 advisory functions 
o national tariff policy and electricity policies 
o recommending measures for the development of the electricity markets. 
                                                     
5 This was thanks to significant manoeuvring by the MNRE to ensure that renewable energy would be given an adequate 
platform under the new regime. An examination of this event is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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The role of the regulatory commissions has become nodal for the power sector and the 
renewable energy sector in particular. 
Figure 2.4  Overview of electricity regulatory commissions 
Source: Authors’ own. 
2.3.3 A brief overview of the actor dynamics in the power sector 
Historically, the political economy of the power sector at the state level has been 
complicated. Until 1993, most state electricity boards were running year-on-year losses and 
even subsidies by the state government and soft loans from the federal government were 
not enough to cover them. There were multiple reasons for these losses: the state electricity 
boards were subsidising some sectors (notably agriculture) which accounted for a large part 
of the supply, but a minor share of the loss was due to cut-rate tariffs and poor metering 
practices. Industrial consumers, meanwhile, were charged extremely high rates and were 
subject to a cross-subsidy surcharge to make up for the losses, affecting operational costs 
(Tongia 2003). With mounting losses, the creditworthiness of these utilities dropped and their 
capacity to invest in additional infrastructure and generating capacity eroded. 
 
In addition, through various formal and informal channels, the decision-making capability of 
the state electricity boards was severely compromised by the state governments, affecting 
tariff determination, revenue realisation, internal management and other functions. The 
federal government did, however, with the aid of several agencies such as the World Bank 
and private sector consultants, commission a series of studies to assess the state of various 
state electricity boards and chart a pathway to improve their functioning. Some adopted 
‘unbundling’ reforms early (such as Orissa (now called Odisha), Uttar Pradesh and Delhi), 
while many resisted (Tamil Nadu only began the process in the late 2000s and Maharashtra 
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did so in 2005).6 Meanwhile, as industrial consumers increasingly resorted to captive 
generation and merchant contracts, a dual-track service economy was set up – one 
completely state-owned, and the other, through licensing and regulation, a market for 
capacity and power populated by private players.7 Renewables featured in both segments. 
 
However, even after unbundling, the structure of most state electricity boards is such that 
there is one holding company, with several subsidiaries along the value chain. Many utilities 
are still running deficits and/or continue to run unsustainable financial practices, and are still 
entirely state-owned companies rather than privatised independents. As such, policy 
frameworks within the power sector – including for renewables – have changed greatly over 
the period we are looking at, between 2003 and 2013, so it is important to keep a picture of 
these conditions in mind when exploring the policy formulation and implementation. 
2.4 Policy frameworks  
Figure 2.5  A timeline of key policies pertinent to the renewable energy 
sector 
Source: Authors’ own.  
 
2.4.1 Major policy initiatives 
 
a. Electricity Act (2003–present)  
 
This was intended to consolidate relevant laws and create the regulatory structure governing 
generation, transmission, distribution, trading and use of electricity, and generally for taking 
measures conducive to promoting competition and development in the electricity sector. It 
mandates the creation of a Central Electricity Authority and State- and Central Electricity 
Regulatory Commissions to oversee electricity supply, with clear goals of promoting 
renewable energy. It also allows third-party investors to use state infrastructure and makes it 
the responsibility of state bodies to oversee the provision of this infrastructure. 
 
The regulatory commissions are responsible for ensuring suitable measures of connectivity 
for developers and plant operators and sale of renewables to customers, mandating a 
minimum purchase of renewable energy (renewable energy obligations or renewable 
purchase obligations) each year. This minimum purchase fraction varies from state to state. 
                                                     
6 Unbundling is the process whereby state electricity boards set up separate generation, transmission and distribution 
companies. In some cases these were then privatised. 
7 Interview with Bureau of Energy Efficiency, 4 November 2013. 
17 
 
b. National Electricity Policy (2005) 
 
This is a consequence of the Electricity Act, and outlines compliance with Section 3 of the 
Act. The policy outlines the steps to be taken by all stakeholders in improving energy 
security and access. It outlines the need for specific purchase agreements and tariff 
mechanisms to promote renewable energy as well as particular measures to reduce the 
capital cost of technologies. The regulatory commissions are charged with the responsibility 
of ensuring suitable connectivity to the grid and the sale of electricity. Additionally, the 
commissions are free to specify a percentage of total electricity consumption in the area of a 
distribution licensee to be drawn from renewable energy sources, and each state can set its 
own renewable purchase obligations with guidelines from the regulatory commission. The 
National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) stipulates a minimum renewable 
purchase obligation of five per cent for each state and recommends an increase each 
successive year. 
 
c. National Tariff Policy (2006)  
 
This also follows the Electricity Act, outlining compliance with Section 3. For renewable 
energy it specifies that appropriate state commissions would have to fix a minimum 
percentage of purchase of energy, depending on the impact on retail tariffs, and it introduces 
the need for preferential tariffs or feed-in tariffs (FITs).8 
 
d. Integrated Energy Policy (2006) 
 
An expert committee report from the Planning Commission, this policy addresses all aspects 
of the energy sector and proposes solutions to issues of energy security, access, pricing, 
efficiency and environmental aspects. It proposes the phasing out of those capital subsidies 
linked to creation of renewable grid capacity by the end of the 10th Five-Year Plan (although 
this did not happen by 2007). As outlined in the Electricity Act (2003), it also requires the 
various State Electricity Regulatory Commissions to determine and specify FITs with the 
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission acting as a coordinating and guiding agency. 
Finally, it also requires power regulators to create incentive structures for integrating 
renewable energy and co-generated power into their systems and link these incentives to 
performance (i.e. the amount of power generated). 
 
e. National Solar Mission (2010) 
 
This aims to reduce the cost of generating solar power through long-term policy and 
regulatory measures that create an enabling ecosystem. The goal is to rapidly diffuse both 
solar photovoltaic and solar thermal generation for off-grid and grid-connected applications, 
create research and development (R&D) capacity and promote domestic production of 
critical materials and products. The mission has clear objectives and a roadmap for 
implementation. The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy is the lead ministry, setting 
strategies, timelines and evaluation criteria. The obligations in this mission are tied closely to 
India’s obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The 
salient features of the policy provisions include: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8 A feed-in tariff is a mechanism designed to offer cost-based compensation for each unit of power generated from renewable 
energy technologies, which includes some pre-determined profit margin. It is usually fixed and associated with a long-term 
project contract, and is typically decreased for newer projects to reflect technology improvements. 
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i. a three-phase roadmap with targets for adding to capacity in various 
segments (utility-scale, decentralised, heating applications, etc.) 
ii. a reverse auction-determined rent mechanism to allocate projects9 
iii. a payment guarantee routed through the Reserve Bank of India 
iv. from phase 2 onwards, a viability gap funding instrument using central 
government funds10 
v. risk mitigation instruments for off-takers11 
vi. the creation of infrastructure in the form of solar parks.  
 
f. Foreign direct investment (as of the Foreign Exchange Management Regulations 
2000) 
 
The government allows up to 100 per cent foreign direct investment in the renewable energy 
sector through the automatic route, i.e. without the need for prior approval from the 
Government of India and/or the Reserve Bank of India. 
2.4.2 Key incentives for renewable energy 
 
a. Accelerated depreciation12  
 
i. 1990–2002: 100 per cent 
ii. 2002–11: 80 per cent 
iii. 2011–12: 35 per cent (15 per cent normal and 20 per cent additional 
depreciation). 
 
This mechanism, under the Income Tax Act (now replaced by the Direct Taxes Code), 
played a large role in the early development of the wind energy sector (see Rajsekhar, Van 
Hulle and Jansen 1999; IRENA 2012). Accelerated depreciation allows an investor to divert 
taxable income into a wind power project which then acts as a tax shield. With accelerated 
depreciation, investors can show the allowed depreciation value as deductible from income 
in the first year of the investment, thus avoiding the tax that would be levied on that amount 
(in India this is approximately 30–40 per cent for corporates). In addition, the government 
provides an income tax holiday for the first ten years (see below), thus allowing this 
investment to recoup its equity, typically in the first five to seven years. The project internal 
rate of return is approximately ten per cent.13 
 
In the case of solar, the policy varies from state to state. Gujarat allows 80 per cent 
accelerated depreciation on solar projects with power purchase agreements (see Section 
2.3.1) that specifically mention this clause. Grid-connected plants that have signed power 
purchase agreements with NVVN (National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) Vidyut 
                                                     
9 A reverse auction is a process by which one entity (in the case of rent allocation, the government) announces that it wants to 
purchase a certain amount of product or service (in this case, power), and solicits competitive bids from individuals (in this 
case, firms) so as to acquire the product or service at the lowest cost or rent. 
10 Under viability gap funding, the government can provide capital grants for a share of project costs, where the project would 
otherwise not be viable due to the constraints on user fees that can be charged.  
11 Off-taker: the party that directly purchases the power generated from the power producer. 
12 Accelerated depreciation is a method of depreciating the cost of a fixed asset such that the depreciation value is greater in 
the earlier years than the later years. This effectively reduces the taxable income for the investor in the first few years and thus 
reduces overall taxes in exchange for higher value of taxable income later. This essentially means that, due to the time value of 
money, the depreciated asset frees up cash flow and provides a return. 
13 The internal rate of return (IRR) of a project is the calculated interest rate at which the net present value of all costs (negative 
cash flows) of the investment equals the net present value of the benefits. In theory, the higher the IRR of an investment, the 
more attractive it becomes (if one does not account for risks and other opportunities). Net present value, in turn, is a measure 
of the excess or shortfall of all cash flows from an investment, taking into account the time value of money. Along with IRR, it is 
a widely used metric to compare investment opportunities. 
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Vyapar Nigam Ltd, the only power trading body in the country)14 can avail themselves of this 
benefit, given a corresponding drop in their preferential FIT. This measure has not been as 
popular as sale of power to the grid, in the case of solar power (see the sector overviews in 
Sections 2.6 and 2.7). 
 
With the introduction of the Direct Taxes Code, the 35 per cent accelerated depreciation 
means that the tax savings for core business are much lower, barely clearing the minimum 
tax a corporate entity has to pay by law.  
 
b. Tax holidays (initiated in the 7th National Five-Year Plan, 1985–90) 
 
The government allows income from the sale of renewable power to be tax-free for ten years 
under Section 80(1)(A) of the Income Tax Act.  
 
c. Preferential tariffs (introduced by the Electricity Act 2003) 
 
State Electricity Regulatory Commissions must fix a preferential tariff for renewable energy 
to incentivise investors. The seminal tariff order in the country was passed by the 
Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission whose practices were adopted by other 
regulatory commissions later (see Section 3.2). Essentially, states have a multi-year 
levelised tariff offering a fixed return for investors based on assumptions of variable costs, 
plant performance and returns from comparable investments in other sectors. 
 
d. Renewable purchase obligations (introduced in the 7th National Five-Year Plan and 
enacted by the Electricity Act 2003) 
 
The first renewable purchase obligation was introduced in 2006, obliging distribution utilities 
and captive generation/open access (see below) consumers to procure a portion of their 
power from renewable sources. This portion is fixed by the State Electricity Regulatory 
Commission, depending on availability and demand for energy, and may be revised every 
year (some states continue to revise it regularly). The regulatory commission has the 
responsibility to oversee and facilitate this purchase. Renewable purchase obligations have 
been implemented by 24 states; however, long-term renewable purchase obligations have 
not been announced by many. This lack of long-term commitment has also led to some 
confusion for investors. 
 
e. Generation-based incentives (GBIs) (2009) 
 
These are disbursed half-yearly through the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency 
(IREDA). The central government provides an incentive of 0.5 rupees/kWh for projects that 
offer the benefits of accelerated depreciation. This incentive is over and above the tariff fixed 
with the respective State Electricity Regulatory Commission. 
 
f. Renewable energy certificates (RECs) (2010)15   
 
Introduced by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy to help those states with poor 
renewable energy generation capacities meet their renewable purchase obligation targets. 
Additionally, renewable energy certificates are intended to support the independent power 
                                                     
14 NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Limited (NVVN) was formed by the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) Limited, as a 
wholly-owned subsidiary with a vision to be a catalyst in the development of the wholesale power market in India, enabling the 
trading of surplus power – see www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/NVVN.pdf (accessed 8 September 2014). 
15 A renewable energy certificate is an instrument that decouples the electricity from renewable sources and its other benefits 
such as zero-climate forcing and zero-pollution. It is a certificate that provides proof that a certain amount of renewable power 
has been produced. This certificate can then be sold or traded separately from the electricity itself. The buyers are typically 
entities that buy commodity power from the grid, but then also buy renewable energy certificates to simulate ‘sourcing’ part of 
their power from renewable energy sources. This is typically done under regulatory obligations. 
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producer (IPP) business model, facilitate interstate transactions and reduce the transaction 
costs and risks associated with generation. Since the announcement of the NSM many 
states have a separate solar renewable energy certificate market. 
 
g. Wheeling, banking and third-party sale (introduced in the 7th National Five-Year Plan 
1985–90)16 
 
These measures were particularly useful for the development of the wind industry because 
they facilitated captive consumption and were all measures that came about from the 
deregulation of the power sector. 
 
Wheeling refers to the transfer of power from a generation site to a consumption site by 
using state-owned transmission infrastructure for a captive generation project. In effect, this 
means drawing power from one location and supplying an equivalent amount at another, 
with the utility charging a service fee in cash or in kind. 
 
Banking refers to the storage of power with the state-owned utility. This, in effect, allows 
power to be transferred to the utility from a generation site and an equivalent amount drawn 
later within the allowed banking period. The utility charges a service fee in cash or in kind. 
 
Open access/third-party sale: this allows a power provider and power user to enter into a 
contract and use the state infrastructure to transfer power or buy power from open 
markets/third-party supply contracts.  
2.5 Wind and solar power in India 
Renewable energy in India traces its history to the 1980s, when the global oil crisis led to the 
creation of a Committee on Alternative Sources of Energy for developing and deploying new 
technologies to harness non-conventional sources (becoming the MNRE in 1996). It began 
its work by exploiting wind power. In 1989, with the involvement of the Tamil Nadu and 
Gujarat Electricity Boards (the two states with the best wind resources) and the Danish 
International Development Agency, it launched its first wind turbine demonstration project in 
Gujarat. Following this, the World Bank seed-funded the newly created IREDA to finance 
renewable energy projects.  
 
Early projects in renewable energy were targeted at industrial investors, who required the 
power from wind turbines as a hedge against erratic and costly power from the state 
electricity boards (see Rajsekhar et al. 1999 for more details). Since then, the wind industry 
has gone through periods of change (see Figure 2.6 for a short overview).  
 
In the first phase (1990s–2000) the industry underwent a period of learning how to adapt 
foreign technology to Indian conditions, and there was some consolidation both in the 
manufacturing industry as well as the particular policy instruments required to spur a 
domestic industry (Mizuno 2011). In the next phase (2000–07), which is examined through 
the case studies in this paper, policies for wind power began to change, embedded in the 
context of the wider power sector, when the institutional and policy regime of the Electricity 
Act was taking shape. In the phase following that (2007–09) investments took place under a 
stable regime promoting renewables (see Figure 2.7). These two phases (2000–07 and 
2007–09) also mark the growth of prominent wind turbine manufacturers and large-scale 
wind farms (over 25MW) in India. The last phase (2009–present) marks a shift to more 
mature business models and policy instruments with a focus on encouraging power 
generation and tying together production from resource-rich states to those states without 
significant potential (see Section 2.4).  
                                                     
16 These measures allowed the captive generation and merchant power supplier models to emerge. Prior to these measures, all 
electricity was mandatorily bought from the state utility. 
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Throughout this transition the MNRE has remained a coordinating agency and a body of 
technical personnel with a marginal role in the power sector. However, in the case of solar 
power, it has taken a more direct role. 
 
The scope of solar power in India prior to 2005–08 was minimal, relegated to off-grid 
applications totalling a few hundred MW. Domestic manufacturing capacity, too, was less 
than 200MW. However, thanks to the launch of the NSM (2010) with the National Action 
Plan on Climate Change in 2008 and the launch of Gujarat’s and other states’ solar policies, 
total installed capacity in solar power reached 2.18GW by the end of 2013. Approximately 
two-thirds of this installed capacity is in Gujarat. The MNRE has had a crucial role to play in 
the NSM, as implementing body and coordinating agent, which is explored later in Section 
4.1. The next two sections provide an overview of investments in the two sectors under 
examination. 
2.6 Wind power sector overview 
The wind power market in India is highly concentrated across a few states with significant 
wind resources, namely: Karnataka, Tamil Nadu (which has the best quality resource), 
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (which has had hardly any 
installations). These states are followed by Madhya Pradesh and Kerala, which again, have 
had few installations in the past.  
Figure 2.6  Installed wind power capacity by state, 2002–12 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from Global Wind Energy Council (2012b). 
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Figure 2.7 shows the annual investment pattern in wind power in India: 
Figure 2.7 Annual investment in wind power in India, 1993–2013 
 
Notes: Asset finance: money borrowed by firms by using balance sheet assets such as accounts receivable, short-term 
investments or inventory; VC/PE: venture capital/private equity; public market: stock exchanges where firms raise money by 
selling equity shares to any willing investor; corporate debt: i.e. bonds sold to investors, with the debt repaid over time; mergers 
and acquisitions grossed: mergers (when two companies merge their operations and assets) and acquisitions (when one firm 
buys out all or almost all of the stakes of another); asset finance acquisition: when one firm buys out the assets of another. 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from BNEF (Bloomberg New Energy Finance) (2014). 
 
Note the growth in asset finance year-on-year. Public markets accounted for a large tranche 
of the investments in wind energy firms in 2008 as both developers/engineering, 
procurement and construction (EPC) players and turbine manufacturers who doubled as 
EPCs raised money to sustain their business (see manufacturers’ business models below in 
Figures 2.9b and 2.9c).17 In 2010, many firms entered the Indian market looking for a long-
term opportunity as IPPs and, along with Suzlon Energy Ltd, were responsible for the peak 
in corporate debt issues and external commercial borrowings. 
2.6.1 Buy side: projects 
The wind power market has undergone stages of change on the buyer and supplier sides, 
which was discussed briefly in Section 2.5. The figures below show the evolution of the 
market in terms of project size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17 EPC is a common form of contracting arrangement within the construction industry. 
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Figure 2.8a  Number of wind power projects by facility size, 2003–06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8b Number of wind power projects by facility size, 2007–09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8c  Number of wind power projects by facility size, 2010–13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
Source for Figures 2.8a–c: Authors’ own, based on data from BNEF (2014). 
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 An examination of the Bloomberg New Energy Finance data shows that most 
investors have consistently preferred small-scale investments (<5MW). These 
constitute a large ‘retail’ market 
 Projects in the 5–20MW range are typically by private sector firms with other core 
businesses, investing in wind 
 Projects between the sizes of 20 and 40MW show a wide variety of investors. These 
include larger power companies, diversified firms, IPPs, as well as publicly-owned 
utilities 
 Projects in the 40–60MW segment are mainly owned by large diversified 
conglomerates, IPPs or publicly-owned firms only 
 Large-scale facilities (>100MW) are becoming increasingly popular. An examination 
of the data showed that investments in large-scale wind farms were by IPP firms. 
This trend began in the period 2006/07 when the first facilities under the IPP mode of 
business emerged. 
 
Over this period the revenue models of the projects themselves had undergone considerable 
evolution as the policy framework itself had changed. The figures below provide an overview 
of the evolution over time. 
2.6.2 Revenue models and projects 
The data for this section comes from both documentary analysis and interviews with key 
industry experts.18 
Figure 2.9a  Wind power revenue models prior to 2003 
                                                     
18 Interviews with Bloomberg New Energy Finance, India (17 October 2013), and Idam Infrastructure (1 November 2013), and 
other documentary analysis. 
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Figure 2.9b Wind power revenue models 2003–09 under the Electricity Act 
regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Figure 2.9c Wind power revenue models 2009–present under the Electricity 
Act and more recent performance-based instruments 
Source for Figures 2.9a-c: Authors’ own, based on interviews cited in footnote 21. 
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The models show a gradual move away from captive generation projects or tariff-driven 
projects with considerable tax benefits to instruments that rely on creating a guaranteed 
market and managing the demand side. As such, instruments such as the generation-based 
incentive and renewable energy certificates have been more attractive for foreign investors 
and firms with significant foreign equity stakes and have facilitated the deployment of larger 
amounts of capital, as accelerated depreciation is much more valuable for firms with an 
existing core business locally (interviews with SunBorne Energy, 8 November 2013, and a 
prominent wind IPP firm, 30 September 2013). 
2.6.3 Supply side: manufacturing sector 
The turbine manufacturing industry itself has undergone considerable evolution. It began 
with a business model of turbine erection and commissioning in the 1990s but moved to an 
end-to-end services model in the early 2000s, which ranged from project development to 
commissioning, operation and maintenance (interview with Ajit Gupta, former advisor, 
MNRE). This model, followed closely by Suzlon Energy Ltd in particular, also allowed 
manufacturers to play a larger role in the value chain and cater to the fragmented buy side of 
the market (Vietor and Semineiro 2008; Tendulkar 2012). By the late 2000s, there was 
considerable maturity in the way that wind parks or estates were being developed early on 
key sites, and then individual wind turbine generators sold to investors packaged as turnkey 
projects. 
 
However, some newer firms following the IPP model are discarding the older pattern of 
turnkey solutions by taking on project development and EPC activities themselves. This 
allows greater customisability and presence across a larger part of the value chain, and thus, 
increased profits (Pearson 2013). 
Figure 2.10  Wind power market evolution 
Source: Authors’ own, based on interviews cited in footnote 21. 
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Over the years the supply side has also evolved in its composition and, under the latest 
policy regime, firms guaranteeing better turbine performance and generation have rapidly 
gained market share. 
Figure 2.11a Wind power market share, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11b Wind power market share, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11c Wind power market share, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source for Figures 2.11a–c: 
Adapted from Narain (2013). 
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In our five wind-rich states, wind power remains highly regulated. The segment supplying to 
state-owned entities relies highly on policy changes. Inversely, the segment selling power in 
the open market or via merchant contracts depends on policy for the wider power sector and 
the governance of infrastructure, etc. 
2.7 Solar power sector overview 
Figure 2.12  Investment in solar energy, 2005–12 
 
Notes: Asset finance: money borrowed by firms by using balance sheet assets such as accounts receivable, short-term 
investments or inventory; VC/PE: venture capital/private equity; public market: stock exchanges where firms raise money by 
selling equity shares to any willing investor; corporate debt: i.e. bonds sold to investors, with the debt repaid over time; merger 
and acquisition grossed: mergers (when two companies merge their operations and assets) and acquisitions (when one firm 
buys out all or almost all of the stakes of another); asset finance acquisition: when one firm buys out the assets of another. 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from BNEF (2014). 
Figure 2.13  Installed solar PV capacity by state, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Bridge to India (2014). 
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Grid-connected solar power in India is still a nascent sector that has only taken off since 
2008–09 with the announcement of the NSM and the Gujarat Solar Policy. The policy 
frameworks section provides an overview of the provisions of the NSM and Gujarat’s 
domestic policy provisions (see Section 2.4). 
2.7.1 Projects 
Facilities in the solar power market in India are typically smaller than large-scale solar parks 
in China and Europe. There are many reasons for this: due to the perceived inherent 
riskiness of the technology and bankability of the projects, many investors prefer smaller 
projects; and secondly, large swathes of contiguous land plots are difficult to acquire quickly 
in India, where land acquisition is a risky and difficult proposition (see Section 4). 
Figure 2.14  Breakdown of solar power investments by project size, 2003–13 
(cumulative) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from BNEF (2014). 
 
Solar power in India is characterised by a mix of firms but does not share the ‘suppliers’ 
market’ characteristics of wind power, which was driven to a large extent by manufacturing 
firms. Developers in solar power are the primary link in the value chain and equity has flown 
from a variety of sectors. 
 
Debt, however, comes from a few select sources. Many commercial and public sector banks 
have not participated in solar sector projects (unlike wind, which is now considered ‘mature’), 
which rely instead on donor agencies/bilateral and multilateral institutions/development 
institutions and a few risk-bearing non-banking financial companies.  
2.7.2 Supply side: manufacturing sector 
The manufacturing sector in solar power in India consists of both photovoltaic technologies 
(crystalline silicon (c-Si) and thin films) and solar thermal technologies. The latter are still in 
the early stage of development and there are currently no dedicated manufacturing 
companies for solar thermal systems in the country.  
 
In PV technologies, India is mainly present downstream in the value chain: of the four major 
links in upstream technology – polysilicon, ingots and wafers, cells, and module assembly – 
India only has a presence in the last two stages. As of 2013, around 1,000MW of cell 
manufacturing capability existed in India and around 2,000MW of domestic module 
manufacturing capability existed as compared to only 15MW of ingots and wafers 
manufacturing. In the next set of stages, inverters and the balance of systems, India has 
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approximately 2,000MW of installed capacity.19 The vast majority of installed capacity is 
focused on thin films. A few Indian firms account for nearly 80–90 per cent of the installed 
capacity, and this includes Moser Baer, Titan Solar, Indosolar, Tata BP Solar (now Tata 
Power Solar) and the state-owned Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. 
 
                                                     
19 Balance of systems refers to the physical structures, wiring and electrical control components of a solar system other than 
the photovoltaic module. 
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3 Case studies – wind power sector 
 
The selection of case studies for both the wind and solar sectors was made by following two 
steps: 
 
Firstly, two models – with the Ernst & Young country attractiveness index for wind and solar 
as the independent variable and the investments in each quarter as the dependent variable 
– were used to identify the effects of policy on investment. This, however, is national data 
and is not disaggregated for state level. 
 
The relationship between the variables in the two models was studied using standard 
regression techniques (OLS (ordinary least squares) Univariate and Granger causality) and 
we found that the independent variable closely predicted variations in the dependent 
variable. In addition, since these were national-level events, it was a poor reflection of state-
level variations in policy and investment. 
 
The data were disaggregated to state level as far as possible: 
 
 For wind power, this meant looking at the five leading states which house over 95 per 
cent of India’s wind generation capacity and examining, qualitatively, the variation in 
investments vis-à-vis policy changes in:  
o Tariffs 
o Wheeling/banking changes 
o RPO requirements 
 Investments in manufacturing are not specifically addressed, but experts and the 
desk literature point to the important role of individual firms from the manufacturing 
sector. The case study in Section 3.4 on Suzlon Energy Ltd has been chosen to 
reflect this 
 For solar power, which is quite nascent in India, the major policy initiative that has so 
far utilised new instruments and methods is the NSM. This forms the basis of one 
major case study in Section 4.1 
 India’s solar power manufacturing sector is small compared to its counterparts in 
China or the US. However, its development pre-dates significant project-level activity. 
This is investigated through a case study on the manufacturing sector in Section 4.2. 
 
The interviews for this study were conducted over a 12-month period in 2013. For key events 
and series of events, both third-party observers and the decision-makers involved were 
interviewed (the latter, as many as possible). The list of completed interviews can be found 
in the Annex. 
 
To explore the drivers of investment in wind and solar energy in India, we then examined the 
material thrown up by each of our studies with the following framework: 
 
 To what extent can formal targets and financial incentives explain changes in the 
level and pattern of wind and solar investment in India? 
 For periods of major change that cannot be fully explained in each sector, which 
public and civic actors were most important in driving the growth/slowdown in 
investment? 
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We then proceed to analyse these sets of actors: 
 
 To what extent can this group of actors be described as a coalition or alliance? 
 What are the key characteristics of these coalitions? (e.g. active/passive cooperation, 
shared/differing interests, formal/informal, local/national/international focus) 
 For identified investors, what were the key determinants of their investment 
decisions? (And what role did other actors play?) 
 Which factors were most important in the coalescing of the identified coalitions? (e.g. 
shared interests, personal linkages, pre-existing institutional relationships; deliberate 
state actions to encourage coalition formation, such as ‘policy-bundling’) 
 Which factors were most important in the success (or failure) of the identified 
coalitions? (e.g. fit with other aspects of development policy; observable co-benefits, 
such as employment; favourable external environments.) 
3.1 Wind power case study 1: Tamil Nadu – acceleration 
between 2003 and 2005; deceleration between 2005 and 2007 
With the best quality wind sites in the country, Tamil Nadu has historically been the most 
favoured investment destination in wind on a year-on-year basis. For our purpose of looking 
for investment events that do not seem entirely explained by policy and/or can potentially 
yield the greatest lessons about the political economy determinants of investment, the 
growth of wind power capacity in Tamil Nadu between 2003 and 2007 contains plenty of 
interesting material, as the desk research indicates:  
 
 Increase in capacity surpassing official targets. During the 10th National Five-
Year Plan period (2002–07), the MNRE’s official national target for additional wind 
capacity was 2,200MW. However, the capacity installed during this period reached 
5,426MW, and Tamil Nadu was the largest contributor with 3,100MW. This was also 
surprising given that, at the time, its calculated wind energy potential was 1,750MW 
 Incentives for investment – or the lack thereof. The state was self-sufficient in 
terms of its electricity needs at the time, thanks to its existing thermal power 
generation (thus ruling out the usual argument in favour of renewables – the 
requirement to establish energy security). FITs were quite low (the lowest among the 
major wind states), although other measures such as wheeling, banking of power 
and open access were available (see Section 2.4.2). A key question is whether these 
three measures were enough to attract investors. If they were, who were these 
investors and what was their motivation? What role, if any, did the state government 
play apart from policymaking? 
 Investment pattern not entirely explained. Investment grew steadily between 2003 
and 2005, followed by a period of decline between 2005 and 2007, with no major 
changes in the tariffs, wheeling, banking and open access policies over the entire 
period 
 Large variety of actors. The state has a large spread of actors across the public 
and private sectors. Bearing in mind the need to examine the actions of as many 
classes of actors for our study as possible, this case may yield lessons about drivers 
of or brakes on investment in renewable energy capacity that arose out of the 
interactions between these actors: 
o The Bloomberg New Energy Finance database (BNEF 2014) shows that 
investments in wind came from industrial investors across multiple sectors – 
textiles, automobiles, manufacturing, cement, petrochemicals, financial 
services and agribusiness – as well as from large conglomerates (also see 
Figure 3.3) 
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o Both the academic and business literature point to close and mutually 
favourable state-business relationships in Tamil Nadu (e.g. Benecke 2011; 
Calì, Mitra and Purohit 2009) 
o A significant number of manufacturing firms are based in Tamil Nadu, which 
have been active in manufacturers’ associations and other fora there since 
the 1990s – their role in lobbying, marketing and shaping attitudes toward 
wind power may have been important.  
 
The information and supporting facts for this case study have been drawn from interviews 
with the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (November 2013), Idam Infrastructure (November 
2013), IREDA (September 2013), Suzlon Energy Ltd. (August 2013), Indian Wind Energy 
Association (July 2013) and a former official at the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (June 2013).  
Table 3.1  Tamil Nadu – chronology of key events 
Date Event 
2002 The Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission fixes a wind tariff of 2.70 
rupees/unit. This is much lower than other states looking to promote wind power 
(such as Maharashtra and Gujarat). The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Tamil Nadu 
Energy Development Agency and the regulatory commission announce intent to 
promote wind power. The development agency carries out resource assessments 
over 15 districts in the state. 
 The Indian Wind Energy Association and the Indian Wind Power Association 
aggressively market wind power to textile firms as a potential avenue for energy self-
sufficiency and long-term cost savings. 
2003 Continuing a historic trend, the state’s electricity board runs a deficit of 20bn rupees. 
This increases over the following years. 
 Rising furnace oil prices and competition from low-cost manufacturers in Bangladesh 
raise concerns in the textile industry over competitiveness. The Ministry of Textiles 
states that wind energy generation projects are eligible ‘in principle’ for an interest 
rate subsidy under the Technology Upgradation Fund Scheme. 
2003–06 Investors from various sectors including textiles, automobiles, financial services and 
wind turbine suppliers continue to invest. Prominent firms and groups include Vishal 
Exports Overseas Ltd, NEG Micon, Tamil Nadu Spinning Mills Association, Lanco 
Infratech, Indowind Energy Ltd and the Shriram Group. 
2004 Revised orders for wheeling, banking and open access. Investment under captive 
generation business model increases. 
2005 Lack of infrastructure connecting the wind-rich sites in southern parts of the state to 
the load centres in northern parts. No investment forthcoming from the Tamil Nadu 
Electricity Board in transmission corridors although No Objection Certificates 
(authorisations for wind farms) continue to be issued.20 
Wind plants are declared ineligible under the Technology Upgradation Fund Scheme. 
2006 Revised tariffs of 2.95 rupees/unit are announced, which are much lower than the 
band for thermal power producers (which in turn, are lower than those of other 
states). 
2006–07 Grid infrastructure issues lead to the setting up of a ‘task force’ between the state 
government and Indian Wind Turbine Manufacturers Association which encourages 
private investment in infrastructure, especially at substation level. 
2007 10th National Five-Year Plan period ends. Record increase in capacity in Tamil Nadu 
over the 10th Plan period, beating official targets set by the Planning Commission. 
                                                     
20 A transmission corridor mainly consists of overhead transmission lines and accompanying electronic controls, and may 
include pooling stations to aggregate generated electricity and at the end, substations through which power is distributed. 
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Figure 3.1  Increase in wind power capacity, 2003–12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: EY CAI: Ernst & Young country attractiveness indices – a guide to the investment attractiveness of various renewable 
energy markets based on aspects of policy support, the business environment and other institutions; TN: Tamil Nadu. The data 
for this figure have been taken from CAI issues 1–32. 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from Ernst & Young (2014). 
Figure 3.2  Wind-rich sites in Tamil Nadu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ranjan (2012). 
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3.1.1 Key actors, roles, priorities and constraints 
The key actors include central government (Ministry of Textiles – a non-active player 
extending incentives, Ministry of Finance, MNRE); state institutions (Tamil Nadu Electricity 
Board, Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission, and state government); other public 
sector institutions (IREDA, Small Industries Development Bank of India, the Industrial 
Development Bank of India, Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation – all financiers, 
except for the energy development agency); private companies (wind turbine manufacturers 
(NEG Micon, Vestas-RRB, Suzlon and Enercon) and other user and manufacturer 
associations (Indian Wind Power Association, Indian Wind Turbine Manufacturers 
Association, Indian Wind Energy Association)); and private investors (textile firms, the Tamil 
Nadu Spinning Mills Association, automotive firms and others).  
 
We will firstly look at the various actors’ roles during the period of growth. 
Tamil Nadu Energy Development Agency – technical assistance  
As stated earlier, wind resource assessments in India are critical. Despite considerable 
potential, there are few locations where the yields are very high and class I and II sites in the 
country are extremely valuable. Tamil Nadu has some of the highest yields and the Tamil 
Nadu Energy Development Agency (as per its mandate) conducted a study in 2002 
identifying a number of potential sites (found mostly in the southern part of the state) and 
made this information available. These sites then went on to house many of the wind farms 
developed during the 10th Plan period. 
Ministry of Textiles – extension of incentives for one class of investor  
In 1999, the Ministry of Textiles launched the Technology Upgradation Fund Scheme for 
small and medium-sized industries operating in the textile sector. Under this scheme, an 
interest rate subsidy of up to five per cent of the loan amount per year was provided for 
expenditure on the expansion, replacement or setting up of new operating machinery. In 
essence, the subsidy allowed Indian textile firms to borrow at rates comparable to debt 
markets in developed countries. Power equipment for mills, looms and factories also fell 
under the purview of this scheme. In 2002, after much discussion with representatives from 
the textile sector and the wind power sector, the Ministry of Textiles commissioned a 
technical study. Following its recommendations the ministry allowed the inclusion of wind 
turbines in the technological upgrade schemes. In an optimistic scenario (with a capacity 
utilisation factor of 30 per cent, which was not uncommon in many of the better sites) the 
generation costs of wind power were ~1.2 rupees/kWh–1.5 rupees/kWh, compared to utility-
supplied power at 4.5 rupees/kWh. The motivation of the Ministry of Textiles was to help a 
struggling textile industry (see Table 3.1).  
Priorities 
The Ministry of Textiles’ priority was to develop a competitive textile industry based on 
modern technology. 
Private investors 
There were primarily three categories of investors in the state: firms looking to hedge against 
electricity supply risk for their operations, those seeking tax credits (many of the former were 
also tax credit seekers), and those looking to diversify their sources of income through power 
sale agreements with the state electricity board (these included both turbine manufacturers 
and small IPPs). Together these entities also formed their own sub-sector associations as 
well as prominent wind farm owners’ associations. These firms covered a variety of sectors: 
automotive manufacturers (such as Ashok Leyland), chemicals and cement, and – 
somewhat uniquely for Tamil Nadu – a large contingent of spinning mills and textile 
manufacturing entities (see Figure 3.3). The Tamil Nadu Spinning Mills Association, for 
example, became one of the largest investors in wind energy during this period. In particular, 
these firms benefited highly from the Technology Upgradation Fund Scheme explained 
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above. All of these investors were ‘retail customers’, i.e. they relied on the wind turbine 
manufacturers for project development, execution and operation. 
 
Thanks to increasing competition from low-cost manufacturing in Bangladesh, Indian textile 
manufacturers found that major brands had begun to move their operations offshore, 
prompting a widespread response from mill owners (Tamil Nadu remains home to most of 
the cotton production and export machinery in India).21 Operationally, reducing costs was not 
simple – labour unions in Tamil Nadu have historically been extremely strong and wages in 
the state have always remained high – leaving power consumption as the most attractive 
means to cut costs in the short term. Given that industrial consumers (which included 
medium and small textile mills) were charged higher rates, wind power from captive systems 
or open access contracts became an excellent option.  
 
The location of these assets is important to the slowdown in later years. Most of the wind-
rich sites were in southern Tamil Nadu (see Figure 3.2), whereas the industrial clusters 
(including textile clusters) were mostly located in the northern part of the state. Between the 
northern and southern parts of the state there remained only a narrow transmission corridor 
to transfer power and this became crucial. 
Figure 3.3  Tamil Nadu wind projects – investors by sector, 2003–07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
Percentages calculated on number of projects, not installed capacity. 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from BNEF (2014).  
Tamil Nadu Electricity Board – facilitator, financial interests in promoting wind 
The state electricity board’s priorities during the time of growth were: financial sustainability, 
rapid clearances for wind projects, and development of wind power. Its main constraints 
were financial, though equally it could not make autonomous decisions; it was held in check 
by, among others, the regulatory commission. Continuing its historical role as a one-stop 
nodal agency for issuing clearances for wind projects, infrastructure provision, offtake 
clearances and grievance redress, the state electricity board remained extremely supportive 
of wind power between 2002 and 2005. 
                                                     
21 See www.tn.gov.in/hhtk/dht/dht-textile.htm (accessed 11 September 2014). 
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The senior management of the electricity board had also maintained close relationships with 
the state government, together facilitating much of the investment in wind projects in the 
previous decade (1992–2002). This past role had also led to a number of mutual trusting 
relationships between the project developers (who were manufacturing firms), and between 
2002 and 2006 a number of ratings agencies afforded Tamil Nadu the highest ranks and 
marks in terms of ‘attitude’ and ‘procedural issues’. Another point mentioned in the 
interviews is the pre-existing relationship between mid-level managers in the electricity board 
and the wind industry. 
 
The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board had two goals: firstly, under the instructions of the state 
government, to promote wind power for industrial consumers; secondly, to keep tariffs low 
and manageable for residential consumers, particularly in poorer areas. Operationally, the 
former was possible firstly because, between the late 1990s and 2007, much of the state’s 
increase in wind power capacity was captive generation at sites already connected to the 
main grid. So, for the electricity board, allowing captive generation and charging for wheeling 
and banking facilities allowed them to earn revenues, with minimal outlay. In addition, there 
was enough firm (i.e. guaranteed, uninterrupted) power in the state to carry and manage the 
variable generation by wind power, enabling the banking and wheeling facilities to come into 
play (see the policy frameworks outlined in Section 2.4.1).  
 
Another factor, however, reduced the capacity of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board to provide 
critical elements such as infrastructure and investment in firm power. The board followed a 
government mandate (like all other state electricity boards) to provide cheaper power for 
residential consumers and the large number of political constituents in the agricultural sector, 
and consumer segments in economically backward areas – this meant that the overall costs 
of supply were higher than the recovery (Singh 2006; Tongia 2003; Dubash and Chella 
Rajan 2001). Increasingly dependent on borrowing and government subsidies, the board, 
despite its reputation for efficient collection and operation, followed a financial model that 
was unsustainable in the long run. In essence, the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board would 
borrow either from public banks or receive loans from federal government, in turn sanctioned 
by multilateral development agencies under a sovereign guarantee. Unable to repay these 
loans, this created a problem in later years when government ‘dole-outs’ ran out and the 
state government resisted changes in the governance of the state electricity board (namely, 
unbundling – see below).  
State government – supporter of wind power through project authorisations 
Politically, in Tamil Nadu, two parties have alternated control since 1969. In 2002, the party 
that had overseen some of the record increase in capacity between 1995 and 1998 returned 
to government. It remained supportive of wind power and continued to encourage an 
increase in capacity under the captive scheme, authorising a large number of projects and 
setting official targets for expansion. These targets were modest, however, apparently based 
on outdated information and lacking rigour, with only minimal participation from both the 
Centre for Wind Energy Technology and the Tamil Nadu Energy Development Agency 
(interview with former bureaucrat, Tamil Nadu).  
 
The government also aimed to keep tariffs low under the sale-to-utility business model to 
manage procurement costs. The government meanwhile continued with two important 
provisions that had begun in the 1990s that were conducive to wind power. The first was 
making the state electricity board a nodal agency for project authorisation and land 
acquisition issues. Thanks to a close relationship with the management of the board, not 
only were No Objection Certificates for wind farms issued rapidly, but private land acquisition 
was encouraged, with the electricity board even stepping in as a facilitator. Under their 
schemes, private land was accorded a price by the government depending on the potential 
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yield from the site on a graded scale. Thus, many private landowners stood to gain a large 
profit from selling high yielding sites, as revealed by recent studies.  
 
In the light of Tamil Nadu’s Energy Development Agency’s assessments of resources, with 
an emerging sympathetic policy regime and rapid project clearances, securing first-mover 
advantage became exceedingly important to firms’ strategies. With resources still being 
assessed, firms with access to the best sites could offer better products and assets to 
prospective customers, resulting in a flurry of activity. When a new site was discovered, the 
land was acquired and ‘hoarded’ until customers were found. 
Priorities 
During the period of growth the state government’s priorities were: industrial development, 
energy sufficiency, and low tariffs for residential consumers. 
Wind turbine manufacturers – risk mitigation through supply models, information 
dissemination 
It was in this period that individual manufacturers developed and honed the turnkey project 
business model that was to become a staple of the wind power industry (see Section 3.3). 
Under this model, the entire risk of prospecting, site development, construction, operation 
and maintenance was to be the responsibility of the wind turbine-supplying firm. Suzlon, 
Vestas-RRB, NEG Micon and Enercon were some of the prominent players, with strong 
supply chain bases within the state. With these firms bearing the brunt of short-term risks 
and project management, the risk exposure of investors went down drastically. In particular, 
once projects were cleared under particular schemes, both federal government schemes 
such as tax breaks and state government schemes such as tariff payments were included in 
the respective disbursing agency’s budgets. Thus, in theory, policy fickleness or payment 
risk would not affect the contracts and power purchase agreements. For the captive model, 
as the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board earned money with no additional investment, there was 
no conflict of interest.  
 
One more point is worth mentioning here: a majority of the investments in wind energy 
projects made each year were made in the third financial quarter, prompting some experts to 
question whether these investments were made for tax benefits under accelerated 
depreciation. Those manufacturing firms who were able to deliver projects before the year’s 
close gained a competitive advantage.  
 
With respect to connections, interviewees mentioned that in the wind industry, thanks to a 
history of working closely together in the 1990s to develop and execute wind projects, there 
was a high degree of trust between the officials of the state electricity board and the wind 
industry. While individual firms and officials were not named, on the whole, the interviews 
revealed that issues around land acquisition, project commissioning and other problems 
common to projects in other parts of India were, in Tamil Nadu, rare. Another important role 
played by the manufacturers (mostly through the platform of associations, discussed below) 
was in creating and disseminating information on wind power as an investment; their 
advocacy and lobbying skills proved invaluable.  
Priorities 
The wind turbine manufacturers’ priorities were: profit and growth of the wind industry.  
Wind industry associations – advocacy/lobbying 
The industry associations had a general priority of sectoral development. Apart from shaping 
investor perceptions through educational events, conferences and workshops, the Indian 
Wind Power Association, Indian Wind Turbine Manufacturers Association and the Indian 
Wind Energy Association worked collectively to diffuse an ‘ideology of wind’ to both the 
government as well as the industry. Out of these, the wind power and wind energy 
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associations consisted of both wind turbine manufacturers as well as prominent investors in 
projects (the latter was founded by Suzlon and was mainly active in Maharashtra). The 
Indian Wind Turbine Manufacturers Association, on the other hand, consisted solely of 
manufacturing firms. The wind energy and the wind turbine manufacturers’ associations, in 
particular, were instrumental in creating the business case for wind as a captive generation 
option to save on operational costs; they lobbied actively for wind projects under the 
Technology Upgradation Fund Scheme for textile firms. The buy-in from textile firms 
depended much on this instrument. 
Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission – policy clarity 
The Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission was initially formed in 1999 under the 
Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act of 1998. In 2003, its powers were expanded under 
the Electricity Act to its current form, where it consisted of former officials from the state 
electricity board who were experienced in both the technical and financial aspects of 
managing wind power. As such, when the reforms of the Electricity Act took place (see 
Section 2.4.1), the regulatory commission was responsible for rationalising the tariffs of wind 
power. However, the commission was also cognisant of the fact that the costs of wind power 
were to be kept low. Taking advantage of the state’s higher yields from windy sites, it came 
up with some of the lowest tariffs in the country. The interviews and prior research hinted 
that the regulatory commission was sensitive to the fact that the state electricity board’s 
model might be unsustainable and thus revised tariffs only three times in a ten-year period 
(2001–11), keeping them low. At the same time, by providing guidelines on banking and 
wheeling provisions, complementary to the state’s policy, the regulatory commission 
provided much-needed clarity.  
Priorities and constraints 
The commission’s priorities were: tariff rationalisation, policy clarity, and smooth operation of 
the state electricity board. It was constrained by the lack of legal powers to enforce its 
decisions and the overall power/political scenario within the state. 
Public financiers – low-cost debt  
Providing loans on a project-to-project basis, the Indian Renewable Energy Development 
Agency was a key provider of below-market rate credit in these early periods. The other 
important lenders were the Small Industries Development Bank of India, the Industrial 
Development Bank of India and the Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation, who 
disbursed the interest rate subsidy to the textile factory owners who were eligible for the 
Technology Upgradation Fund Scheme. These bodies were, however, operated under a 
government mandate to lend. Their priorities were: market returns, the development of the 
wind industry, sound projects and financial models and, for the Small Industries- and 
Industrial Development banks, the development of the textile industry. 
 
To what extent did the role of these actors change during the period of deceleration 
experienced by Tamil Nadu’s wind sector? 
Tamil Nadu Electricity Board – no incentive to extend support to infrastructure 
By 2005, the carrying capacity of the narrow corridor used to transfer power reached its limit. 
New wind farms added in the southern part of the state could not ‘wheel’ power to the 
despatch centres in the north. It was proposed that the narrow transmission corridor be 
augmented. However, the capacity factor of turbines in Tamil Nadu was, at maximum, 35 per 
cent, and these transmission corridors were meant to carry power from wind only.22 This 
effectively meant that for 65 per cent of the time, the proposed transmission corridors would 
lie unused, making it an expensive investment with low returns. In light of the constrained 
                                                     
22 The capacity factor of a turbine is the power produced per year as a fraction of total power that would be produced if the 
turbine were to operate at full rated capacity through the year. 
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capacity to spend on infrastructure, and with little support from the state government, no 
support for this transmission corridor was forthcoming.  
 
However, the state electricity board continued to issue certificates for wind farms despite this 
lack of investment in infrastructure as there was no directive from senior management or the 
state government to stop. In this case, while there was no action in favour of wind, there was 
no action opposing it either, but the lack of government support dented growth.  
 
By 2006/07, another set of debates had opened the functioning of the state’s electricity 
board to further scrutiny. In this period, a number of vertically-integrated state utility boards 
had already ‘unbundled’ (see Section 2.3.3) or had begun the process. The Tamil Nadu 
Electricity Board, on the grounds of its previous collection efficiency and functioning, resisted 
these procedures for two years. The state government, in turn, supported the status quo 
(with vested interests in the electricity board’s borrow-and-subsidise paradigm), which 
resulted in a deadlock for two years with the board’s capacity to make decisions severely 
constrained. The increase in thermal power capacity also slowed down. 
State government – policy paralysis 
The sitting state government, who could have issued directives to invest in the transmission 
corridor, did not take a decision one way or the other. In 2006, it was defeated by the main 
opposition who did not view the investment in this infrastructure as crucial and so the 
increase in wind power capacity stalled.  
 
In addition, the newly elected state government resisted the unbundling of the state utilities 
and the subsequent proposed privatisation (some experts pointed to the fact that this would 
take away the government’s influence on the state electricity board’s decision-making). A 
deadlock on this issue between 2006 and 2008 was the focus of debate and deliberation 
between the union and state governments. In 2008, the decision was finally made to 
unbundle the board without privatisation.  
Priorities 
During the period of deceleration, the state government’s priority was low electricity tariffs for 
residential consumers. 
Ministry of Textiles – policy fails to achieve intended objective  
In 2005, after three years of investment in wind projects under the Technology Upgradation 
Fund Scheme, the textiles ministry ruled that wind farms would no longer be eligible for the 
interest rate subsidy. The motivation for this decision lay in the consideration of the union 
Inter Ministerial Committee that firms investing in wind turbines were not making any 
upgrades to existing textile technology, which defeated the purpose of the initiative. This 
removal of financial support slowed down investments by textile firms into wind farms. 
Despite representations by wind energy associations and a few investors from the textile 
sector, the decision was not revoked. The Technology Upgradation Fund Scheme itself 
lapsed in 2007. 
Turbine manufacturers and manufacturing associations – advocacy over infrastructure 
issues 
In response to slowing investment, the Indian Wind Turbine Manufacturers Association and 
individual manufacturing firms petitioned the state government to permit private sector 
players to set up infrastructure. In addition, in 2006, the turbine manufacturers association 
and the state electricity board together formed a ‘task force’, allowing private investment into 
evacuation infrastructure at the substation level. This resulted in new substations being set 
up in southern parts of the state, although transmission infrastructure was still missing.  
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3.1.2 Assessment of relationships between actors 
Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and state government  
This relationship was both formal and informal. The senior management of the electricity 
board and the state government had worked together in the past to develop wind power in 
the state. In addition, the state government was responsible (through the energy 
department) for formal arrangements such as appointments and salaries in the directorial 
positions.  
Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission and Tamil Nadu Electricity Board  
This relationship was formal. A number of previous officials at the electricity board were 
present as members in the regulatory commission. As such they were sensitive to the 
board’s technical and financial constraints. 
State government and Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission  
The state government and commission had maintained informal relationships from the past 
history of working together at the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. 
Manufacturers’/manufacturing associations and state government  
Maintained a formal relationship through public fora, conferences, representations and 
annual meetings. 
Manufacturers and Tamil Nadu Electricity Board  
This relationship was both formal and informal. Thanks to the past history of working 
together in creating technical criteria for wind projects and executing them, a number of 
manufacturers and the mid- and senior management of the electricity board had maintained 
a network of mutually trusting relationships. One interviewee remarked that the bureaucracy 
in Tamil Nadu was always extremely helpful in acting as a nodal agency. 
Lenders, project owners and manufacturers 
Maintained both formal and informal business relationships.  
3.1.3 Key observations 
 
 Wind power in Tamil Nadu benefited highly from its ‘co-benefits’ to industrialised 
clusters, rather than purely as a business in itself 
 The utility/state electricity board was a critical actor within the system and close 
relationships between the utility and state government and a common, positive view 
of wind power proved extremely conducive 
 Historical relationships between the state electricity board, the government and 
experience with wind power projects formed the basis of trusting relationships 
between private actors and state electricity boards. Risks of delays and technical 
integration were reduced 
 The captive generation model with the open access provisions at low penetration did 
not offer any direct incentives for utilities to oppose wind power at the time.  
3.2 Wind power case study 2: Maharashtra – acceleration, 
2005–07 
With the second highest potential in the country (after Tamil Nadu, but with poorer quality 
sites – yielding capacity factors of 19–22 per cent in comparison to Tamil Nadu’s 26–33 per 
cent) Maharashtra also ranks second in terms of installed capacity. However, Maharashtra 
was the initiator of two key policies for clean energy that have had a significant impact on the 
growth and development of wind power in India – namely the renewable purchase 
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specifications and the FITs. Furthermore, Maharashtra was also home to a number of high-
profile wind energy projects across a variety of revenue models – the captive generation, 
sale-to-grid and open access contract. So, the following factors make Maharashtra an 
attractive case study: 
 
 There is a clear investment peak between 2004 and 2006 following policy changes at 
the state level. The details of implementation may yield lessons 
 Maharashtra’s wind energy policy environment has an array of elements: a number 
of incentives extended by the state government, the regulatory commissions and 
some by other agents such as the state energy development agency. As such, if 
policy has played a major role, Maharashtra may provide fertile ground in which to 
explore which policies make the most difference 
 Maharashtra, as Suzlon’s home state, hosts a number of high-profile projects that 
defined some of the early business models in the wind industry. The influence of 
such success stories on other actors’ decisions can usefully be explored 
 Maharashtra’s regulators and its energy development agency have been extremely 
active – in contrast to other states, where the latter especially may play a muted role 
 A number of policy and organisational innovations have come out of Maharashtra. 
The drivers and actors behind these may be better understood through this case 
study 
 Maharashtra poses an interesting question: with a large and diverse investor base in 
wind turbines across many industries, what motivated these investors, as compared 
with those in Tamil Nadu? 
 
The information and supporting facts for this case study have been drawn from interviews 
with a former official at the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission (November 
2013); Idam Infrastructure (November 2013); Suzlon Energy (August 2013); a former official 
at the Maharashtra Energy Development Agency (October 2013); Indian Wind Energy 
Association (December 2013); and Bloomberg New Energy Finance (October 2013). 
Table 3.2  Maharashtra: accelerated development – chronology of events 
Date Event 
2003 Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission raises tariffs from 2.25 rupees/unit to 
3.5 rupees/unit with an annual escalation of five per cent over a contract period of 13 
years – the tariff itself has a control period and is revisited regularly. First legally 
binding tariff order in the country. Also revised the wheeling and banking 
agreements, making them the lowest in India. 
2004 Petition filed by director of the Maharashtra Energy Development Agency asking the 
commission to inculcate a statutory provision for a renewable portfolio standard, on 
the basis of provisions in the Electricity Act. Also introduced the Green Energy Fund. 
2005 Suzlon signs memorandum of understanding with the government of Maharashtra to 
develop wind power in the state. National Electricity Policy comes into effect. 
Maharashtra Electricity Board unbundled. 
2006 Regulatory commission fixes a renewable purchase obligation for Maharashtra; 
record year for capacity addition in the state. 
2007 Investment slows drastically toward the end of the year, and tariff orders dry up. 
Upcoming elections stall clearances for wind projects as the land used for wind farms 
becomes the subject of scrutiny. A prominent non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
raises objections that the performance of wind farms in Maharashtra is lower than 
expected. 
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Figure 3.4  Increase in Maharashtra wind power capacity, 2002–12 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from Centre for Wind Energy Technology (2012). 
3.2.1 Key actors, roles, priorities and constraints 
The key actors include central government (MNRE, Forum of Regulators, Central Electricity 
Regulatory Commission); at state level, the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission, 
Maharashtra Energy Development Agency, Maharashtra state government, Maharashtra 
State Electricity Board; and private companies (manufacturers – particularly Suzlon, 
investors, scheduled commercial banks, the Renewable Energy Developers Association of 
Maharashtra and the Indian Wind Energy Association). There were also notable civil society 
actors: Prayas, the World Institute of Sustainable Energy and the Centre for Science and 
Environment. 
 
The roles they played during the period of growth and expansion of the wind power industry 
in their state were as follows: 
Maharashtra State Electricity Board – facilitator 
In terms of institutions and the power sector scenario, Maharashtra, like most other states, 
had a power deficit in 2003 (this is still the case). The supply-demand gap increased from 
13.4 per cent in 2002/03 to 18.1 per cent in 2005/06 as the state utility resorted to load 
shedding to manage demand.23 Major contributors to the state’s thermal power generation 
capacity include private sector giants Tata and Reliance Power as well as state-owned 
enterprises such as the National Thermal Power Corporation, GAIL and others. Investment 
in generation capacity and infrastructure at the state level, however, remained capped 
because of the poor financial health of the state electricity board, despite a subsidy of over 
5bn rupees each year from the state and central governments between 2003 and 2006. The 
board was finally unbundled in 2005, completing the transfer of assets and liabilities to the 
four daughter firms by 2007. The unbundling had a significant expansionary effect: with fresh 
funds issued from the central government for restructuring, the state electricity board (now 
the holding company for the three daughter firms responsible for power generation, 
transmission and distribution) announced fresh investment in transmission infrastructure, 
and notably, in the wind-rich districts of Dhule, Sangli and Satara (the latter was already 
                                                     
23 Load shedding is a term used to describe planned and unplanned power supply cuts to certain consumer-geographic 
segments when the demand for power exceeds the utility’s (in this case the distribution company’s) supply. 
45 
 
home to what was then Asia’s largest wind farm, the Vankusawade Wind Park owned by 
Suzlon). 
 
The lack of infrastructure to transfer the energy generated from the project site to the 
substation and from the substation to the transmission corridors always remains a key 
consideration for wind projects. As utilities were responsible for this, wind projects had often 
faced a risk of delay and execution problems. The problems most often cited were the 
availability of funds and the capacity to invest in infrastructure (also see Tamil Nadu case in 
Section 3.1). In Maharashtra, the senior management of the state’s electricity board and 
energy development agency had created an arrangement where the developer/promoter 
could pay for 50 per cent of the infrastructure through the development agency and the 
electricity board would bear the remaining cost. This was successful in reducing the burden 
on the utility for providing infrastructure for disaggregated wind projects. 
Priorities and constraints 
The electricity board’s priorities were low tariffs for domestic consumers, agriculture and the 
rural areas. It also sought financial consolidation (with energy sufficiency). It was constrained 
in its decision-making, especially financial, and perceived itself as being under pressure from 
civil society groups to keep residential tariffs low. 
Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission – leading policy reform 
Since 2003, when the Electricity Act came into effect, Maharashtra’s Electricity Regulatory 
Commission had come up with a series of influential tariff orders. Firstly, unlike other state 
regulatory commissions it revised its tariff orders annually, and held consultations frequently. 
This regularity of decision-making allowed for lobbying groups to remain actively engaged in 
the process and highlight a number of issues that set the tone for renewable energy policies 
in the state (and were reflective of debates in others). In 2003, Maharashtra’s regulatory 
commission decided that wind energy tariffs would be determined on a cost-plus 
methodology, allowing equity investors a return of 12–15 per cent. The motivation behind 
this was the energy shortage in the state (described above) and to make wind competitive 
with other investments in the market (which offered this sort of return). There was also a 
vision that, in the future, India would rely on renewables as they constituted a more secure 
source of energy and thus it was important to provide a platform for growth. In addition, to 
give a nudge to retail investors interested in setting up captive or open access plants, the 
wheeling and banking orders were strengthened, with a clear division of responsibilities for 
grid infrastructure. These orders, however, had a ‘control period’, capping the amount of 
capacity that could be added under a direct sales agreement with the utility to 750MW, in 
order to determine the industry response before proceeding. Thus, between 2004 and 2006, 
the policy environment for wind power in Maharashtra was considerably strengthened. 
 
The regulatory commission also conducted a study to show that purchasing wind power at a 
higher cost would not drive up the consumer retail prices charged by the utilities significantly, 
because it constituted such a small percentage of the overall total. The study was a 
response to fears raised by both the utility and residential consumers (led and represented 
mainly by the NGO Prayas) who participated regularly in the regulatory hearings. The results 
of the study were then used to show that a renewable purchase specification could be 
implemented in other states as well, thus paving the way for this incentive’s wider use and 
later, renewable purchase obligations, too (see Section 2.4). 
 
Dr Pramod Deo, a key member of the state regulatory commission, had been responsible for 
setting up the Maharashtra Energy Development Agency in 1986 and played an important 
role in particular policy manoeuvres. Between 1999 and 2004, the development agency’s 
director, who maintained connections with Dr Deo, helped to introduce the idea of a 
renewable portfolio standard. This was intended to boost numbers of co-generation projects 
in sugar mills, which were a major consumer of energy in the industrial segment, but wind 
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power also benefited as a result of the clarity this measure brought to the market. In 2006, 
Maharashtra’s regulatory commission introduced a renewable purchase specification within 
the state, set at three per cent – the first anywhere in India. 
Priorities and constraints 
The commission’s priorities were energy sufficiency and security, and the smooth and 
transparent operation of the state electricity board, plus adequate representation of its 
stakeholders. In common with other state regulatory commissions it felt constrained by its 
lack of legal powers to enforce the judgements it reached. 
Maharashtra Energy Development Agency – policy and organisational innovation 
The state energy development agency’s director, Dr G.M. Pillai, who later founded the World 
Institute of Sustainable Energy, oversaw a period of great activity in Maharashtra’s 
renewable energy industry. On the one hand, there was a movement to establish funds to 
provide the infrastructure necessary to transmit the electricity from the wind farm into the 
main grid that had become a bottleneck in Maharashtra, and to promote co-generation with a 
large sugar and textiles industry that was growing considerably each year. The plan, called 
the Green Energy Fund, was promoted by the energy development agency and the Minister 
for Non-Conventional Energy, and received support from the Maharashtra government. It 
essentially relied on a ‘polluter pays’ principle to create a fund for investing in transmission 
infrastructure from renewable resource-rich sites to existing state electricity board corridors. 
The fund was created by imposing a cess on commercial and industrial units to the tune of 
0.04 rupees/unit, and resulted in an estimated collection of 1bn rupees per year, placed 
under the governance of the state energy development agency and the central government 
through the MNRE. Another 1–2bn rupees each year was collected from private investors, 
including commercial banks and the local infrastructure giant, Infrastructure Leasing & 
Financial Services. Over the next two years most of the funds (approximately two-thirds) 
were diverted to co-generation projects and related infrastructure, but they also contributed 
to the roadways constructed up to the wind sites and, to a smaller extent, to the transmission 
lines.  
Priorities 
The energy development agency’s priorities were promotion of renewable energy and 
corresponding policy measures, but also political prestige. 
Forum of Regulators and Central Electricity Regulatory Commission – policy 
brokering 
The Forum of Regulators is a body consisting of the chairpersons of various state regulatory 
authorities and the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission. Dr Deo, who took over as 
chairman of the state’s electricity regulatory commission in 2005, also helped broker the idea 
of national renewable portfolio standards ensconced within the provisions of the Electricity 
Act. The rationale was that some states, such as Tamil Nadu, already had enough power to 
meet the renewable purchase specification and that demand could be created with greater 
clarity in other states. It was felt that, nationally, the renewable energy market could not grow 
without such a provision across all states. The MNRE included the provision for a renewable 
purchase obligation within the National Electricity Policy and National Tariff Policy, setting up 
the regulatory bodies responsible for ensuring it happened. 
Private manufacturers and Suzlon – process innovation to capture market 
Prior to the passing of the Electricity Act in 2003, Maharashtra had added just 400MW of 
wind power capacity since the introduction of wind power in India in the 1980s and growth 
was stagnating. While 2003–04 did not see much improvement, 2005–06 saw a surge in the 
creation of wind power generation capacity. Of a total addition of 545MW Suzlon was 
responsible for 473MW, much of it in the districts of Sangli, Nandurbar, Ahmednagar and 
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Dhule (the wind-rich belt in western Maharashtra), and announced that the following year 
they would develop a wind farm with a capacity to generate 1,000MW.  
 
Maharashtra was already home to some highly publicised projects; for example, Bajaj Auto, 
a leading automobile manufacturer situated in the Pune industrial cluster, was one of 
Suzlon’s early customers. Suzlon commissioned a 62.5MW captive generation project for 
Bajaj Auto that allowed the company to write off a large portion of the electricity bill and get 
tax benefits, proving the success of a captive generation model similar to Tamil Nadu’s (see 
Section 3.1). 
 
Our interviewees made clear that securing first-mover advantage when the policies were 
about to be announced became critical. Since the tariff order was valid only for a certain 
amount of time and the power purchase agreements were for 13 years, speed became 
imperative. The critical link in the stage was acquiring land in the wind-rich belt in western 
Maharashtra, where gaining right of way and ensuring that wind farms could be prospected 
and developed required a certain amount of time. Negotiating with individual landholders and 
clearing the authorisation processes of the state was a long-drawn-out process. Maharashtra 
allowed these firms to negotiate directly with the third party, or in the case of agricultural 
land, go directly through the government. Suzlon Energy, based in Pune, which had already 
created a network of likely customers, managed to secure a vital first-mover advantage.  
 
The firms who started early benefited. Enercon India set up two wind farms for sale to the 
newly created state utility, which bagged orders from China Light & Power in 2006 who 
became India’s first large-scale wind IPP. Meanwhile, Suzlon received some high-profile 
offers for its wind farms in Dhule and Nandurbar, including BP Energy India, Tata Power 
(which both operated as IPPs), Essel Mining (a subsidiary of another giant conglomerate, 
the Aditya Birla Group), and also the Steel Authority of India and REI Agro who were 
diversifying into wind power. In 2006, Suzlon also opened its gearbox manufacturing unit in 
neighbouring Daman, a small union territory south of Maharashtra, created after it acquired 
Hansen Industrial Transmissions in Europe. The new induction gears produced in this facility 
also helped Suzlon create machines that were marketed as yielding higher capacity factor 
outputs, which were more profitable.  
Priorities and constraints 
The manufacturers’ priorities were straightforward: profit and a stable policy environment in 
which to do business. They were constrained by risks and delays in accessing project-level 
resources, particularly land. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3.1  Suzlon: end-to-end services in wind parks 
Given the fragmented buy side of the wind turbine market, Suzlon had pioneered a business 
model of end-to-end service. With scarce wind sites, grid integration issues and the large 
number of customers interested in small installations, Suzlon (followed by other wind turbine 
suppliers) had initiated a model of wind parks. These estates or parks were, essentially, large 
swathes of land, over hundreds or thousands of hectares, owned entirely by the developer 
who in this case was also the turbine manufacturer. Turbine manufacturers, after initial 
resource evaluation, purchased the land, carried out detailed evaluation and micro-siting 
(which could be done well as the land ownership was not fragmented), and marketed the 
future turbines to investors. Simultaneously, the development of the wind park took place and 
construction activities began. The operation and maintenance of these parks were carried out 
by the developer for a fee, and the investor gained from the revenues and fiscal benefits with 
no additional input required. Beginning in the late 1990s, this model then became very 
prominent in the Indian market between 2003 and 2007, and all of the major turbine 
manufacturing firms – Vestas, NEPC Micon and Enercon – developed their own version. 
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Private investors – shift to newer models 
The investors sought profit, too, but through tax benefits and returns on equity. A variety of 
investors invested in wind during this period: industrial consumers looking for captive/open 
access generation options as well as, uniquely in Maharashtra, firms from finance, chemicals 
and individual investors looking to diversify into wind power. Firstly, and most importantly, 
the state’s renewable energy policies (stated above, and in effect from 2006) had created 
some excitement that Maharashtra would be an attractive destination for investment over the 
longer term. Secondly, there was confidence in the regulator (especially for the management 
of payment risk – between 2002 and 2006 it had issued orders against the non-payment of 
bills) and the local energy development agency. Thirdly, with the unbundling of the state 
utility in 2005, the cracks in the state’s power sector were exposed and resulted in a slew of 
investments from the state government in infrastructure that increased the availability of 
good projects. 
 
With attractive returns from FITs combined with the mitigation of risk offered by the 
manufacturers’ turnkey project models, wind power in India was seen in terms of a new 
business model separate from the traditional attractions of depreciation/operational cost 
savings from captive generation. Agribusinesses, mining firms, independent power 
generating firms, banks, high net worth individuals, automotive firms, textile firms and 
chemical industries all invested for the profits that could be made.  
 
One class of consumer that developed during 2007 was the IPP. With the high tariffs and 
power demand in the state, some prominent investors (such as China Light & Power and BP 
Energy) invested in big-ticket projects (40–50MW or more) purely as a means to sell power 
to the grid. This model was new in the Indian wind industry at the time and set the tone for 
tariff revisions and other instruments in the future (see Section 3.3). 
Financiers – nascent period for long-term lending relationships 
During this period wind power began to be seen as a stable business, with low risks and 
adequate returns. As the risk perception of the newly restructured market settled, lenders 
built up closer relationships with manufacturers. Suzlon, for example, syndicated loans with 
a consortium of lenders regularly, and the State Bank of India (SBI) chairman was a member 
of Suzlon’s board of directors. Enercon, similarly, relied on existing networks with scheduled 
commercial banks and the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (although the 
latter would only lend on a project-to-project basis). Many networks based on business 
relationships were developed during this period and continue to this day.  
 
But what happened when growth began to slow down, during the period of 
deceleration? 
Maharashtra State Electricity Board – unbundled, financially constrained 
By 2007, as the tariff orders began to lapse and the state electricity board was unbundled, 
the newly formed Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company found itself at the 
centre of a number of reimbursements and past payments that were pending. Given that 
dues were pending to external suppliers of thermal power and to private sector giants, wind 
power was given a much lower priority leading to payment delays – a significant risk for new 
investors. 
Civil society – flagged concerns about improper policy implementation 
The high wind tariffs in Maharashtra had become the subject of public scrutiny ever since the 
influential tariff order. Prominent civil society organisation the Centre for Science and 
Environment (CSE) investigated a number of installations in the state, bringing to light 
certain issues that brought wind farms some adverse attention. Finding that there were many 
locations where the capacity utilisation factor of the turbines was as low as 11 per cent and 
that, in certain areas, the wind farms had not even been developed but that the land was 
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being held for tax benefit purposes, the CSE published a series of studies highlighting these 
problems. They became the subject of much media attention and allegations that the 
accelerated depreciation was not incentivising production adequately.  
Priorities 
The NGOs’ priorities were: low cost of renewables, efficient policies and project execution. 
Maharashtra state government – policy paralysis, inability to manage local policy 
implementation 
In 2007, with state elections looming, the government in Maharashtra, particularly the 
Ministry for Non-Conventional Energy, remained constrained in terms of new investments. 
On a separate note, wind farm developers unwittingly became the centre of populist protests 
in Maharashtra over land deals. Local politicians around the Pune area (near to Dhule and 
Nandurbar) harked back to the land deals covered in 2005/06, alleging that developers had 
not compensated local landowners adequately or had forcibly acquired the land. A popular 
petition by one member of the legislative assembly, a member of the opposition party, 
gained enough support to be taken up in the local legislative assembly by the opposition 
president. Maharashtra, which already had a reputation for a volatile political environment, 
now suffered blows to the reputation of its business environment. Ratings agencies still rank 
the state poorly when it comes to land-related and procedural issues. The combination of 
political risk and temporary regulatory standstill slowed wind power installations 
considerably. 
Priorities 
The state government’s priorities were industrial growth and low tariffs. It was constrained by 
pressure from the electorate and an inability to monitor and regulate projects and local level 
processes. 
3.2.2 Assessment of relationships between actors 
State government and Maharashtra Energy Development Agency  
This relationship was both formal and informal. The agency required support from the 
Minister for Non-Conventional Energy to launch the Green Energy Fund and required 
assistance in securing buy-in from the state’s electricity board. In this, the government was 
very helpful. 
Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission and Maharashtra Energy 
Development Agency  
Again, a relationship that was both formal and informal. The founder of the agency was a 
member of the regulatory commission. In addition, the leadership of the agency was in close 
contact with the commission through formal channels. The idea of a renewable portfolio 
standard required both sets of agents to formulate and then push through the idea at the 
state level.  
Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission and Forum of Regulators  
This relationship was exclusively formal. The chairperson of the commission who was, by 
extension, a member of the Forum of Regulators, tried to sell the idea to the MNRE of a 
cost-plus methodology of tariffs, as well as the idea of a renewable energy portfolio 
standard. 
State government and Maharashtra State Electricity Board  
This relationship was both formal and informal. With the need to provide power cheaply for 
smaller industries, low-cost power for other electoral constituents, and overall, cut down 
operational costs and losses, the electricity board shared many goals with the state 
government. 
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3.2.3 Key observations 
 
 The role of the regulator and leadership can be extremely important under the policy 
regime set out in the Electricity Act. Provisions for wheeling, banking, tariffs and other 
elements that determine the revenue model fall under the purview of the regulator, 
whose decisions are, in principle, independent of the state government 
 The Forum of Regulators provides a seemingly important arena for brokering policy 
ideas and principles. It is also an important body for disseminating research 
 The risk profile of wind projects and the lack of service providers in development, 
execution and operations allowed turbine manufacturers to develop an end-to-end 
service model that helped expand the investor base to a much larger, more 
fragmented market. This precipitated a suppliers’ market. 
3.3 Wind power case study 3: the generation-based incentive 
and independent power providers, 2009–12 
Given the events of the previous years and the experience with higher tariffs and multiple 
investors, many stakeholders in the wind industry pushed for a generation-based incentive 
(GBI). There was a view within policymaking circles that, as well as higher tariffs, 
performance-rewarding instruments and a push for greater efficiency were necessary, 
prompting interest from a class of firms looking to provide and sell power as a service. The 
launch of this GBI also coincided with other measures that incentivised better performance. 
Experiences in states such as Maharashtra showed that the renewable purchase 
specifications (later, renewable purchase obligations as defined by the Central Electricity 
Regulatory Commission – see Section 2.4.2(d)), implemented with strong regulatory support, 
were a valuable tool to provide market/policy clarity. However, nationally, the market was still 
shallow as a number of states with poor renewable energy resources were setting 
(understandably) low renewable purchase obligations. In order to tie together states’ 
renewable purchase obligations a mechanism of tradable renewable energy certificates was 
established (see Section 2.4.2(f)), which essentially allowed obligated states (and entities) to 
purchase these certificates in lieu of generating power from renewable energy sources. 
Hence, the GBI and the renewable energy certificates represented a shift in the system of 
incentives toward performance.  
 
Newer investors and entrepreneurs – including those from overseas – invested in the IPP 
model introduced in 2007 and, as the model matured, brought some expertise to India as 
well. To give some idea of their scale: the five largest IPP investors in India have a combined 
project pipeline of 16GW in the next five years, compared with India’s cumulative installed 
capacity of 19GW in 2013. In 2010 and 2011, approximately 35 per cent of all projects were 
IPP projects, signalling the beginning of a possible shift, or at the very least a significant 
addition to the wind power market. This case study aims to illustrate, firstly, the launch of the 
GBI and its role in attracting investors; and secondly, the incentives and risks faced by this 
newer class of investor.  
 
The information and supporting facts for this case study have been drawn from interviews 
with a prominent IPP firm (September 2013); Suzlon Energy, Regulatory Affairs department 
(September 2013); Bureau of Energy Efficiency (November 2013); Indian Wind Energy 
Association (December 2013); and Bloomberg New Energy Finance (October 2013). 
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Figure 3.5  Annual increase in wind energy capacity for all of India,   
2002–12 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from Centre for Wind Energy Technology (2012). 
 
Table 3.3  GBI, IPPs and acceleration, 2009–12 – chronology of events 
Date Event 
December 
2009 
MNRE announces GBIs of 0.5 rupees/kWh over and above power purchase 
agreements worth US$60m for projects totalling 4,000MW. 
2010 The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission announces renewable energy 
certificate norms. Markets open but are extremely shallow. Mytrah Energy and 
ReNew Power incorporated. Outlook of foreign lenders toward Indian wind sector 
improves drastically after the events of the global financial crisis. 
2011 ReNew Power, Green Infra, Mytrah Energy, China Light & Power all expand their 
project portfolios. Investment peak year for wind energy investments in India. 
2012 GBI withdrawn, accelerated depreciation withdrawn, renewable energy certificate 
market failures appear, combined with macroeconomic instability, weak rupee and 
cautious lending – resulting in a dramatic fall in investments. 
2013 Fall in stock prices and a strengthening rupee make wind an attractive investment. 
GBI reinstated, investments rise again. 
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Table 3.4  Key investment events 
Date Event 
2008 Green Infra incorporated by IDFC Private Equity Ltd with a financial commitment of 
~US$88m. 
October 
2010 
Mytrah Energy listed on London’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM) – raised 
US$79.24m in equity. 
June 2011 Mytrah Energy secures a first tranche of mezzanine finance (a first for any Indian 
wind energy IPP) – raised US$78.5m from the India Infrastructure Fund (managed 
by IDFC Project Equity). 
August 
2011 
Mytrah Energy secures a second tranche of mezzanine finance – raised US$33.3m 
from IDFC Ltd. 
September 
2011 
ReNew Power receives US$250m equity investment from Goldman Sachs. 
December 
2011 
Mytrah Energy secures a third tranche of mezzanine finance from PTC India – 
raised US$20m from PTC India Financial Services.a 
June 2013 Goldman Sachs invests another US$135m. Constructed portfolio reaches 318MW. 
Notes: a PTC India Financial Services is also a public–private partnership between the state-owned Power Trading Corporation 
India Ltd (60 per cent equity shareholder), Goldman Sachs, Macquarie Group, Capital Investment, Global Investment House 
and the domestic Life Insurance Corporation and SBI. 
3.3.1 Key actors, roles, priorities and constraints 
The key actors for central government are: the MNRE, Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister’s 
Council on Climate Change and the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission. 
 
The key institutions at the state level are: Rajasthan government, Maharashtra state, 
Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited, Maharashtra State Power 
Generation Company – Mahagenco Ltd, Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Ltd (the 
state nodal agency for Rajasthan) and each of the relevant State Electricity Regulatory 
Commissions.  
 
The private companies and investors include IPP entrepreneurs, foreign equity investors 
(e.g. Morgan Stanley, BlackRock), wind turbine manufacturers, and industry associations 
(e.g. the Wind Independent Power Producers’ Association, and India Wind Turbine 
Manufacturers Association).  
 
But there are other lenders as well, both public (e.g. IREDA and SBI) and private (e.g. IDFC 
India and L&T Infrastructure).  
MNRE – policy reform 
Role 
Up until 2007, the MNRE had, for many years, followed a regime of tax incentives (e.g. 
accelerated depreciation) to attract investments in wind power. With rising tariffs (led by 
Maharashtra), however, the wind park and wind estate models selling power to the grid had 
become quite profitable for large (>25MW) wind farms in India. The scale of the projects was 
also helpful for utility firms and end-use managers as the size of the facilities smoothed 
factors such as load variation and unpredictability of the resource. With enough tariff 
variation across the wind-rich states (high in the case of Maharashtra, moderate in the case 
of Rajasthan and low in Tamil Nadu and Gujarat) it was felt that a ‘level playing field’ or at 
least a longer-term incentive was needed for larger players. In addition, there were questions 
raised as to the efficacy of the depreciation-based tax incentive to actually produce power 
(raised mainly by civil society organisations, see below). The ghosts of ‘gold-plated’ 
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machines in the past had also been raised by an evaluation of underperforming farms and 
assets in newer installations (Rajsekhar et al. 1999). Indeed, as the accelerated 
depreciation-driven market was heavily geared toward installation, a large portion of the 
profits in the value chain were accrued by manufacturing firms, whose interests were not 
immediately aligned with generating electricity.  
 
Following a number of closed-door discussions with stakeholders in the industry beginning in 
2006, in 2009, the MNRE introduced the generation-based incentive, which could not be 
used with the depreciation benefits available to wind projects, with a cap of US$60m for 
projects totalling 4,000MW. This was done on an experimental basis with a control period of 
two years. This was a relatively low-risk layer of revenue, disbursed by the state nodal 
agency and which bypassed the state electricity board entirely. Although the incentive added 
a small part to the returns on equity, it was relatively risk-free and signalled the move to a 
focus on generation. 
Priorities and constraints 
The ministry wanted to make sure it got the right sort of investment to spur the wind power 
market, to promote the generation of electricity rather than simply the installation of turbines. 
It wanted to rid itself of the investors attracted by the depreciation incentives who were 
primarily interested in wind power assets as tax shields and exited once they had recovered 
their investments and taken the tax benefits. Its priorities therefore included the stronger 
renewable energy certificate market, incentives (such as the GBI) for all classes of investors, 
plus funding for infrastructure. The MNRE was constrained, however, by its limited ability to 
signal policymaking at the state level. It also had little spending power and marginal 
influence over areas such as infrastructure provision, land, and so on. 
Planning Commission, Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency and other 
bureaucrats (policy reform) 
Prominent bureaucrats within the MNRE (in particular, the ministry’s former secretary and 
joint secretary), the Clean Development Mechanism of IREDA,24 a few state regulatory 
commissions and prominent members in the wind energy industry (such as Dr Ajay Mathur: 
former president of Suzlon, former consultant and later, the director general of the Bureau of 
Energy Efficiency) had long pushed for a move to incentivise the generation of electricity, 
leading to a series of stakeholder meetings from 2006 onwards. This was outlined within the 
Planning Commission’s (2006) Integrated Energy Policy report which also came to the same 
conclusions. The business case for a GBI was constructed (theoretically) and the MNRE 
brokered the idea to the Ministry of Finance.  
 
A second prod in this direction came from the sheer numbers that wind power had achieved. 
In 2006, for the first time, electricity from wind exceeded power produced from nuclear power 
(a highly publicised and much debated sector at the time). This event, much discussed 
within policymaking circles, became an important talking point in preparations for the climate 
change talks taking place in Bali at COP 13.25 
                                                     
24 The Clean Development Mechanism is an arrangement made under the Kyoto Protocol which creates emissions reduction 
‘credits’ through emissions-reducing projects in developing countries. These credits can then be purchased by developed 
countries to meet their own emissions reduction targets. The revenues generated add to the revenues of the project generating 
these credits. 
25 Conference of the Parties, Thirteenth Session. The Conference of the Parties is the governing body of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
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Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Prime Minister’s Council on Climate 
Change – policy innovation 
Role 
In 2009, the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change announced its National Action Plan 
on Climate Change. One of the key provisions was that each state must set a minimum 
renewable energy purchase obligation (at five per cent) and escalate it each year. The 
obligated entities included distribution utilities, group captive customers26 and open access 
customers (third-party customers using the state’s transmission network to buy power from 
merchant providers). The problem was the inclusion of states with minimal renewable energy 
resources. 
 
Discussed internally within the Forum of Regulators and the Central Electricity Regulatory 
Commission, the idea of a renewable energy certificate market was deemed a suitable 
means to link generation at the state level to national demand. The physical transfer of 
power remained a problem, however – in particular, electricity transmission between the 
northern and southern parts of the country is extremely constrained as transmission 
corridors simply do not exist. The renewable energy certificates, in accordance with the 
Electricity Act, would introduce a compliance measure so that states could, in theory, set and 
meet renewable purchase obligation targets. Given the demand for power, however, the 
certificates do not directly address states’ primary concern (i.e. the physical supply of 
electricity) (see Shrimali, Tirumalachetty and Nelson 2012 for further details on the 
renewable energy certificate market’s performance). 
Priorities 
The commission’s priority was to implement the stipulations of the National Action Plan on 
Climate Change. 
State Electricity Regulatory Commissions – adopting renewable purchase obligations 
and other policies 
Apart from federal-level policy, some states became early adopters of the renewable 
purchase obligations and renewable energy certificates – the Maharashtra and Rajasthan 
regulatory commissions were the first to announce an adoption of renewable purchase 
obligations after the National Electricity Policy and National Tariff Policy were passed in 
2006. In Maharashtra, this only meant strengthening existing renewable portfolio standards. 
By 2009, this renewable purchase obligation was projected until 2014 and included open 
access customers. This was a significant signal for the market.  
Independent power producers (IPPs) – changing the model27 
With higher tariffs, Clean Development Mechanism benefits and, now, the introduction of the 
generation-based incentive and renewable energy certificate market, the returns on equity 
(on a per project basis) could range between 15 and 16 per cent, making wind more than 
competitive with other investments. Our interviews revealed that the higher tariffs, projected 
demand for power, and a positive reception of the renewable energy certificate market 
formed the final tipping point for a rush of development players in the wind power sector. 
With the central government itself endorsing and regulating the renewable energy certificate 
market, investors felt confident that there was sufficient policy stability. 
 
This market model is already used in other countries, although it is a first for India. 
Gradually, the focus of manufacturers also began to adjust. Traditional turnkey models 
became cheaper and more cost-efficient. Turbine design improved so that they could 
function efficiently at lower wind speeds: Suzlon, ReGen Powertech and other 
                                                     
26 A group of firms or facilities purchasing power from a single supplier. 
27 Please refer to the wind power sector overview in Section 2.6 for details of the business models. 
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manufacturers all launched models with better yields in International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) class II and III sites which have low-medium wind speeds.28 In fact, 
ReGen has been able to claim that their turbines are the most efficient in Indian conditions.  
 
The initial turnkey model has also been challenged. Manufacturers providing turnkey project 
services typically carried with them information about attractive sites and would gain first-
mover advantage by proceeding to secure the land in question for future sale. IPPs, with 
their large scale, have themselves sought out sites and many (e.g. Mytrah Energy, ReNew 
Powertech and Greenko Group) have built their own expert teams of experienced individuals 
to conduct resource assessments, secure the land, build the necessary infrastructure and 
carry out other pre-project activities. The strategy was to optimise on costs, allow for 
customisation (by not relying on the turbine models provided by the turnkey service 
provider), and so increase their profits. In the years that these firms have entered the 
market, the share of established giants such as Suzlon and RRB has fallen, and the share of 
firms such as GE Energy and ReGen Powertech who position themselves primarily as 
suppliers, has grown.29 
 
Even in the IPP model, our interviews revealed that the state-level policies were more 
important than central-level policies. Tariffs, wheeling and banking provisions (all controlled 
by state regulators, utilities and governments) form the basis of the revenue models 
developed by IPPs, and thus, IPP projects still remain sensitive to ‘policy fickleness’ at the 
state level (see accounts of state-level actors below). These firms all have a diverse asset 
portfolio across multiple states – concentrated in Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka, 
Gujarat and Tamil Nadu – and their experience is illustrative of the risks and incentives 
present in the sector.  
 
In addition, IPPs’ interests in the sector are not entirely and immediately aligned with 
manufacturing firms, especially those vested in the older business models where the 
manufacturer controls a large part of the value chain. The Wind Independent Power 
Producers’ Association formed a separate representation to governments at the state and 
national levels, making sure that their point of view was fully represented in the policy 
consultation processes. 
Priorities and constraints 
The IPPs’ priorities were profit and building up scale rapidly. They could get higher returns 
by using the generation-based incentive and renewable energy certificate market than from 
the previous incentive of accelerated depreciation, although the risks were higher. They 
were constrained by their exposure to risks at state level, in terms of access to the 
infrastructure necessary to transmit the electricity generated and political uncertainty over 
instruments that enable merchant contracts (see Section 3.3.2). 
Equity investors – new models attracting foreign investment 
Since the launch of the National Action Plan on Climate Change and the global financial 
crisis, the outlook for the Indian market has changed considerably. Foreign investment firms, 
with a benchmark return on equity of 20 per cent, found that the IPP business could deliver 
the returns and also had sufficient scale to absorb the capital that they wanted to deploy. As 
a result, a number of deals have been struck in the Indian wind power sector (see Table 
3.4). The role of these actors beyond investing and providing guidance on best practice to 
their ventures, however – particularly in policy formulation – was minimal. Indian equity 
                                                     
28 International Electrotechnical Commission: the IEC categorises wind speeds according to classes ranging from I (the best 
quality, highest speeds with the greatest frequencies) to III (among the lowest wind speeds). A brief overview can be found 
online at: www.renewablesfirst.co.uk/wind-learning-centre/what-is-the-wind-class-of-a-wind-turbine/ (accessed 12 September 
2014). 
29 There exist many other reasons for this, including the financial unsustainability of the business models followed by these 
firms both domestically and internationally. See wind case study 3.4. 
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investors have also been engaged. IDFC Private Equity, one of India’s largest infrastructure 
funds with a mandate to invest in renewables, has committed the most funds. Most other 
Indian firms have limited themselves to providing debt capital. 
Priorities 
The foreign investors are interested in profit alone. 
Table 3.5  Key foreign investments in IPPs, 2010–12 
Firm Foreign investor Details 
ReNew Power Goldman Sachs September 2011: US$250m 
June 2013: US$135m 
Mytrah Energy 
(formerly 
Caparo) 
Eton Park International, 
BlackRock Investment 
Managers, Capital Research 
Global Investors 
Raised US$80m on London’s AIM 
Raised US$111.8m from domestic 
investment firm IDFC Ltd 
China Light & 
Power, India 
China Light & Power (Hong 
Kong) 
Undisclosed. Entirely owned by CLP 
Bhilwara Green 
Energy 
International Finance 
Corporation 
US$15m in equity 
Inox 
Renewables Ltd 
International Finance 
Corporation 
US$130m (US$40m equity, rest in 
debt) 
 
3.3.2 Risks inherent in the GBI and IPP model 
Reneging on contracts – Gujarat state government and Gujarat state utility 
In Gujarat, IPPs came up against significant challenges in early 2013, when a developed 
wind farm was refused an offtake agreement. This was the result of a decision taken by the 
local electricity board that average pooled purchase cost-based purchases would not be 
allowed.30 Although the underlying reasons for this decision were unclear, the broad 
explanation was that the electricity board was constrained in its budget and, as the purchase 
costs were too high, decided to suspend power purchase agreements. Following this 
decision, ReNew Power’s team attempted a series of negotiations speaking with the officials 
of the state electricity board and its utility (GUVNL – Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd), which 
proved unsuccessful. A parallel series of petitions was also made to the state chief minister, 
who had previously publicly supported renewable energy in his state. As petitions from other 
notable operators in the state also gained momentum, the electricity board and utility were 
forced to reverse their decision, but with a compromise – that half of the capacity installed 
would be commissioned under an average pooled costs scheme and half would be 
commissioned under a cheaper, fixed feed-in tariff. The outcome of this series of decisions 
severely affected the profitability of the project and delayed commissioning by six months. 
Priorities 
It is the stated view of the Gujarat government that the state should be a leader in attracting 
foreign investment as well as a leader in the energy sector (these are general stated 
objectives, unconfirmed as applying to the wind power sector in particular). One interviewee 
remarked that the state government possibly also aimed to become an energy exporter. The 
priority for GUVNL, the state utility, was to maintain its financial stability. 
                                                     
30 Average pooled purchase cost is the weighted average cost of electricity at which the purchasing entity (in this case, the 
state utility or privately owned distribution company) buys power from various sources. As in India, tariffs for the power sector 
are determined by the electricity regulatory commissions; this is notified by the state electricity regulatory commissions. 
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Conflict over tariffs – Maharashtra state government and Maharashtra State Electricity 
Distribution Company vs Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission 
In August 2013, when the Maharashtra State Electricity Regulatory Commission raised the 
existing tariff of wind power by 40 paise/unit (~0.67 US cent) to 5.81 rupees/kWh, it faced 
stiff opposition from the state government, the Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution 
Company and Mahagenco (the state power generation utility). The stance taken by the 
government and the distribution company was that the commission, by fixing higher tariffs for 
wind power (particularly when selling to industrial consumers directly) was biased in favour 
of wind, particularly when the Maharashtra tariff was much higher than those of Gujarat and 
Tamil Nadu. Citing the performance of plants under the accelerated depreciation scheme, 
the parties pointed out that investors in the recent past (2011/12) had already recovered 
their capital costs. The result was that the distribution company refused to sign wind power 
purchase agreements; projects worth 500MW, in various stages of development and 
commissioning were suspended.  
 
The motivation of Mahagenco for protesting was straightforward. Tasked with promoting 
solar power, Mahagenco owns all of the state solar generation plants. The regulatory 
commission has fixed some of the lowest rates in the country for solar and claims by 
Mahagenco reveal its perception that these tariffs for solar power are unviable. The final 
result of these clashes was that the commission did not lower its tariff rates and the 
distribution company refused to sign power purchase agreements, a practice that it had 
already adopted when the tariff hike was initially being considered, even before its approval. 
Thus, wind power projects totalling up to 500MW and already developed between March and 
September 2013, could not be commissioned. 
Priorities 
With successive cabinet changes between 2006 and 2008, the Maharashtra state 
government, previously extremely supportive of renewable energy, particularly wind power, 
has more recently adopted a less supportive stance. Its priority is energy efficiency, but 
relying more on stable thermal power (coal) rather than wind. 
 
The Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company, since unbundling in 2005/06, has 
been rectifying the debts and loans that made it a loss-making entity. Low costs have been 
its main priority. 
Elections and political unpredictability – Rajasthan state government and Rajasthan 
Renewable Energy Corporation Ltd  
Uncoordinated activity has also caused problems in Rajasthan. The state is characterised by 
certain unique elements – namely, lower tariffs, different land acquisition policies (generally 
seen as better), and higher force majeure risks including theft and lockouts – and is 
perceived as requiring administrative support and coordination. While the administration was 
traditionally supportive of wind power producers (and now, increasingly, solar power), in 
what was perhaps an attempt to upstage Gujarat or other states and emulate the success of 
the NSM, the state nodal agency announced that a further 300MW of projects in the state 
would be allotted purely through competitive bidding. This was problematic on many counts: 
as investors’ business models were geared toward conventional project allotments and 
offset the high costs and risks of setting up infrastructure by the stable returns of tariffs, their 
effectiveness in responding to the new proposal was severely compromised. Given the 
uncertainty surrounding the returns in competitive bidding, which only added to the riskiness 
of projects due to the lack of grid infrastructure, the Indian Wind Turbine Manufacturers 
Association and the Wind Independent Power Producers’ Association approached the state 
chief minister to discuss this issue and ask for a phased introduction of competitive bidding. 
Despite sympathy and a promise of investigation from the political class, no action could be 
taken with the looming state elections. The state election commission, in an attempt to curb 
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any populist measures and hasty legislative action, suspended all decisions for a period of 
six months before the election. Unable to respond, the state government could not publicly 
announce a decision and the Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation was subsequently 
approached by the powerful wind turbine manufacturers association as well as the newly 
formed association of IPPs. In September 2013, the decision was reversed. However, in 
early 2014, a new state government was elected, which has so far shown less interest in 
promoting renewable energy than the previous one. 
Failures in the certificate market, the grid – state energy regulatory commissions  
Another significant source of risk includes the failure of the renewable energy certificate 
market and the related question of grid expansion. Interviewees cited significant reluctance 
shown by state utilities to purchase these certificates. Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi 
particularly would not meet their renewable power obligation targets and obligated bodies in 
these power-starved states argued that the physical transfer of power was a greater priority 
for them than obligations. In each of these states, the central government was loath to take 
punitive action by withdrawing grant money, as development was much higher on the 
agenda than renewable energy. The state regulatory commissions, sympathetic with the 
utilities on this matter, also did not take action.  
 
A proposed solution to the renewable energy certificate market has been the creation of 
interstate infrastructure. The bottleneck preventing physical transfer of power between states 
lies in the poor condition of interstate corridors and state-level infrastructure constructed by 
state utilities and distribution companies. Private sector stakeholders have raised concern 
that the Power Grid Corporation of India’s current approach to setting up grid infrastructure is 
highly influenced by its experience with the conventional power industry. Project approvals 
and processing times take six months and along with other activities and construction, up to 
three years in total. For wind projects, which have a turnaround time of six to 15 months, this 
is impractical. This bottleneck also compromised the firms’ ability to sell surplus power from 
high-quality sites to third-party consumers in other states. A second factor affecting project 
profitability is also the high charge made by the Power Grid Corporation for its grid 
infrastructure. Charged on an installed capacity basis rather than per-unit transfer, wind 
power projects suffer from additional transaction costs due to their low capacity utilisation 
factors. This means that few agencies are willing to invest in upstream infrastructure, 
including government agencies. A major constraint for the regulators, as ever, is their lack of 
legal powers to ensure compliance from the utilities. 
A remedy? Industry associations and the Planning Commission 
In the light of the various coordination issues between states, regulatory stakeholders and 
private sector stakeholders, the prevalent view in the industry is that a forum for all 
stakeholders in the wind sector is necessary. To this end, representations from the 
associations of turbine manufacturers and IPPs approached the Planning Commission and 
the creation of a national ‘task force’ to bring stakeholders together is now underway.  
3.3.3 Assessment of relationships between actors 
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy and State Electricity Regulatory Commissions  
Officials at the ministry have formal relationships with the state level regulatory commissions, 
but can only recommend and have no legislative powers. Officials do maintain informal 
relationships with regulators at the state level, but these have limited influence. 
Central regulatory commission and state regulatory commissions 
The central commission can determine the norms and broad structures of the policy 
mechanisms. However, the implementation of the policy at the state level is entirely 
dependent on the state regulatory commission and the central commission lacks any 
enforcing powers. 
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State regulatory commissions and state-owned utilities 
The goals and priorities of the state regulatory commission may (as in the case of Tamil 
Nadu) or may not be (as in the case of Maharashtra) aligned with the state utility, although 
broadly power sufficiency is an important factor. Formally, the state commission can pass 
orders with which the utility must comply, but the utility can delay action through protests or 
appeals to the government, so in effect the state commission may have limited power to 
enforce its decisions in the short term. 
3.3.4 Key observations  
 
 At the state level the risks created by a lack of coordination between the various 
bodies concern investors the most. They rely on the legal status of the agreement as 
an important measure against short-term policy changes 
 Merchant contracts are less risky than power supply agreements with utilities (in 
terms of payment risks). However, by controlling the banking, wheeling and open 
access policies, state level regulatory commissions and governments have 
considerable influence over the viability of the revenue models. For particularly cash-
strapped utilities, for which industrial consumers form high-value segments, 
supporting open access (merchant) contracts is simply not a priority 
 The overall trends in the industry point to a move toward a ‘national framework’ of 
policy, although the implementation has been challenging so far. However, the policy 
has favoured a more mature business model and a new investor class whose 
interests are more aligned with the desired output (i.e. the generation of more power) 
 The industry is therefore at least beginning to show signs of a structural shift away 
from the older suppliers’ market. The state of the manufacturing industry itself may 
become a medium-term risk in the future if supply fails to meet demand. 
3.4 Wind power case study 4: Suzlon – the Indian ‘champion’ in 
the wind power manufacturing sector 
The explosive growth of the Indian wind power market between 2000 and 2007, which put it 
among the leading wind power markets in the world, is marked by Suzlon’s growth into a 
dominant force in the domestic market. During the same period, Suzlon not only became the 
dominant local player, but one of the world’s leading wind turbine manufacturing firms – its 
growth avidly studied by scholars. 
 
However, the foundations for this growth – the demand conditions in the Indian market, the 
strategies adopted by the firm, the unique factor conditions and wider technological interplay 
– offer intriguing lessons as to how investments in wind power were enabled. This case 
study, then, is a brief overview of Suzlon’s domestic success and, through this firm, a 
historical view of the Indian wind turbine manufacturing sector itself. This case study, dealing 
with a single firm and its role in facilitating investments, does not follow the structure of the 
previous case studies directly, but is organised into a number of sub-sections: the early days 
of Suzlon, its global manoeuvres and strategic action, its domestic manoeuvres and strategic 
action and finally, its recent position and activity under the changing policy and investment 
regimes explored in the previous case studies.  
 
The information and supporting facts for this case study have been drawn from interviews 
with the Suzlon Energy, Business Development department (March 2014) and Suzlon 
Energy, Regulatory Affairs department (September 2013). 
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Table 3.6 Suzlon Energy – chronology of key events 
Date Event 
1995 Suzlon Energy Limited founded in Maharashtra by Tulsi Tanti and the Tanti family. 
1997 Suzlon acquires former licensing partner Südwind Energy in Germany. 
2001 The Tanti family closes textile business to focus solely on Suzlon Energy. 
Suzlon executes captive generation projects for big-ticket investor Bajaj Auto. 
Suzlon executes wind park projects to demonstrate the financial viability of wind 
energy investments. 
2004 Suzlon Energy A/S founded in Denmark. Per Pedersen from NEG Micon joins Suzlon, 
develops global strategy. 
Joint venture with ELIN Motoren GmbH. 
Citigroup Inc and ChrysCapital invest US$24m for a collective stake of 15 per cent. 
2005 Acquires Hansen Transmissions International NV for US$520m. Funded by ICICI 
Bank, SBI, Deutsche Bank AG and Barclays Bank PLC. 
Listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and National Stock Exchange of India; raises 
~US$348m. 
Invests US$14m in Minnesota, US, in a manufacturing facility. 
Takes over Sarjan Engitech (engineering components firm). 
Arrangement with Winergy for gearbox supply (within India). 
2006 Enters Italian, Australian and South Korean markets. 
Gains 53 per cent market share in India. 
Gains a seven per cent market share globally. 
Establishes rotor manufacturing facilities in Gujarat and Maharashtra. 
2007 Acquires 33 per cent stake in REpower for €453m. 
Raises US$500m in debt through the sale of zero-coupon convertible bonds in the 
US.31  
Raises US$552m through a follow-on offer of equity to qualified institutional buyers.32  
Hansen listed on the London Stock Exchange for ~US$400m. 
2008 Strong focus on cost-efficiencies and reducing sourcing distances. 
Acquires a further 37 per cent stake in REpower. 
SE Forge issues equity shares to IDFC Private Equity, raises 4,000m rupees 
(~US$80m). 
Sells ten per cent stake in Hansen. 
Completes a blade retrofit programme, adding significantly to the company’s debt. 
Completes a US$383m rights issue. 
2009 May: Sells two per cent stake to raise 230 crore rupees (US$50m). 
July: Raises US$175m through an offer of global depository receipts.33  
  
                                                     
31 Zero coupon convertible bonds: bonds bought at less than their face value, with the face value repaid at maturity by the 
issuing entity; zero coupon means that there are no periodic interest payments; ‘convertible’ means that they can be converted 
to shares of common stock of the issuing company at a certain price. 
32 Qualified institutional buyers: entities satisfying a certain net-worth criteria and who own and invest, on a discretionary basis, 
a minimum amount of money as determined by stock-exchange regulating bodies (for example, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in the US). 
33 Global deposit receipts: bank-issued certificates in more than one country for shares in a foreign company. The bank, in this 
case, is typically an international bank and the shares are traded domestically in the issuing country, but are offered for sale 
globally through the various branches of the bank. Thus, these receipts allow companies to raise capital through international 
channels. 
61 
 
(Table 3.6 cont’d.) 
2010 Celebrates 5,000MW of installations in India – cumulatively, nearly one-third of the 
Indian market. 
Enters into a long book-order with leading IPPs. 
2011 Exits Hansen by selling its remaining stake. 
Launches 9x wind turbine platform in India. 
Defaults on its foreign currency convertible bonds accumulated in the previous years.34 
2012 Enters into a corporate debt restructuring programme with a consortium of 19 
banks/lenders, raising working capital limits. 
2013 Sells 75 per cent of its Chinese subsidiaries. 
 
Founded in 1995, with an initial investment of US$600,000 as a diversification from Tulsi 
Tanti’s core textiles business, Suzlon Energy was one of India’s first wholly indigenous wind 
turbine manufacturers. Like other Indian firms, Suzlon began by gaining access to European 
technology via licensing agreements, in Suzlon’s case with Südwind in Germany, but saw an 
opportunity to absorb these capabilities when the latter went bankrupt in 1996, enabling 
Suzlon to take it over. This acquisition, allowing the development of capabilities upstream, 
was the first of many for Suzlon Energy. 
 
Suzlon’s management board, consisting largely of Mr Tanti and his family, saw wind power 
generation as a ready market in India. Their own experiences with erratic power supply and 
the high costs of power for industrial consumers convinced them that wind power, which was 
supported by accelerated depreciation and various other tax incentives and excise duty 
breaks, was a viable alternative and provided a ready growth market. All that was needed 
was a proper business model. In Mr Tanti’s experience, Indian firms had very little expertise 
in installing and maintaining wind farms, and did not always have the capacity to bring the 
necessary skills together for one-off projects. Thus, he saw an opportunity for an 
engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) service provider, who could develop, 
execute, operate and maintain a project on behalf of the power plant owner, thus creating 
and capturing value. This formed the core of Suzlon’s business model – selling turnkey 
projects along with supply and maintenance contracts for businesses of all sizes. This model 
would soon spill over to other countries. 
 
In the early 2000s, a number of flagship projects helped Suzlon Energy cement their position 
as one of the leading firms in the wind turbine industry and popularised their end-to-end 
service model, which became a staple for the Indian market (and later, for other markets), 
creating pressure on other manufacturing firms to develop their own variants of the same 
service. 
 
Many major projects executed by Suzlon in the late 1990s/early 2000s set the standard for 
the captive generation/buy-back projects that became the standard model in the Indian 
market. One of these was a 62.5MW captive generation project for Bajaj Auto, one of India’s 
leading automobile firms, in Pune, Maharashtra. This project allowed Bajaj Auto to 
significantly reduce their power bill through the wheeling and banking arrangements with the 
state utility (see Sections 2.3 and 2.4) and, along with the major tax incentives, significantly 
cut operating costs. Bajaj would be a repeat customer for Suzlon for other significant 
projects. Suzlon’s own presence in Maharashtra, Mr Tanti’s home state, expanded rapidly by 
leveraging the Tanti family’s existing business network in the textiles business. By 2004, 
Suzlon had become a dominant player in the state, and established manufacturing facilities 
in other wind-rich states, namely, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat. The company’s existing 
                                                     
34 Foreign currency convertible bonds are ‘convertible’ bonds that allow companies to sell bonds in a currency other than their 
domestic currency, thus allowing customers from other countries to buy these bonds. As they are ‘convertible’ they can be 
converted into a share of common stock of the issuing company for a certain price. 
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connections and its understanding of the textiles business also helped Suzlon bring the 
captive generation model as a means to cut costs to other textile industry clusters in these 
states (see Section 3.1), where the speed of executing such projects became critical.  
 
Another critical offering that Suzlon brought to its customers was access to credit. Banks in 
India, at the time, perceived wind power to be a fairly risky business, so they lent at rates 
with a high premium, and took a long time to conduct the due diligence. Suzlon and other 
turbine manufacturers aimed to speed up the process. Relying on individual relationships 
developed with a few key banks (e.g. SBI and Punjab National Bank) during earlier wind 
power projects, Suzlon helped project investors secure credit for their projects, putting the 
entire risk of the project on its own balance sheet. For the partnering banks, a strong 
balance sheet-based loan provided an instrument to distance themselves from the risks of 
individual projects as it shifted the risk onto the individual investor and EPC firm. The 
balance sheet of the third party (in this case, Suzlon) became the key metric for lending. 
Fuelled by strong growth, Suzlon’s year-on-year cash flows helped create confidence in both 
lenders and investors, and this model was particularly prevalent between 1995 and the early 
2000s when the Electricity Act was taking shape (see Figure 2.5 for a timeline). 
 
Another key project by Suzlon, the Vankusawade Wind Park in Maharashtra, was set up to 
demonstrate the viability of the IPP/buy-back scheme. In 2001, Suzlon acquired thousands 
of hectares in the Satara district of Maharashtra, setting up grid infrastructure and 
developing a wind park based solely on its S33 350kW turbines. By 2004, this was Asia’s 
largest wind park and in 2014, with a total capacity of 184MW, it remains one of the largest. 
Suzlon developed the site from scratch, conducting resource surveys (previously the purview 
of the state nodal agency) to assess the road and grid infrastructure. Suzlon also 
commissioned and erected the turbines on its own, and then ran the wind farm. While the 
Vankusawade Wind Park is wholly owned by Suzlon, the pattern of ownership of other such 
farms in Jaisalmer in Rajasthan, or Sankaneri in Tamil Nadu, is different. What is interesting 
is the ownership of the individual turbines: a number of firms from Maharashtra’s rich 
industrial belts and from Tamil Nadu and Rajasthan own projects ranging from less than 
5MW to 50MW within the wind farms, constituting a large ‘retail’ consumer segment. Suzlon 
developed and refined this wind park model – acquiring and setting up assets which entailed 
a risk of delays and construction early on, then offering customers projects of various sizes 
with a short turnaround time (approximately four to seven months) and providing a 
‘guaranteed’ stable return for 20 years by virtue of the locked power purchase contracts with 
the state-level utilities. In fact, Suzlon took on the role of representative in negotiations with 
the utilities and in appealing to regulators and other machinery against payment risks, etc. 
(see case studies 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, which show that the state utilities are important 
stakeholders whose cooperation is critical for a project’s success). 
 
Suzlon also competed on the basis of an extremely short turnaround time between an 
investment decision and the erection and commissioning. The company’s head of 
Regulatory Affairs, Chintan Shah, explains that: 
 
Suzlon always had a ready pipeline of land available. We would begin the project 
activity early on, acquiring or leasing the land, putting up our wind masts and setting 
up roads and sometimes even setting up electric substations. Once you have these 
things in place, the actual turbine manufacturing takes only two months. The 
installation and commissioning [have] a similar timeline. Therefore, what is 
apparently a short turnaround time really is not, and people don’t often see this 
background homework.  
 
This ability to rapidly meet consumer demand constituted a key competitive advantage for 
Suzlon. The diversity of the project sizes allowed investors with different requirements, 
ranging from investments of a few hundred thousand rupees to many millions, to participate 
63 
 
in wind projects. With Maharashtra’s tariff regime, wind power became attractive both as a 
business and as a tax-saving scheme. While in Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Gujarat, 
investors looked for both business models – captive generation and selling power to the grid 
– with roughly 40 per cent of investments going into the former, Tamil Nadu had a greater 
number of investors in captive generation (see case study 3.1). 
 
This model, of course, met with great scrutiny. NGOs and industry experts alleged that the 
capital subsidy-intensive regime in India, with its focus on accelerated depreciation, 
encouraged sub-optimal behaviour, citing investment decisions made in Suzlon’s wind 
parks. The criticism was based on the fact that many of Suzlon’s orders came in the third 
quarter of the year, when most firms carried out tax-planning activities. If investing in wind 
power was primarily a way to save on taxes, then the parent firm would decide to invest and 
expect a rapid turnaround time – and Suzlon, thanks to their willingness to take on projects 
of all sizes and deliver them fast, was the reliable provider. This led to a burst of last-minute 
investments in wind power, with little regard to the execution of the project itself or to the 
power generated.  
 
However, these allegations were denied by both the wind turbine manufacturers and the 
investors. The Renewable Energy Developers Association of Maharashtra, a consortium of 
investors, many of whom had sunk equity into wind park-based projects by Suzlon, Enercon 
and other developers, actively lobbied for good returns on investments through preferential 
tariffs (or FITs) instituted under the Electricity Act. Nonetheless, wind power developers in 
India did not immediately focus on better generation, and indeed, turbine costs, rates of 
return and project execution speed were more important than turbine generating capacity 
and performance. Despite a wealth of detailed data on this issue, NGOs such as the Centre 
for Science and Environment, the World Institute of Sustainable Energy and Prayas 
conducted their own studies, finding that turbine performance in India was indeed lower than 
in other countries, but without reaching consensus on the exact reasons. 
3.4.1 Global aspirations 
By the early 2000s, Suzlon had become a manufacturer of choice for many Indian firms, 
actively creating the business case for wind and conducting market development activities at 
industry fora and conclaves. Partnering with industry associations such as the Indian Wind 
Energy Association, Indian Wind Turbine Manufacturers Association and the Indian Wind 
Power Association, Suzlon was an active participant in educating a number of industries and 
industrial clusters who were either new or first-time investors in wind. Its rapid growth 
attracted major private equity investments from the US-based Citigroup Inc and 
ChrysCapital, who together invested nearly US$25m in the firm. However, Suzlon’s growth-
aggressive model needed further diversification and Mr Tanti believed that the only direction 
to expand would now be global.  
 
In 2003, Suzlon’s expertise in Indian low-wind environments helped it secure project orders 
in the American Midwest. With this, the firm decided to establish its presence in other 
countries. Its core strategy consisted of three elements: vertical integration, establishing 
manufacturing centres within learning networks and close to the demand sites, and finally, 
leveraging its international footprint and its knowledge of diverse environments. With growing 
markets in Europe, China and the US, becoming an international player presented a 
lucrative opportunity.  
 
Vertical integration, both forward (into distribution) and backward (into core component 
manufacturing), allowed Suzlon to gain two important advantages: firstly, in the existing 
business climate the supply for critical turbine components such as gearboxes was 
controlled by a few manufacturers, whose production capacity was the determining factor in 
the global supply of wind turbines. By acquiring these capabilities, Suzlon provided itself with 
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a firm platform for sustained future growth. This was doubly advantageous in terms of cost 
and value: because of the limited supply, a large portion of the profits in the wind turbine 
value chain was captured upstream in component manufacturing. Suzlon, by virtue of 
vertical integration, could internalise these profits within its supply chain.  
 
The second advantage was that Suzlon could, in essence, control every aspect of its 
product, replicating its end-to-end services model or develop new models according to the 
domestic business environment of whichever market it chose to explore. This flexibility was 
crucial for the company as a differentiator. In a flurry of acquisitions and expansion, Suzlon 
bought AE Rotor Holding BV in the Netherlands, set up manufacturing facilities in Minnesota, 
set up joint ventures with ELIN Motoren GmbH in Germany, founded a global headquarters 
in Denmark and brought in expertise in the form of Per Pedersen, the chief operating officer 
of European giant NEG Micon. This significant knowledge and asset base, combined with 
investment in upstream R&D in India, helped Suzlon begin the indigenisation of multiple 
components of the turbine – effectively allowing specialised design suitable for the local 
markets in which it operated. This also allowed the firm to diversify its product offerings from 
smaller turbines to mid-size turbines (and for the Indian market, which lagged behind Europe 
in terms of technology, ‘larger’ turbines of over 1MW). Suzlon, without the expertise and 
access to funds that other global firms possessed (e.g. GE Energy and Siemens), had 
managed to build up capabilities to rival the existing giants in the global wind turbine 
manufacturing industry. 
 
To fund this aggressive inorganic growth Suzlon listed itself on the Bombay Stock Exchange 
in 2005, raising approximately US$350m, with its shares being oversubscribed nearly 40 
times. Breaking off its license agreements in rotors with Aerpac BV and blades with Enron 
Wind, Suzlon then attempted two major acquisitions that were critical links in the global 
supply chain. 
 
In 2006, Suzlon bought Belgium-based Hansen Transmissions, a key supplier of cutting-
edge gearboxes to Vestas, Siemens and Gamesa, so gaining access to R&D and 
manufacturing capabilities in gearbox technology. Essentially, this made Suzlon a supplier to 
some of its competitors. Hansen would provide Suzlon with the manufacturing, innovation 
and financial capabilities (through stake sales) that sustained its strategy for years to come. 
Fresh off the back of this success, Suzlon proceeded to diversify its product offering even 
further, moving into large-scale on-shore and offshore turbines, by purchasing REpower, a 
German company with capabilities of manufacturing 3.5–6MW turbines – at the time, the 
world’s largest. Strategically, Suzlon gained early entry into what it anticipated would 
become a booming offshore wind industry in Europe as well as critical know-how on 
handling and integrating such large machines. 
3.4.2 Manoeuvres within a stable regime 
The Indian market was characterised by rapid changes in the policy regime at the state level, 
in terms of tariffs, utility offtake agreement windows, government policies and tax incentives, 
etc. For a turbine manufacturing firm to succeed, the ability to secure early-mover advantage 
within a favourable policy window and lock in project investments was critical.  
 
To try to achieve some policy stability and predictability, a number of turbine manufacturing 
firms actively lobbied at state-level electricity regulatory commission meetings and 
advocated the need for longer-term security. In different periods, this materialised as 
investment peaks in different states. Suzlon secured bids for a large proportion of the 
capacity added during a favourable policy period in Maharashtra between 2003 and 2007. 
The firm’s management teams and board were made up of people from different 
backgrounds – policy analysts at leading NGOs, ex-government officials, top management 
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from banks, and so on – which helped the company develop a strong network that gave it 
flexibility and the ability to react quickly to external changes. 
3.4.3 Domestic activity under a changing policy regime  
While Suzlon was diversifying its operations across the world,35 its share of projects within 
India still made up a significant chunk of its revenues (~60 per cent in 2011). India now had 
the fourth largest wind market in the world, supported by FITs and renewable purchase 
obligations under the Electricity Act. At state level, however, there was frequent policy 
change and constant uncertainty. Acting with speed, and capturing the resources for good 
wind projects – sites, land, infrastructure, government approval – to gain early-mover 
advantage was more important than ever. By 2007, Suzlon held the top spot in the domestic 
market, but its long-running model of end-to-end services was facing increased competition. 
To compound the difficulties, its debt-heavy model and aggressive acquisition-based growth 
had created a large deficit, which was increasingly difficult to fund.  
 
Between 2007 and 2008, Suzlon raised funds from multiple sources, including selling a 10 
per cent stake in Hansen and listing it on the London Stock Exchange. In the same year, 
doubts about the reliability of Suzlon’s products were raised in the US, where a number of 
turbines, installed in major projects across the south and Midwest, developed cracks in the 
rotor blades. The firm had to spend massive amounts in a blade-retrofitting programme, 
further denting its cash flow.  
 
Then came policy changes in the domestic market. The Indian government was unhappy 
that the current policy regime encouraged investment in renewable energy sources but not 
the actual generation of power. So, in 2009, it increased FITs and introduced the generation-
based incentive, market-based tradable renewable energy certificates and renewable 
purchase obligations. As a result, the nature of the investor in wind power began to change, 
as did the basis of competition. Projects became larger, foreign direct investment in wind 
power generation increased and interest in achieving and driving grid parity surged. Firms 
still relied heavily on the ‘retail’ market for wind power, but in addition new turbine 
technologies emerged which claimed better overall efficiency and productivity – the gearless 
turbine, for example, introduced by newcomers to the market, cost less to maintain and had 
greater generation capacity. In addition, as IPPs emerged, some de-linked project 
development and operation, separating turbine supply from other services. Suzlon, while still 
a key turbine supplier to many IPPs, lost market share. Between 2007 and 2012, it dropped 
to 34 per cent in the face of competition from turbine suppliers such as Gamesa, Enercon 
(now known as WinWinD), GE and ReGen Powertech, which focused on R&D and 
developing turbines tailored to local low-wind speed regimes. Indeed, GE and ReGen are 
leading suppliers to IPPs, earning almost all of their income from this segment.36 Thus, the 
policy regime and changing investor characteristics combined to change the nature of the 
demand itself, which was no longer met by the end-to-end services business model.  
 
Suzlon found itself struggling to sustain its growth-led, debt-based business model. After 
2009, the debt it took on exposed the firm and its subsidiaries to a high degree of risk, and 
Suzlon had to resort to further equity dilution in the core business and subsidiary firms both 
domestically and internationally. By 2011, the debt had grown to approximately US$200m, 
putting the board under enormous pressure. At the same time, to compete technologically, 
Suzlon began the development of its first wholly indigenous turbine designed specifically for 
IEC class II and III regimes in India, the 9x platform, which incorporated multiple features 
from the global best-selling 8x platform. Reliability and grid-integration, along with lifecycle 
costs are now the design characteristics on which Suzlon is attempting to compete with 
                                                     
35 During this period handsome policy incentives in the US, China and other economies were giving wind power a fillip across 
the world. Suzlon, by 2008, had commenced operations in 16 major economies. 
36 Interview with ReGen Powertech, 3 March 2014. 
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other turbine manufacturers. Since 2010, however, Suzlon’s share in the Indian market has 
further decreased, prompting questions about its strategy of global acquisitions.  
3.4.4 The current scenario  
With a global downturn affecting the wind power industry along with the global economic 
crisis and slowdown in the European wind power markets, Suzlon failed to grow at the pace 
required to sustain its debt. Between 2010 and 2012, the firm defaulted on a number of 
loans and underwent a massive corporate debt restructuring programme, diluting its equity 
further. By 2013, its market capitalisation, once nearly US$1,500m, had fallen to US$450m. 
While maintaining its presence globally, Suzlon’s domestic revenues fell further as the Indian 
government’s withdrawal of the accelerated depreciation incentive severely dented growth in 
the ‘retail’ segment of the Indian wind market – the key segment for Suzlon (see 
UNEP/BNEF 2012, 2013). This policy uncertainty led to further risks and a tough business 
environment for Suzlon, exacerbating its existing debt-related problems. 
 
The CEO and owner, Mr Tanti, recently announced the intent to slow the company’s growth-
centred approach and to focus on consolidation within its core markets and initiate cost-
cutting measures. In light of these events, there has even been talk of moving its core 
manufacturing and research facilities to the US, in anticipation of an improving economy and 
policy environment abroad. The firm believes that the wind industry is about to pick up 
globally as the economy rebounds, and expects that its technology bets and services model 
is also likely to pick up, and Suzlon, durable, is likely to thrive.  
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4 Case studies – solar power sector 
4.1 Solar power case study 1: investments under the National 
Solar Mission, 2009–11 
Prior to the NSM India had no definitive policy package to support renewable energy 
generation and to bring together the various institutions involved in its implementation. The 
mission represents a transformation of the whole system – the policymaking process, the 
engagement of public and private stakeholders, and the implementation – and involves both 
the MNRE and the Ministry of Power, under the aegis of the Prime Minister’s Council on 
Climate Change and the National Action Plan on Climate Change. Studying the NSM is 
useful for understanding the conditions and coordination that are required for an intervention 
of this nature, as well as the roles of actors and investment involved in creating a high-profile 
industry such as solar power is perceived to be.  
 
Points to note:  
 
 Implementing the mission required the government to signal the creation of a market 
within the regulatory structure of the power sector. This also required state-level 
bodies to coordinate and this case study explores how they did this 
 The mission created a framework for both integrated industrial development policy 
and deployment. The political economy interests of different private actors affected 
the policymaking elements as well as the investments themselves 
 Solar photovoltaic technologies can be broadly classified into two types: crystalline 
silicon (c-Si) and thin films. Of these, the former has had a longer track record of 
deployment and a relatively proven history. Crystalline silicon can also yield higher 
conversion efficiencies as compared to thin films, but is relatively expensive to 
produce. Thin films, by comparison, are cheaper to produce and are relatively more 
durable. It is also believed that thin film technologies can still be improved to yield 
higher efficiencies, although, due to a global oversupply of c-Si, thin films are 
attracting few investors, even at the R&D phase 
 The first phase of the NSM imposed a domestic content requirement on all projects 
allocated. In batch 1, this was limited to the modules used in projects, and in batch 2 
this was expanded to include crystalline silicon solar cells as well. Thin film 
technologies were exempted from this requirement. 
 
This case study aims to shed some light on the following questions: What motivated actors 
to act and come together? Which aspects of policy were important for investors? What 
mechanisms emerged from these interactions? 
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Figure 4.1  Investment in solar power, 2004–12 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from Ernst & Young (2014) and BNEF (2014). 
 
The information and supporting facts for this case study have been drawn from interviews 
with a former official at the MNRE (November 2013); the World Bank (October 2013); Bridge 
to India (July 2013); a prominent solar power developer (April 2013); a prominent solar 
power system manufacturing firm (June 2013); and the authors’ observations of NSM 
stakeholders’ meetings in phase 1 (February 2013) and phase 2 (September 2013). 
 Table 4.1  National Solar Mission – chronology of events 
Date Event 
2006–07 Internally, the MNRE begins to formulate a national action plan or ‘mission’ for 
solar power. 
2008 National Action Plan on Climate Change announced and ‘missions’ brought under 
the aegis of the Prime Minister’s Office. NSM (previously an MNRE initiative) 
launched. An initial budget allocation of 385 crore rupees (US$85m) made. Closed-
door meetings initiated between various ministries. 
2009 NVVN becomes nodal stakeholder in power purchase agreements through NTPC, 
a registered public sector company, which is brought in as an institutional actor. 
September 
2010 
Asian Development Bank announces US$400m commitment. Four hundred and 
eighteen project bids submitted for a cumulative target of 1,000–2,000MW for 
phase 1, batch 1. Project sizes are small (5MW cap) with a domestic content 
requirement. Developers prefer sourcing alternative equipment from foreign 
suppliers. 
October 
2010 
Thirty solar projects allocated and the transparency of the process is lauded. 
Authorisation of 172.3m rupees to 37 ‘solar cities’. 
July 2011 Projects constituting 610MW achieve financial closure. 
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(Table 4.1 cont’d.) 
November 
2011 
Solar Energy Industry Advisory Council constituted by the MNRE to help attract 
investments, encourage R&D and make the Indian solar industry competitive. 
December 
2011 
Allocated 350MW in utility-scale solar projects under batch 2 (20 projects). Ninety 
per cent of these projects are in Rajasthan. Cap on project sizes relaxed (up to 
20MW), and players looking for scale invest. 
2012 NVVN replaced by the Solar Energy Corporation of India under the supervision of 
the MNRE. Power purchase agreements directly signed with the Solar Energy 
Corporation of India. 
Notes: NTPC: National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd; NVVN: NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd. 
 
Figure 4.2  Institutional framework of the National Solar Mission 
Notes: PPA: power purchase agreements.  
Source: Adapted from PwC (2012). 
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Table 4.2  A short overview of the salient features of the National Solar 
Mission 
Instrument/provision Purpose 
Reverse auctions Price discovery/push down costs 
Long-term power purchase 
agreements 
Reduce payment/policy risk 
Tripartite payment 
agreement with NVVN and 
Reserve Bank of India 
Provide stronger offtake agreements; ensure that payments from 
utilities will be routed through the Reserve Bank of India 
Domestic content 
requirements 
Market provision for domestic manufacturers 
Payment guarantee 
schemes 
Mitigate payment risk arising from utilities’ poor financial health 
Caps on project sizes and 
allocations to one firm 
Encourage competition 
Non-compliance penalties 
on timelines for execution, 
generation and operation 
for plant owners 
Dissuade non-serious candidates 
Legal norms mandating 
local vehicles for 
investment 
Regulation and inflow of capital 
Restrictions on equity 
dilution for stipulated time 
periods 
Ensure long-term participation 
 
The provision of long-term power purchase agreements, the tripartite agreement and 
payment guarantee schemes were the most important de-risking measures for investors who 
looked for stable returns and some protection from the risks in the renewable energy power 
sector at large. 
4.1.1 Key actors, roles, priorities and constraints 
The key actors in this case were numerous. For the central government they included: the 
MNRE, Ministry of Power, Prime Minister’s Office, former Special Envoy for Climate Change, 
National Manufacturing Competitiveness Council, NTPC (National Thermal Power 
Corporation Ltd) and NVVN (NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd), and the Central Electricity 
Regulatory Commission. 
 
At the state level it was Rajasthan that played a major role: its state government, the 
Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Ltd and the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory 
Commission. 
 
In terms of private companies, these were pure play solar power developers,37 
conglomerates, equity investors (foreign and local) and manufacturing firms. 
 
The domestic debt financiers were the scheduled commercial banks, e.g. Axis, ICICI and 
SBI. Finally, the international debt financiers included: the International Finance Corporation, 
Asian Development Bank, US Exim Bank and China Exim Bank. 
                                                     
37 Pure play developers are firms with no business other than developing solar power projects (as opposed to conglomerates 
and diversified businesses). 
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Ministry of New and Renewable Energy  
Role  
Prior to the launch of the National Action Plan on Climate Change, the MNRE had already 
internally discussed a plan for some sort of national ‘mission’ on solar power. Interviewees 
pointed to a number of factors that contributed to this internal initiative: firstly, India’s own 
large resource endowments; secondly, the fact that Indian firms had already begun forays 
into solar power (both manufacturing of solar power systems and deployment at the utility 
and sub-utility scale); and thirdly, the MNRE had already had experience with solar power in 
the distributed and off-grid segments.  
 
However, before a plan was launched a national climate agenda had begun to take shape, 
prompted by both the Prime Minister’s Office and actions at fora such as the G20, and also 
by the actions of the vocal Minister of Environments and Forests at other international fora. 
When the National Action Plan on Climate Change was launched, the Prime Minister’s Office 
moved the nascent solar mission under the aegis of the plan. Not only did this broaden the 
scope and provide a strong mandate, but it was also an ambitious plan to make India a 
globally significant market for solar power. Driving the mission, however, firmly remains the 
prerogative of the MNRE. 
Priorities 
The MNRE’s main priorities were national: to achieve energy sufficiency and political 
prestige for India. The mission, in its initial form, was discussed to expand MNRE’s initiatives 
in renewable energy deployment. Once the National Action Plan on Climate Change was 
launched and the nascent mission included, the MNRE saw an opportunity to increase the 
scale and scope with a strong mandate. 
Constraints 
It lacked the capacity to manage larger issues in the power sector, such as the behaviour of 
state utilities and infrastructure development. Through the Solar Energy Corporation of India, 
the MNRE gained a greater role within the implementation of the mission. It also lacked the 
capacity to influence debt financiers. 
Ministry of Power 
Role 
Once initial inertia had been overcome, the implementation of the mission passed to the 
bureaucracy. The secretary of the Ministry of Power shared a common connection with the 
former Special Envoy for Climate Change and the secretariat in the MNRE. All three became 
involved in a series of closed-door roundtable discussions with the MNRE and, later, 
included the secretary of the National Manufacturing Competitiveness Commission. When 
the NSM was included within the National Action Plan on Climate Change the Ministry of 
Power also became involved, and its subsidiary bodies and public sector arms, the National 
Thermal Power Corporation and the Power Grid Corporation of India, were then able to 
closely engage with the solar mission’s implementation. 
Priorities 
The Ministry of Power wanted above all to ensure the smooth roll-out of the mission, acting 
under the prime minister’s mandate. The secretary of the Ministry of Power was concerned 
to coordinate well with the MNRE to implement the mission.  
Constraints 
The ministry’s main constraint was its limited jurisdiction over state-level issues and 
governance. 
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NTPC (formerly known as National Thermal Power Corporation) and NVVN (NTPC 
Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd)  
Role 
In the next stage of planning NTPC presented itself as a partner in implementation. This was 
fortuitous in the way that NVVN, a player in a shallow and marginal power trading market, 
was actively scouting for business and received a nodal position as an intermediate off-taker 
and counterpart to power purchasing agreements for firms in the NSM. This allowed for the 
design of important de-risking measures and instruments for inspiring investor confidence 
and added another element of agency to the willingness to act on the plan for a solar 
mission (see Table 4.2). One important, even critical, resource made available due to this 
was an arrangement allowing the unallocated power supplied by the NTPC,38 often a 
strategic tool in the hands of the central government used to incentivise power-starved state 
governments into adopting better management practices, to be diverted for the cause of the 
solar mission.  
 
These early discussions had brought up a number of concerns about attracting investors that 
policymakers tried to meet. Firstly and foremostly, was the need to provide some idea of 
market size and long-term growth potential (for both developers and manufacturers). Prior 
experience from the stop-and-go growth and policy reform in the wind power sector (and the 
overall experience in other sectors of the economy) fuelled the view that, for solar power, it 
would require a much smoother transition between the stages of development.  
 
The interviews pointed to a common view that the NTPC’s role in standardising technical 
aspects of the mission had been crucial for carrying the mission. Most importantly, the 
bundled power scheme for utilities (thus reducing costs), the technical screenings required 
for the auction mechanism and the assistance in grid management issues which had hitherto 
plagued the wind power sector, enabled the smooth governance witnessed in the first phase. 
The tripartite offtake agreement between NVVN, the state utilities and the Reserve Bank of 
India allowed for the mitigation of payment risks by utilities (which is a significant risk in India 
as seen in the wind case studies). According to this policy measure, in case a state utility 
which is a signatory to the tripartite agreement fails to pay its dues to the solar power 
developer on time, the NVVN has a right to invoke the relevant clauses in the agreement 
and allow for a payment to be routed through the Reserve Bank of India to the developer.  
 
A strong message was also sent out to the state governments as significant stakeholders 
and their involvement in the mission’s execution prior to day one was counted as an 
accomplishment of coordination. One interviewee remarked that the uptake was particularly 
strong in Rajasthan as, apart from offering excellent resources, the state had hoped to 
become a ‘power exporter’ (some experts said that Gujarat might also be aiming to export 
solar power). 
Priorities 
As a ‘public sector undertaking’ the NTPC was concerned to implement the Ministry of 
Power’s mandate smoothly. NVVN’s priority, as a marginal player in India’s relatively shallow 
power trading market, was to secure new business opportunities. 
                                                     
38 Power generated by central government-owned public service enterprises is ‘allocated’ or diverted to states based on norms 
and guidelines decided by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, taking into account factors such as the state’s power 
deficit. This is revised annually, and takes the form of a contractual supply to the state in question. However, 15 per cent of the 
power generated is not immediately allocated to any particular state, and the central government makes a decision as to where 
the need is greatest and accordingly diverts this power. The official use of this power is to meet exigencies such as droughts or 
seasonality in hydropower. 
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Central Electricity Regulatory Commission 
The central regulator was also key to the NSM’s success. Along with the NVVN, the central 
commission provided technical support in rolling out the mission and was responsible for 
determining aspects of the bidding process, selection process and other guidelines. Its 
priorities aligned with the MNRE and Ministry of Power in rolling out the mission smoothly. 
Private firms – manufacturers and developers 
For a more detailed overview, see Altenburg and Engelmeier (2012). 
Role 
Even prior to the launch of the solar mission, the learning mechanisms in place (open-door 
discussions, stakeholder consultations) were inclusive and, at least procedurally, the views 
of the private sector were taken into account in each successive iteration (the interviews with 
private sector representatives, the stakeholders’ meeting and with third parties confirmed 
this). However, the influence of individual actors was unclear although some researchers 
have suggested that certain measures, such as the introduction of a domestic content 
requirement, may have favoured incumbents, particularly manufacturers (also see 
Chaudhary et al. 2014 for more detail). Within both policy and industry circles there was an 
aspiration to make India a low-cost manufacturing base for the world and promote 
opportunities for employment locally. 
 
Investors in projects in the first phase of the solar mission came from a variety of 
backgrounds and can be divided into: (1) Indian pure play solar EPCs/developers (Kiran 
Energy, SunBorne Energy); (2) IPPs (both Indian and foreign); (3) large power companies, 
both private (such as Tata Power and Reliance Power, and although they did not bid for 
projects under the solar mission, Mahindra) and public (such as GAIL); (4) foreign 
developers (such as Solairedirect and SunEdison); and (5) Indian firms with other core 
businesses diversifying into solar power (these can be subcategorised as public sector 
undertakings looking to diversify or fulfil their investment mandate and avail themselves of 
tax benefits, and privately owned firms from a variety of sectors – see EAI 2011 and NVVN 
2010).  
 
Equity investments into these parties also came from a variety of channels, including foreign 
firms (notably US-based firms such as Bessemer Venture Partners and Khosla Ventures), 
Indian private equity and financial services firms with a mandate of investing in renewables 
(such as IDFC Ltd) and a number of existing large conglomerates mentioned above. Equity 
internal rates of return varied from 17 to 20 per cent, with foreign firms looking for higher 
returns, but surprisingly, were found to be as low as 15 per cent and in some extremely rare 
cases, below that (also see Nelson et al. 2012). Some of these firms were betting on making 
exits through capital markets or looking to be acquired a few years down the line as other 
firms gained confidence in the sector. 
 
Opinions offered by interviewees and direct observations of stakeholder meetings pointed at 
a variety of motives for investors: many were seeking first-mover advantage (many firms in 
the first batch of bidding also returned to the second batch of bidding, signalling their long-
term interests), some simply looked to gain experience early on and become pure play 
service providers later on (such as SunBorne), some looked to integrate backwards (or 
forwards, such as major local manufacturers squeezed by Chinese and Taiwanese 
competition upstream), and many wished to diversify from core businesses to manage risk 
or jump to what they perceived were attractive returns from the benchmark 15 rupees/kWh 
tariff (also see Altenburg and Engelmeier 2012). It is notable that many bidders in the first 
batch were firms with hardly any prior experience, who miscalculated the costs, risks and 
returns involved.  
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A number of experienced firms also showed a significant risk appetite and, surprisingly, 
managed to achieve extremely low bid prices even in states where the perceived risks were 
high (such as Solairedirect in Rajasthan). The interviews indicated that these firms wanted a 
‘foot in the door’ and first-mover advantage and were willing to bear the risk-return trade-off 
to participate early in the solar sector. Many have returned for the second round of bidding 
and thus seem to be serious players. Others pointed at possible co-benefits from the 
investment in solar – some firms, for example, already owned the land on which they were 
building solar farms, and this, for them, was a way to earn revenues while boosting the 
values of existing assets. 
 
The interviews and documentary analysis (see PwC 2012; World Bank 2010; CEEW-NRDC 
2012) revealed that at the end of the first batch of allocations, four major forms of risk 
emerged, in the following order:  
 
1. State-specific risks (including infrastructure availability, land acquisition, force 
majeure, resource availability, etc.) 
2. Finance-related risk 
3. Policy and political risk (in particular, whether the NVVN would remain engaged and 
whether the state-specific contracts with utilities would remain bankable) 
4. Technology-related risks.  
 
The first of these was a crucial determinant to the investment decision. From the developers’ 
perspective, securing good quality sites with approval from the respective authorities has 
always remained a long-drawn-out process with some uncertainty involved, and was the 
cause of a great deal of variation in the expected returns of a project between firms engaged 
in buying land/acquiring land from the government and those firms who had already owned 
the land. Bankers proved even more sensitive. One interviewee and many representatives in 
stakeholders’ discussions remarked that, despite their wariness, banks genuinely wanted to 
lend but could not find enough ‘good’ projects where the state-specific risk was deemed 
manageable. This was more so in the solar thermal segment, where high-quality data on 
solar irradiance was lacking and hence added significantly to the project risk. 
 
Infrastructure and land availability, common concerns across the Indian power and 
infrastructure sector, still rank highest for most investors. Investment tended to flow to those 
states which undertook measures to de-risk solar projects (Karnataka, Gujarat and 
Rajasthan all initiated a policy of ‘solar parks’ to provide access to crucial resources).  
Priorities 
The first priority for manufacturers and developers was profit. 
 
 Incumbent private firms in other sectors: in the first batch of projects allocated under 
the mission, the technical criteria for screening bids were relaxed in order to ensure 
wider participation. A number of local firms with no prior experience in solar power 
development entered the fray, and analysts reported that the apparent high returns 
from an initial benchmark cost set by the central regulatory commission of 15 
rupees/kWh attracted these investors. These firms form the largest class of investor 
 Foreign entrants/foreign equity investors in Indian firms: experienced foreign 
developers (such as Solairedirect and SunEdison) also entered the market, although 
most of them partnered with a local firm with expertise in engineering, procurement 
and construction areas. Again, drawing from analyst reports and interviews, these 
firms were interested in the business of solar power and opportunities for a large 
market because of the power deficit in the country, as well as the returns offered by 
the policies on solar. Note that all of these entrants also have projects under state 
policies in Gujarat and other states, separate from the solar mission. Some firms 
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were also developers who were looking to provide services, but ventured into 
operation to gain experience 
 Publicly-owned firms: state-owned firms have ventured out into solar power projects, 
though their combined market share is less than 10 per cent. Interviews suggested 
that these investment decisions were made for three reasons: firstly, the relatively 
attractive returns; secondly, these firms already possessed the capabilities required 
to execute projects from their core businesses. Finally, Indian public sector 
undertakings typically have investment norms spelled out by the government for 
profits made and diversifying is a common practice when investments in related 
areas are feasible. As many of these firms already own critical assets in land and 
have access to infrastructure, the project execution risks are lower. 
Constraints 
The main constraint on developers was that they had a smaller share of the industry and 
relatively low policy influence in the first phase. 
 
For the manufacturers, the price of supply and financing models were mainly uncompetitive 
with the modules and equipment-linked finance available from foreign suppliers. 
Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation and the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory 
Commission 
Role 
We note that most solar projects under the NSM are based in the state of Rajasthan (Bridge 
to India 2013). A number of reasons exist for this: this state, with large swathes of barren 
and desert land (60 per cent of total land area), receives the highest amount of insolation in 
India (5.78 kWh/metre2/day) with good quality investment-grade resource data available. 
The state had a handful of solar projects already running (owned by Moser Baer and 
Reliance Power) as early as 2008, and Rajasthan’s attractiveness preceded the solar 
mission. The state’s electricity regulatory commission had announced its commitment to 
develop solar power in 2008 by imposing a solar renewable purchase obligation, in some 
sense, pre-empting the mission. In terms of the overall power sector, Rajasthan’s state 
utility, the RVPN, is one of the more creditworthy institutions in the country. Although 
payment issues had crept up in the past, renewables overall have had some support from 
Rajasthan’s electricity regulatory commission, including a payment guarantee mechanism, 
which lowered risks. 
 
The mission’s provisions also stipulate the development of solar parks for clustered 
development of projects. State governments would receive financial assistance from the 
MNRE, subject to financial and technical criteria, which is also an attractive incentive. The 
Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation had already been taking a leadership role in wind 
power, coming up with a wind renewable purchase obligation (which was not highly 
enforced, but existed nonetheless) and in 2010, signing a memorandum of understanding 
with the Clinton Foundation and the Asian Development Bank to float the Rajasthan Solar 
Park Private Ltd to oversee the development of such parks. Additionally, the state utility, with 
a comparatively strong balance sheet as far as state utilities go, set up dedicated 
infrastructure lines for wind along the sun-and-wind-rich districts of Jaisalmer, Barmer and 
Marwar-Jodhpur. With this initiative in place, the state representatives have made contact 
with the MNRE repeatedly, with a view to make Rajasthan a solar state. 
Rajasthan state government 
Role 
Politically, the ruling Congress government (in power since 2008) has been supportive of 
renewables as a means to draw investment into the state. In 2011, as solar power continued 
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to grab headlines, Rajasthan’s chief minister inaugurated the Rajasthan Solar Energy Policy 
2011, and has since been vocal in support for solar power. Previously, he had also been 
supportive of wind power projects. Strategically, as some experts pointed out, solar power 
offers a valuable opportunity for the state to draw investment, and has thus remained part of 
the state’s industrial development agenda. Committing financial resources, however, 
particularly for infrastructure, remains a crucial area for support and the state recently 
received a massive fillip when it received a US$500m loan from the Asian Development 
Bank to expand grid infrastructure in the state.  
Priorities 
The state government’s main priority was development: to gain comparative advantage by 
developing a solar power sector, and to attract the investment to do so. 
Debt financiers 
Role 
Debt finance for the NSM (and solar in general) has been a cause of concern. In the first 
phase of the mission, borrowings from scheduled commercial banks had a combined share 
of less than 30 per cent of the debt market (and typically went to larger firms and 
conglomerates with excellent balance sheets, who had pre-existing relationships with these 
banks), on a balance sheet basis. The International Finance Corporation, which provided up 
to 30 per cent of the debt, was the other major lender, albeit with a mandate to promote the 
fledgling solar sector in India. Non-banking finance companies such as the Indian 
Renewable Energy Development Agency and the Infrastructure Development Finance 
Corporation invested on a project-to-project basis, typically providing loans to more 
experienced players. The most voluminous channel, however, was equipment-linked debt 
provided by the US Exim and China Exim banks for projects using panels from these 
countries. These lenders provided up to 30–40 per cent of the debt in the first phase to both 
domestic firms as well as foreign entrants, at low interest rates and generous loan tenures. 
Additionally, once Exim funding had been secured, it was also easier to get additional loans 
from local lenders, a fact reflecting that lenders did not have much confidence in locally 
manufactured modules. To put this in context with the overall condition of the financial 
industry in the economy, infrastructure as a whole slowed considerably between 2010 and 
2012, and banks reached their priority sector caps,39 so their lending for renewables has 
been somewhat restricted. However, all stakeholders agree that there needs to be more 
done for projects to be considered more creditworthy. The MNRE cites this as one of the 
major reasons for introducing a viability gap funding mechanism in the second phase of the 
mission and for using public funds to provide opportunities for leveraging.  
Priorities and constraints 
Development finance institutions such as the International Finance Corporation and the 
Asian Development Bank prioritised providing support to a sector that was still very risky in 
order to set their own lending norms for future engagement. These norms could also then 
inform the private sector. For corporate lenders, too, solar power is still a risky sector with 
many unknown hazards, but it is a sector with potentially high returns. However, the major 
lenders typically have a history of lending to renewable energy projects, and this sector is 
part of their portfolio as standard.  
 
For private financiers the main constraint is risk. Although obliged to lend to infrastructure 
projects, there are no guidelines that specify lending to the solar power sector whose 
projects compete against lower risk-profile infrastructure projects. Two banks (Axis Bank and 
                                                     
39 Lending in India is highly regulated, and each bank must comply with lending norms set by the Reserve Bank of India, which 
specifies certain sectors, such as ‘high-priority’ and fixes a range for assets within the banks’ portfolios. Infrastructure is also a 
priority sector, though lower in priority, and there is little differentiation between various types of infrastructure lending, creating 
competition within infrastructure sub-sectors. 
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Yes Bank) have taken a more proactive stance, though their total share is extremely small 
(only six projects out of a total 249). 
Solar Energy Corporation of India 
At the end of the first phase of the NSM the NTPC’s role was revisited. Deciding that a more 
permanent, dedicated body required a presence in the ‘tripartite’ agreement and as a signal 
to mitigate policy risks, the Solar Energy Corporation of India was founded as a separate 
institution. In addition, as a body headed by officials of the MNRE, the corporation’s 
formation places the implementation of the mission and coordination with state utilities within 
the purview of the MNRE. The solar energy corporation, a body with technical and financial 
capabilities, recently acquired a trading license, and its formation was an attempt to build 
capacity and agency within the MNRE to manage the NSM. The budgetary support for the 
corporation also comes from the central government, routed through the MNRE. The 
corporation’s role is crucial as projects in the second phase have offtake agreements directly 
signed with this body instead of state utilities, and have a lower payment/executing risk 
rating due to the sovereign guarantee. How this translates in the future remains to be seen.  
4.1.2 Assessment of relationships between actors 
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy and Ministry of Power  
The relationships between the ministries were both formal and informal. Senior bureaucratic 
officials within both ministries took the lead in implementing the mission, and maintained 
connections through the professional network within the Indian Administrative Service. 
India’s former Special Envoy for Climate Change was the ‘glue’ in the relationship and 
helped both parties plan the roll-out. 
 
The explicitly formal aspect of the relationship is clear in the governance of the Solar Energy 
Corporation of India, which is governed by MNRE representatives in a directorial capacity. 
These two ministries also have a productive, formal relationship with the Prime Minister’s 
Council on Climate Change. 
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Ministry of Power and Central Electricity 
Regulatory Commission  
This three-way relationship is formally maintained. The Central Electricity Regulatory 
Commission, although institutionally responsible for specifying the norms of the NSM, is also 
headed by the former secretary of the Ministry of Power. The commission aided the speedy 
institutional set-up of the Solar Energy Corporation of India. 
Rajasthan government, Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ministry of 
New and Renewable Energy  
These relationships are both formal and informal. The chairman of Rajasthan’s regulatory 
commission and the former secretary of the MNRE are connected through the Indian 
Administrative Service network. The chairman also served with the chief minister of 
Rajasthan for many years before assuming his current position. The commission’s 
introduction of a solar renewable purchase obligation coincided with his office. 
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4.1.3 Key observations 
 
 The NSM is an example of a system transformation, where an initial idea within one 
ministry was moved under the purview of the central government, allowing access to 
a wider array of resources. Even here, however, coordination between ministries 
appears to be transitory 
 The solar mission shows a well implemented policy, where the involvement of federal 
government players reduced some of the risks that investors were facing. The 
involvement of a body to provide a ‘sovereign guarantee’ seems to have improved 
investment attractiveness 
 Challenges in procuring debt have been flagged as a key area by stakeholders. A 
roadmap for integrating participation from private sector lenders and public banks is 
notable in its absence. 
4.2 Solar power case study 2: Moser Baer Ltd – manufacturing 
growth in the solar sector and the domestic content 
requirement, 2006–09 
Prior to the launch of the NSM, some firms had bet that demand for solar would eventually 
grow. Although these investors were few, they were early entrants in a fledgling solar 
industry that, theoretically, had access to many conducive elements: access to engineering 
talent; global footprints to acquire technology that was, at the time, in its nascent stages of 
deployment; and the ability to take advantage of the local semiconductor industry. However, 
with the lack of any policy framework driving the demand side, the motivations and strategies 
of such early investors can provide experiential knowledge and useful lessons.  
 
In addition, when the mission was eventually launched, it included provisions to support a 
domestic solar industry, including some relatively controversial measures such as imposing 
a domestic content requirement. Despite these measures, however, the Indian solar 
manufacturing industry has not taken off. Nonetheless, the influence of these early entrants 
may still be considerable and understanding the priorities and constraints of these actors 
may also provide lessons for future policy design endeavours. 
 
The information and supporting facts for this case study have been drawn from interviews 
with the MNRE (November 2013), a former official at Moser Baer Ltd (July 2013) and from 
the author’s observations of an NSM stakeholders’ meeting (February 2013). 
Table 4.3  Moser Baer – chronology of events 
Date Event 
2005 Parent company decides to diversify in order to reduce business risk, and solar is seen 
as the next big market to exploit. 
2006 May: Signed technology memorandum of understanding with the Institute of 
Technology, Banaras Hindu University, to expand R&D capabilities. In-house R&D 
centre is approved by the Ministry of Science and Technology (research on thin film 
sputtering technology).40  
August: Parent company invests US$17m into Moser Baer Solar to set up facilities. 
September: Invests undisclosed amount into Solaria, a concentrated photovoltaic 
(CPV) technology company based in Fremont, US.41  
                                                     
40 Thin film sputtering is a method of depositing material on surfaces (in this case, silicon wafers) used to manufacture thin film 
solar cells. 
41 Concentrated photovoltaic technologies use curved optical surfaces such as mirrors or lenses to concentrate large amounts 
of sunlight onto a small area of photovoltaic cells to generate power. These systems use fewer solar cells as compared to a 
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October: Invests US$7m in the final closing of SolFocus’s Series A funding. 
Strategically, Moser Baer’s manufacturing facilities were complementary to SolFocus’s 
innovative concentrated photovoltaic technologies. 
November: Invests undisclosed amount into Stion Corporation, a cutting-edge 
nanotechnology firm, working on producing multiple junction high-efficiency cells. 
2007 February: Acquired OM&T BV, a Philips-owned optical technology and R&D subsidiary 
based in the Netherlands.  
Announces strategic sourcing tie-up with Deutsche Solar AG, a silicon wafer 
manufacturing firm.  
March: Acquires 40 per cent stake in Solarvalue AG (Slovenia) to ensure supply of 
silicon wafers. 
Announces the start of trial runs of 40MW c-Si42 PV production facilities. Grows to 
80MW by end of year. 
Announces planned investment of US$250m to set up thin film manufacturing capacity 
of 200MW by 2009. The investment was planned to incorporate and directly 
springboard off the then-recently announced IT and semiconductor fabrication policy. 
Enters into a technology partnership with Applied Materials Inc, US. 
June: Launches US$150m worth of foreign currency convertible bonds with a tenure of 
five years from their allotment. 
Announces receipt of orders and memoranda of understanding worth US$100m from 
global investors. 
July: Launches eight-year take-and-pay contract with REC Solar (Norway) for supply of 
high-quality multi-crystalline silicon wafers. 
October: Raises US$100m through a consortium between IDFC Private Equity, the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation Group (CDC Group – the United Kingdom’s 
development finance institution), and GIC Special Investments. The firm also positions 
itself for eventual initial public offering. 
November: Signs memorandum of understanding with government of Rajasthan to set 
up a 5MW solar farm (then India’s largest) at a Resurgent Rajasthan summit between 
Moser Baer and the Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation. 
2008 February: Plans 600MW thin film PV capacity expansion with investment of over 
US$1.5bn. 
April: Enters into a ten-year take-or-pay, market price-linked contract with LDK Solar 
for supply of high-quality multi-crystalline silicon wafers. 
May: Completes trials for Gen 8.5 a-Si (amorphous silicon) thin film modules – then the 
world’s most efficient technology. 
September: Currently with annual capacity of 120MW c-Si and 40MW thin film 
modules, Moser Baer raises US$100m from a group of investors including Nomura, 
CDC Group, Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley, IDFC Private Equity and IDFC. The firm is 
valued at US$1.4bn. 
October: Enters into long-term, fixed-price, take-or-pay obligations with a number of 
European system integrators for supply of modules. The cumulative value of contracts 
is estimated at US$500m. 
2009 NSM announced: domestic content requirement proposed. 
January: The thin film line at Greater Noida plant (SunFab line) is ready for production. 
February: Moser Baer’s 40MW thin film line receives international certification from the 
International Electrotechnical Commission. 
September: Awarded engineering, procurement and construction contract to develop a 
1MW solar farm in Maharashtra. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
non-concentrated PV system of the same rating, but can be more expensive due to the added costs of other optical 
components. These technologies are not as mature as conventional PV systems and are still the subject of intense R&D. 
42 c-Si monocrystalline silicon – single crystal wafer cells. 
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Figure 4.3  Investments in solar energy in India, 2005–12 
Notes: Asset finance: money borrowed by firms by using balance sheet assets such as accounts receivable, short-term 
investments or inventory; VC/PE: venture capital/private equity; public market: stock exchanges where firms raise money by 
selling equity shares to any willing investor; corporate debt: i.e. bonds sold to investors, with the debt repaid over time; mergers 
and acquisitions grossed: mergers (when two companies merge their operations and assets) and acquisitions (when one firm 
buys out all or almost all of the stakes of another). 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from BNEF (2014). 
4.2.1 Key actors, roles, priorities and constraints 
The key private actors were: Moser Baer Ltd, the Confederation of Indian Industry, 
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, India Electronics & 
Semiconductor Association, and private equity investors (e.g. Nomura, IDFC Private Equity 
and Blackstone). 
 
The main actor for central government was the Ministry of Communications & Information 
Technology. 
 
There were two significant overseas actors – one a group, the American suppliers (although 
they did not act collectively); and the other the Export-Import Bank of the United States (US 
Exim Bank).  
Ministry of Communications & Information Technology 
The information technology (IT) ministry’s priority was to ensure a profitable IT industry, but it 
was constrained by its inability to rapidly shake up local industry.  
 
In 2007, the Indian semiconductor industry had come under intense pressure from 
Taiwanese competitors, in both foreign and domestic markets. In response, the IT ministry 
launched a special incentives package, under which the union government would underwrite 
20 per cent of the capital expenditure in fabrication units within special economic zones and 
up to 25 per cent on units outside the zones. With a minimum threshold of investment 
amounting to 10bn rupees, few firms had the financial ability to avail themselves of this, 
although interest was exceedingly high.  
 
Instead, domestic manufacturers latched onto the idea of a protected local industry to 
provide a guaranteed market. A similar manoeuvre had been implemented previously: in 
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response to a growing threat from Taiwanese manufacturers of optical media, the Indian 
semiconductor industry had followed suit with American and European markets to impose 
anti-dumping duties, effectively delaying the death of local manufacturers. Moser Baer had 
been one of the prime beneficiaries of this protection, as it meant that the domestic market 
for storage media had been insulated from its global competitors, such as RITEK. (However, 
by 2003/04, it had become clear that maintaining volumes, even in India, would not be 
enough to save the business as margins had fallen to less than a third of 2001/02 values.)  
Moser Baer Ltd 
Moser Baer’s main priority was to make a profit, but it was constrained by a lack of financial 
and technical means to establish the same economies of scale as its Chinese competitors. 
Diversification 
Founded in the 1980s by Deepak Puri (who has also been part of high-level discussions on 
the NSM), Moser Baer Ltd had been a respected manufacturer of optical storage media (e.g. 
DVDs, CDs) for many years – it was the world’s largest manufacturer of amorphous silicon-
coated CDs. Facing increasing pressure from new technologies, slowdown in global growth 
and cost pressures from oversupply in the global market, it decided to diversify its business. 
Ratul Puri, the son of the managing director and current executive director, persuaded the 
board to move into solar photovoltaics, leveraging the capabilities they had built over the 
years in handling silicon materials and surface coatings. With an initial investment of 
US$17m, Moser Baer Solar Ltd was founded in 2006.  
Strategy and investments 
The strategy was to replicate something that it had achieved in the CD business – combine 
India’s low-cost manufacturing capabilities with foreign technology to create a base for low-
cost solar photovoltaic cells. Moser Baer expected to serve markets in Europe and the more 
developed economies in East Asia, and indeed, its initial purchase agreements and 
contracts reflected a sound strategy. Domestically, there was already some talk that India 
would look at solar in a bigger way – internally, the firm had placed an estimated demand of 
1,000MW per year in a couple of years – across multiple segments.43 The goal was to 
procure silicon from proven global manufacturers; manufacture the PV cells in India, where 
both capital costs and operational costs are lower (such as for module assembly, labour, 
etc.); and to profit from the considerable gap between the cost of manufacture in India and 
global prices for solar panels. The firm also acquired technology firms in the US (SolFocus 
and Stion), which were both developing radically new technologies at the time, which would 
have given it a strong differentiating factor as well as an international benchmark for the 
quality of its technology quality.  
 
Domestically, under the IT ministry’s special incentive package scheme, Moser Baer Solar 
invested in a fabrication unit in a special economic zone near New Delhi and announced a 
planned investment of 20bn rupees in Tamil Nadu.  
Challenges 
By the fourth quarter of 2008, however, the company faced a series of challenges. Beginning 
with a supply glut in silicon (a capacity of 12GW against a projected demand of 7GW) 
brought about by the rapid expansion of Chinese firms and shrinking growth in the European 
markets, the margins in the global PV module market eroded considerably. At the same 
time, thanks to the global financial crisis, subsidies and fiscal incentives dried up in Spain, 
Germany and other European leaders in the solar market. Moser Baer Solar, now a 
100+MW firm, could not compete with the heavily subsidised, large-scale Chinese firms that 
were looking to expand their capacities up to 1GW. In addition, Moser Baer’s investment in 
                                                     
43 When asked in the interviews whether the firm had foreseen a solar mission in the future, the reply was that there was an 
expectation that solar would pick up in India, seeing the global trend. The form of the policy push, however, was unexpected. 
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R&D had failed to yield a competition-beating technology, especially with the massive drop 
in silicon prices that essentially eroded any performance advantages. The only way out, to 
build scale or scale back, was a false choice. 
Renewable Energy Committee of the Confederation of Indian Industry; India 
Electronics & Semiconductor Association; and Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry 
During this period the NSM had begun to take shape within the MNRE. The managing 
director of Moser Baer Solar, who had been the head of the Renewable Energy Committee 
of the Confederation of Indian Industry and a member of the Federation of Indian Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry, was a part of these early discussions about how to promote 
India’s solar sector. The India Electronics & Semiconductor Association in this period also 
made a series of consultative presentations and representations to the MNRE, with the focus 
on how a push for solar power could help the Indian semiconductor industry. 
 
These industry representatives also argued for protection for Indian manufacturers from 
outside competitive forces. So, in the first phase of the NSM document a domestic content 
requirement was introduced, extending over the cells and modules to be used in its projects. 
Crucially, however, this requirement covered only crystalline silicon as that was the only 
technology under widespread development in India at the time, and the only technology for 
which all manufacturers had developed competencies. This had some unintended effects as 
developers subsequently went for thin film technologies instead, sourced from foreign firms, 
even though the thin film PV modules had been found to work less efficiently in other 
countries. The reasons for the developers’ choice were multiple. Firstly, they claimed that 
locally manufactured modules were not cost-effective, even as manufacturers such as Moser 
Baer rushed to extend delayed payment schemes and long lines of credit for takers. 
Secondly, despite the mad push for competitive lending domestically, the Chinese and 
American Exim Banks provided extremely cheap debt finance (at rates below seven per 
cent) for any developers interested in purchasing products from the banks’ home countries. 
As a result, 75 per cent of the projects in the first phase of the NSM utilised thin films. In 
2011, the only other local manufacturer of the same scale as Moser Baer, Tata BP Solar, 
announced that the two stakeholders (Tata and BP) would part ways. By the beginning of 
the NSM’s second phase in 2013, total manufacturing capacity in India had barely touched 
1,500MW. 
Moser Baer Projects Ltd 
With dwindling sales, in 2008, Moser Baer launched a project development arm as a vehicle 
for its own PV cells, as well as to further diversify within the power business. Moser Baer 
Projects Ltd was incorporated in 2008 with verticals across solar power, thermal, 
hydropower and turnkey contracts. Moser Baer Projects launched plans for constructing 
India’s then-largest solar power plant under the Gujarat state Solar Policy, totalling 45MW, 
and began talks with the Tamil Nadu state government for a 7.5MW plant. (Tata BP Solar, 
now relaunched as Tata Solar, made the same decision, entering into EPC arrangements in 
2011.) Moser Baer’s change of tack worked, and the firm attracted a US$300m equity 
infusion by Blackstone in the third quarter of 2010. 
 
The question of how to foster a domestic solar manufacturing industry in India still remains. 
After introducing six different options for a domestic content provision (including a domestic 
content requirement on total cost instead of components, to benefit the downstream 
manufacturing industry supplying all the other elements of a solar power system such as 
inverters manufacturers, wiring, switches, etc.), phase 2 of the mission has stipulated a 
much higher domestic content requirement (75 per cent) on both crystalline silicon and thin 
film technologies. With analysts predicting the stabilisation of prices in panels worldwide, it 
remains to be seen whether Indian manufacturing can catch up. Both Tata Power and Moser 
83 
 
Baer retain their stake in their respective manufacturing arms. With phase 2 only now 
beginning to move ahead, the goal of creating a local market may yet be achieved. 
4.2.2 Assessment of relationships between actors 
Ministry of Communications & Information Technology and manufacturing firms 
Through the semiconductor industry associations, the solar manufacturing firms maintained 
formal relationships with the IT ministry.  
MNRE and manufacturing firms 
The manufacturers, as incumbents in the solar industry prior to the launch of the mission, 
were consulted extensively and formally.  
Moser Baer Solar and manufacturing associations 
Apart from being a member of trade associations, the managing director of Moser Baer Solar 
was a senior member of these industry bodies.  
4.2.3 Key observations 
 
 The indigenous solar manufacturing industry is, in principle, heavily dependent on 
policy support in light of the current global competitive scenario in the industry 
 Many risks in the Indian solar industry are external to the country 
 Finding the right mix of instruments to develop a local solar manufacturing industry is 
proving to be complex, especially in terms of managing existing firms in the system 
 There are significant vested political interests in protecting a domestic industry that 
may arise out of the industrialisation imperative, although the findings could not 
confirm the motivations (and the political economy of these policy decisions are also 
beyond the scope of this paper) 
 Interactions between actors in different arenas (such as federal government actors in 
renewable energy and other aspects of industry) may be important influences on 
decision-making in the future, with respect to the solar industry. 
4.3 Solar power case study 3: developers in solar power – 
SunBorne Energy 
While the previous case studies have focused extensively on larger sets of investment 
events and policy changes, it is important to understand how the nature of the actors also 
changes. Just as with wind power, where we see the emergence of IPPs capitalising on 
maturing market instruments, in the solar power market, in addition to the big-ticket industrial 
investors and diversified firms, we can see the emergence of pure play developers and 
service providers. Many of these firms are also backed by foreign equity and capital, unlike 
the diversified conglomerates that have simply raised credit on the strength of their existing 
balance sheets. SunBorne Energy, notable for its technological expertise, is one of those 
backed by foreign venture capitalists. 
 
This case study, then, aims to provide an (non-exhaustive) overview of the kind of company 
that attracts foreign capital, the facilitative elements and the risks faced by developers 
(particularly at the state and project level), and the spaces in the market where such 
entrepreneurs find opportunities. 
 
The interviewees for this case study were SunBorne’s CEO and founder (November 2013), a 
representative for Bridge to India (July 2013) and participants at a meeting of NSM 
stakeholders (February 2013). 
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Table 4.4  SunBorne Energy – chronology of events 
Date Event 
2008 SunBorne Energy set up with initial seed funding from Khosla Ventures (established 
2004, venture capital firm with a clean technology focus). 
2009 SunBorne secures US$5.2m from General Catalyst Partners (a US-based private 
equity fund). 
Bids successfully for first NSM project. 
October 
2010 
International Finance Corporation invests US$10m in equity. Another US$5.9m raised 
through compulsory convertible debentures. 
2010 Enters into a joint R&D agreement with the MNRE to develop solar thermal 
technologies. 
May 
2011 
Enters into an agreement with Chinese company Suntech Power for the supply of 
100MW of solar panels until 2013. 
June 
2011 
Enters into an agreement with a local infrastructure developer and IPP to establish a 
5MW concentrated solar power plant in Andhra Pradesh.44 
August 
2011 
Receives a loan of US$30.6m to build its 15MW solar PV plant in Gujarat (later to be 
expanded beyond 50MW). Investors include the State Bank of Patiala, Canara Bank, 
Exim Bank of India and State Bank of Travancore. 
March 
2012 
Completes a 3MW plant in Rajasthan for an IPP. 
July 
2012 
Raises US$5m in another round of equity funding and announces future plans for a 
50+MW thermal project plan in Karnataka. Analysts expect firm to raise over US$20m 
in future rounds. 
2012 SBI Capital Markets funds 5MW Rajasthan PV project. Three projects commissioned 
– power purchase agreement signed with Gujarat. 
March 
2013 
Bidding under Andhra Pradesh Solar Policy, SunBorne is able to put in the lowest cost 
bid for a solar thermal plant of 5MW. 
 
4.3.1 Key actors and their roles 
The private sector actors were SunBorne Energy Ltd and its venture capital investors. The 
public sector actors were, at a national level, the MNRE; and then the governments and 
various agencies of the states of Rajasthan, Gujarat, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. 
SunBorne Energy 
The company was incorporated in 2008 in the US as SunBorne Energy Technologies Pvt 
Ltd. Its founder, James Abraham, was able to attract venture capital investment from clean 
technology-focused Khosla Ventures based in Silicon Valley, US. Within the next two years 
the firm successfully managed to build some of the lowest cost and lowest risk plants in the 
early stages of solar power in India. Although still a relatively smaller player in terms of total 
capacity installed and targeted – as compared to large infrastructure developers such as 
Lanco Solar (which has already bid for over 200MW and in 2012 announced a move to 
integrate vertically) – the firm has quickly gained a reputation for reliability and, along with 
the MNRE, set up India’s first public–private partnership in solar thermal technologies. 
 
SunBorne set out to be primarily a technology and EPC-focused player, in essence 
differentiating itself on the basis of competencies in developing technology, managing 
project risks and providing services in asset development. When SunBorne entered the 
                                                     
44 Concentrated solar power (CSP) systems use mirrors or lenses to concentrate a large area of sunlight onto a small area. 
Electrical power is produced when the concentrated light is converted to heat, which drives a heat engine (usually a steam 
turbine) connected to an electrical power generator – solar thermal power. 
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market most competitors were focusing on financing, project development and ownership, 
with none focused on improving technology and providing EPC as a service. Mr Abraham’s 
view was that as the sector developed over a long period, not only would there be a 
requirement for good technical skills, but there was also scope for the technology to improve. 
As such, despite newcomers also offering EPC services, SunBorne is still one of the few 
companies looking to access and develop next-generation technology, and with the ability to 
do so through its international links.45 
Early stages 
In the early stages, SunBorne focused on building momentum and striking up good 
relationships wherever it operated rather than immediately looking to scale up. The risk 
environment that developers were operating in was not transparent, and so it was important 
to proceed with solid, good projects. In the early period (2008–11), internal rates of return 
from solar power could be as high as 16 per cent but there were a number of risks involved.  
 
Firstly, nearly two years after the global financial crisis (which also affected India, after a 
short lag, though capital markets benefited) financing for infrastructure as a whole slowed 
down considerably. Existing power assets, especially in thermal power which was hit by 
shortages of coal and so lost money, became extremely cheap. As a result, there was not 
much interest in creating new assets and instead more interest in trading existing ones. New 
assets with relative value were difficult to find. 
 
Solar had value because of the returns offered by policy, but as evidenced by the events of 
the NSM there were few takers for such a new and therefore risky technology. Solar PV 
power was hardly proven in India, and solar thermal was even more risky, hardly proven 
anywhere in the world. Thirdly, and most importantly, as Mr Abraham noted, the overall 
policy environment was extremely unpredictable. As solar power is heavy on capital 
expenditure and loans tend to be front-ended, investors require certainty about the long-term 
prospects.  
R&D 
The key differentiator for SunBorne has been its ability to leverage international links in 
technology and its increasing focus on solar thermal power. So far, investments in this 
technology in India have been few, and mostly by developers who already have experience 
elsewhere. At the end of phase 1 of the NSM, 470MW of solar thermal projects had been 
allocated and, as of now, the costs of these are much higher than comparable PV ones. 
However, solar thermal offers some advantages that could be crucial for India. Firstly, the 
peak load hours in India are closer to the evenings, when lights are switched on, in addition 
to air conditioning; however, at this time, solar PV cannot function. Solar thermal, where a 
few hours of storage is possible through purely physical means, could be an excellent way to 
match production to demand. SunBorne is therefore a major investor, developing R&D 
capabilities for solar thermal power. In addition, the firm has been able to negotiate with the 
MNRE to set up a public–private partnership vehicle to manufacture the necessary 
components in India. The view is that with greater investment in R&D in areas where India 
has technical capabilities and expertise (such as mechanical engineering and handling 
industrial processes) there is a great scope for creating technologies that will not just attract 
foreign investors, but will give Indian industry a global comparative advantage. Mr Abraham 
stated in his interview that engineering capability for solar thermal power in India already 
exceeds that of anywhere else in the world. Whereas solar thermal plants can take up to 
US$4m to build in other parts of the world, in India the costs are already down to US$3.3m 
(some 40 per cent of the costs being for labour, which is relatively cheap in India). 
                                                     
45 The authors note that while both Khosla Ventures and General Catalyst Partners backed SunBorne, other venture capital 
firms have not focused on technology in the same way. Bessemer Ventures, for example, has backed firms which have 
followed a more traditional EPC model. 
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Project development and execution 
In actual project execution, the process of land acquisition and managing that process was 
deemed to be the most significant risk. To manage it, firms need to move early, begin 
negotiations with the governments involved and wait until approvals are received from all 
relevant authorities. Mr Abraham said that Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh were both 
relatively efficient bureaucracies in converting agricultural land to non-agricultural land (a key 
step in the approval process) and that obtaining large tracts of land across good sites early 
was important. In the former case, the government acquires land on behalf of the solar 
developer and allots it. Conducting all negotiations through the government can help avoid 
problems later, for example, rising prices as farmers and landowners notice that their 
otherwise unused land is extremely attractive as a solar project site. A smooth land 
acquisition process, free of legal hassles, is thus an important factor for success. Those 
developers who arranged power purchase agreements before acquiring land have found it 
very difficult to execute projects in time.  
 
One of SunBorne’s key competencies is the ability to put up plants quickly. When the firm 
started with its first plant it took 13 months, and now the same process takes just four 
months, including the two weeks it takes for the local inspectors and transmission authorities 
to examine the site and commission the project. In each of its projects, in addition to 
carefully managing the process of land acquisition, SunBorne found that the cooperative 
utility board also played an important role, especially in putting up transmission lines. In 
Gujarat, the utility delayed putting up lines by eight months; in the end SunBorne had to do it 
itself. This is an interesting parallel with the wind sector, which also saw manufacturing firms 
setting up the infrastructure to transmit power away from their projects (see wind case 
studies in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). 
State-specific issues 
Gujarat state government and utility  
In terms of policy fickleness, Gujarat is an excellent example. Although the state has taken a 
leading role in developing solar power through its own state policy, with investors locked into 
a 25-year power purchase agreement, in 2013 the state announced retroactive tariff cuts for 
PV solar plant owners on the grounds that developers’ costs were far lower than they had 
originally stated, as they submitted them when the PV module prices were high, but did not 
actually construct the plants until after global prices had fallen (EFYTimes 2013). SunBorne, 
along with Moser Baer Solar and other operators in Gujarat sought redress from the local 
electricity regulatory commission. Despite pressure from the state utility, the commission 
rejected the appeal to enact retroactive tariff cuts. In August 2014, the commission’s 
decision was upheld by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (the highest judiciary body in 
charge of resolving disputes in the power sector), rejecting the utility’s appeals. Nonetheless, 
Gujarat’s offtake agreements are among the strongest of all the states (see below).  
Andhra Pradesh state government 
Andhra Pradesh is another state where the political environment has suddenly changed. A 
group of separatist agitators from a less well-developed part of the state who had been 
campaigning for a separate government finally got their way, resulting in a decision to split 
the state into two (see Vakulabharanam 2013 and Karri 2013). Thanks to the administrative 
overhaul required, many decisions on land, power and infrastructure will now have to wait. 
Off-takers 
The view of the utility board must be appreciated especially in the light of payment risks. 
Many developers have said that utilities did not like solar power. This was particularly 
because of its intermittency, expense and its ‘must-run’ status, which makes it difficult for 
them to cycle through and manage solar with other sources when there is a large 
concentration of solar power in any one region. However, in Gujarat, Rajasthan and Andhra 
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Pradesh the off-takers’ payment records were good. In Gujarat especially, their utilities 
account for payments to solar power projects easily because of the long-term locked FIT. In 
addition, as the utilities manage to pool the solar-generated power with conventional power 
and because solar is still only a small part of total production, they are able to sell to high-
voltage electricity consumers at a higher margin than their cost of purchase, thus making a 
profit (subsequent losses, of course, accruing because they have to provide free electricity to 
the agricultural sector). In Rajasthan, the proposed terms are somewhat different: the off-
taker for solar power is the Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Ltd (the state energy 
development agency), rather than the utility. In addition to the corporation’s good payment 
records, it also extends a payment guarantee to developers by giving them access to a third-
party bank account from which developers can draw funds with a letter of credit, in case of 
payment delays or defaults.  
 
In this environment, the power purchase agreement is crucial. In the power sector as a 
whole the only protection against arbitrary changes in policy is the contract for the sale of 
power. Across the sector, developers and manufacturers have found that the regulatory 
machinery can come into force and protect them only if the initial contract is strong enough. 
This puts the state electricity board and its management (whose bureaucrats typically have 
long terms in charge) in a very important position as a facilitator of renewable energy 
projects. In general, developers across the solar sector have been very happy with the 
proactive nature of bureaucrats in Rajasthan and Gujarat, as well as their energy 
development agencies. Mr Abraham stated that no developer or investor seemed to be 
concerned about the change of governments as no political party had ever decided to 
change the contracts or conditions on which previous investments took place.  
Structural/sectoral issues 
Finance 
In this risk environment, however, securing long-term credit from an Indian bank would 
depend on the strength of the firms’ balance sheet. For SunBorne, a new company, the 
strength of the equity funding from previous venture capital rounds was an important 
consideration. More important for banks were the exact projects that were being executed. In 
Gujarat and Rajasthan, SunBorne bid for projects that were less than 20MW. With smaller 
projects being easier to manage, easier for the state utility to absorb power from and also to 
learn from, the firm preferred to bid for small projects in the earlier phases – which are also 
more attractive to banks. Lately, one large domestic bank, SBI Capital Markets, with a 
mandate to expand its investment in renewable energy, was signed on as a partner. Its 
involvement is seen to be important because of its ability to syndicate future loan 
requirements.46 
 
Overall in the solar power sector, funding flowed easily for projects in Gujarat, where the 
power purchase agreements and the solar energy policy were clear. It was also easy to get 
funding in Rajasthan – where the chief lenders were large public sector banks such as the 
SBI – because of the low resource and payment risk. Most of the banks that SunBorne 
approached earlier about funding have been willing to experiment with smaller investments, 
but yet deem the sector as a whole to be one that is still immature for large-scale lending 
(which is different from wind power). However, in general, there has been no talk from the 
government about instruments such as debt guarantees, where larger bodies such as 
development finance institutions could be engaged. The view among the industry is that 
                                                     
46 Loan syndication as a project financing mechanism has increased over the past decade. It involves several different lenders 
in providing various portions of a large loan, which is larger than what any single lender is willing or able to provide. Several 
lenders work together to provide the borrower the required loan at a rate agreed by all the lenders. 
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much more can be done to engage financiers, although developers as a whole understood 
their wariness.47 
 
Again, large firms such as Tata Power, Mahindra, Lanco Solar and Welspun, for whom solar 
power is just one small part of a larger conglomerate, have managed to leverage existing 
EPC experience to venture successfully into turnkey projects for solar, and also managed to 
access debt finance very easily because of their strong balance sheets.  
Lobbying and policy advocacy 
The solar power sector is marked by three major lobbies: the Solar Power Developers 
Association, the Confederation of Indian Industry, and the Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry, which have both developers and manufacturers among their 
members. Prior to the first phase the role of developers was relatively limited in policy 
advocacy as there were few of any significance.  
 
However, what has been noticeable about the solar mission so far is that governments 
themselves consulted extensively about the policy process. Mr Abraham remarked that for 
all the policy documents released so far, firms like his have been consulted at every step 
and governments have sent the policy documents for comment. However, stakeholders’ 
influence on the final decision is not entirely clear. A particular illustration is the case of the 
domestic component requirement. Before the launch of the mission’s second phase, a 100 
per cent domestic component requirement was mooted. Developers who stood to lose 
competitiveness and funding channels if such a provision was enforced reacted strongly. 
Over the course of various meetings, it seemed that this had some effect and the domestic 
component requirement was reduced to 75 per cent.  
4.3.2 Key observations 
 
 Despite the immaturity of the solar energy policy, firms and investors have emerged 
in the solar power sector which take a long-term view 
 Even in solar power, the role of the utility is critical. Project risks and operation 
depend on the quality of the utility’s support 
 Investors expect services and technical skills to play a critical role – both in terms of 
reducing risk as well as improving yield 
 The nature of the firm in solar power in India is different from that involved in wind 
power, with the primary players capturing a different part of the value chain rather 
than the supplier-driven manufacturing model prevalent in the wind sector. 
                                                     
47 In the first phase of the solar mission, the net debt provided by scheduled commercial banks was less than 30 per cent. The 
International Finance Corporation was the largest single contributor with 20–30 per cent of the finance involved. The rest came 
from Exim Banks, who were interested in pushing technologies from their home countries in the wake of cut-throat competition 
between photovoltaic manufacturers globally. 
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5 Summary and key findings 
5.1 Investment signals: state-level policy vs federal government 
policy 
Formal financial incentives and service delivery have been critical for driving investment in 
wind and solar power. However, whereas the initial focus was on deriving additional benefit 
from renewables on a cost basis, the market has gradually shifted to mainstreaming 
renewable power alongside conventional generation. The level of this integration is at the 
state level and so policies there are much more important. 
 
The case studies, both for wind and solar power, reveal that the crucial determinants of 
investment decisions are the state-level policies and environments. The MNRE, with its 
limited budget and influence over state-level governments, has only been able to extend a 
few – albeit important – incentives to craft the ‘retail’ business model. However, the 
attractiveness of a project is determined by particular policies at the state level and to what 
extent the federal government policy guidelines have been adopted and implemented. 
Clearly, despite inducements such as accelerated depreciation, generation-based incentives 
and renewable energy certificates across all states, some states have built up their wind and 
solar power sectors far more successfully than others and investments have followed sound 
implementation. 
5.1.1 Tariffs and renewable purchase obligations 
At the state level the most important roles have been those of tariffs and the provision of 
infrastructure and renewable purchase obligations which provide market certainty. Tariffs, 
calculated on a cost-plus methodology for both wind and solar, do depend on the initiative 
taken by the regulator/government in judging what aspects of costs and returns are feasible, 
and thus, despite the transparency, still have many subjective components. The renewable 
purchase obligations are even more subjective – electricity regulatory commissions can fix 
them so that procuring renewable power for obligated entities is not burdensome and the 
market can grow to provide it. However, striking a balance between growth, controlling costs 
and providing certainty has proven tricky. 
5.1.2 Political mandate vis-à-vis systematic implementation 
In the case of solar energy, the main political interventions so far have been the NSM – 
which has also seen a remarkable bias in favour of a certain state, namely Rajasthan – and 
the Gujarat state Solar Policy. In each case, however, the prime mover was a member of the 
political class, and the strong mandate to carry forward a ‘risky’ sector was extremely 
important to ensure that the respective bureaucracies implemented the policies and 
coordinated their different elements and participants – in the NSM’s case, between various 
ministries and the agencies in Rajasthan, and in the case of Gujarat, between the regulators, 
the state electricity board and the utilities.  
5.1.3 Role of the political class 
The reasons for decisions at state level are not always clear, but the role of the political 
class, when aligned in favour of renewables, has been significant. Sharp investment peaks 
have occurred when the support of the political class has shown a clear intent toward 
renewable energy. This ‘intent’, although difficult to sustain as political parties come and go, 
has never been wholly negative toward renewable energy projects and all interviewees 
remarked that, across the board, politicians have been receptive and sympathetic. This has 
not always translated into public finance (as in the case of Tamil Nadu), but has been a 
necessary condition for action at all levels. 
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5.1.4 Climate change as a motivation 
In all of the states where the case studies are based, the renewable energy policy 
documents have stated climate change mitigation as an objective in promoting renewables. 
However, if this is the case then an integrated framework for evaluating impact is 
conspicuous in its absence throughout – and this includes the NSM. With this in mind, it may 
be premature to say that climate change is an important driver. Power sufficiency has been 
much more consistent as a driver across all states, with Gujarat as a notable anomaly – a 
power-surplus state that is still investing in renewables – although even there, renewable 
electricity contributes less than four per cent of total electricity. In the case of Tamil Nadu it is 
much starker, where wind alone contributes 16–18 per cent of the state’s power, and the 
shortages are severe enough to justify heavy investments even in intermittent wind. In each 
interview the motive of power sufficiency was the key explanatory variable, followed by 
industrial growth and ‘prestige’. This implies that climate change concerns may not have 
been as important a driver as energy security and sufficiency. 
5.2 Key roles of certain agents 
The introduction of policy measures has depended to a large extent on the leadership of 
individuals within the bureaucracy and political class. Many of these individuals, particularly 
within the government, have had long-standing professional relationships, which enabled 
manoeuvres for policy and organisational innovation.  
 
In comparison, relationships between private actors and state actors have been in formal 
settings such as the proceedings of regulatory hearings and formal advocacy activities. An 
alignment of interests has occurred primarily when policymakers have taken a strategic view 
of renewable energy in terms of energy sufficiency, sustainable development or climate 
change. 
5.2.1 Role of manufacturers in the wind sector 
Investment peaks in India have clearly followed two signals: macroeconomic conditions and 
state-level policy. However, in wind power the role of the firm (especially the manufacturer) 
has been important in driving the sector forward. Between 2003 and 2007, in organising the 
sector, marketing wind power, pushing for policy reform via organised groups during the 
electricity regulatory commission hearings and also in sensitising members of the political 
class, the manufacturer takes centre stage. However, informal relationships were not 
revealed in the interviews.  
5.2.2 Leadership within electricity regulatory commissions  
What can be seen, however, is the important role of the regulatory commissions – wherever 
the regulators have taken it upon themselves to promote renewables adequately (as in 
Maharashtra and Rajasthan), investors have responded well to the policy signals. Now both 
formal and informal relationships are common throughout the bureaucracy, and the role of 
such relationships in coordinating or brokering policy ideas between the central-level 
bureaucracy and the state level seems to have been important (in both directions). One 
interviewee candidly stated so, speaking of the case of the inclusion of renewable purchase 
obligations in the National Tariff Policy. Particularly in the wind power sector, as players are 
anticipating growth in the renewable energy certificate market (which in principle would yield 
higher returns than the FIT market), those states with a good record of compliance with the 
renewable purchase obligation and strong stances taken by the state regulators, are likely to 
attract investments.  
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5.2.3 Central government leadership 
For solar power, as a nascent sector, the scenario is somewhat different. Firstly, there is a 
strong central-level signal, which is backed by a sovereign guarantee – thus the safest kind 
of signal from an investor’s perspective. Secondly, since the implementation has a clear 
institutional home which is more ‘permanent’ – the MNRE, with states playing a supporting 
role – there is some confidence that political changes will not affect the mission. This is in 
contrast with investment in the states which follow their own ‘boom and bust’ cycles and 
where short-term policy fickleness is a larger problem.  
5.2.4 Connections across state and centre 
As seen in the case of Maharashtra with the introduction of the generation-based incentive 
and later the implementation of the NSM, the connections between individuals across 
institutions and agencies at the central and state levels have been important in driving both 
policy reform and implementation. These individuals have had a shared professional 
background or connections through the Indian bureaucracy, and these roles and the 
movements of professionals across agencies and their leadership have been instrumental in 
creating momentum to drive reform and implement certain policy measures. 
5.2.5 Political interests of critical agents 
Finally, in terms of actual project implementation and risks, in the case of both wind and 
solar power the role of the state electricity board and utility takes centre stage. Whenever the 
state electricity boards have been cooperative, projects are bid for and executed quickly. 
There may, however, exist a coalition of interests that opposes renewables by creating 
inertia in the existing system of cross-subsidisation. Managing the operations of the state 
utilities and their service provision is critical.  
5.2.6 Evolution in the nature of the firm and its interests  
Especially in the case of wind, the role of the manufacturers has been very important. Not 
only do they organise the sector and carry out joint marketing activities, but their actions as a 
combined voice of the industry in lobbying for macro-level policy reform has been crucial for 
keeping things on track. As independent power providers are stepping into the picture, the 
scenario may be changing and the interests of manufacturers and investors may differ. In 
solar power particularly, there is greater disintegration along the value chain – investors in 
projects may be separate from developers and manufacturers. Specialisation in services and 
R&D are emerging as ways to gain competitive advantage. 
5.3 Nature of policy/interest bundling 
Over time, organisational arrangements and instruments have attempted to manage the 
expectations and interests of various actors through formal approaches. However, there are 
many areas to be addressed.  
5.3.1 Managing the political economy conditions of the wider power sector 
Within each sector there are some clear misalignments of interest that have not always been 
resolved, and these have most often caused poor policy implementation or coordination, 
which has damaged the wind power sector severely in the past. As seen in both Tamil Nadu 
and Maharashtra, the state electricity boards and especially the governments have been 
receptive to wind power only so far as it involves no major commitment of financial 
resources, although this is crucial for critical elements such as infrastructure. The electricity 
regulatory commissions, although empowered to issue orders in such a case, do not have 
the powers to ensure implementation, and, as in the case of Tamil Nadu, their interests 
sometimes align with the interests of the state electricity board. Other central government-
mandated policy moves, such as the renewable purchase obligations, also failed to bring 
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about alignments. As seen in the case of IPPs, the renewable energy certificate market has 
failed in so far as some states simply did not comply with the renewable purchase obligation. 
In Tamil Nadu the regulatory commission fixed a renewable purchase obligation that could 
easily be met with the existing generation capacity. In the case of Maharashtra, although the 
renewable purchase obligation was fixed, compliance was poor and only now has the 
regulator taken strong action (Shrimali et al. 2012). Unfortunately, these moves have only 
created further conflicts of interest and the policy has failed to take off. 
5.3.2 Using ‘co-benefits’ to drive renewables 
However, policies have tried to take advantage of the ‘co-benefits’ narrative to attract various 
parties to a common benefit, in particular at the federal level, and some states (such as 
Gujarat, and previously, Maharashtra) have used this to bundle, at least publicly, the 
prerogative of energy sufficiency and sustainability with climate change mitigation concerns 
(see Dubash et al. 2013). This has also been useful in creating a negotiating position with 
which to interact with other actors, such as the one the Maharashtra Energy Development 
Agency adopted when creating the Green Energy Fund or the one that the Rajasthan 
Renewable Energy Corporation adopted to enact reforms to land acquisition procedures. On 
the whole, however, industrialisation and attracting investment seem to have played a more 
important role in securing the buy-in of the political class. While no interview revealed the 
exact nature of these negotiations, in both Rajasthan and Gujarat, which are now moving 
toward a power-surplus position, the political prestige associated with greater ‘development’ 
and foreign investment seems to have been important. In Rajasthan, the fact that the local 
government is taking advantage of deployment to encourage a local PV manufacturing 
industry by imposing a state domestic content requirement, also points to the same (analyst 
interview). 
5.3.3 Fleeting organisational arrangements 
Wherever aligned interests have resulted in innovations to bypass such difficulties (such as 
the role of the Maharashtra Energy Development Agency in setting up infrastructure funds, 
or the MNRE’s role in the NSM in reducing costs for utilities, thus using policy as a tool to 
avoid potential conflicts of interest) the results have been emphatic. As in the case of the 
IPPs and the execution risks they have faced, coalitions or at least short-term coordinated 
actions have had to extend to the highest echelons of power at the state level. By nature, 
each of these seems to be short lived and transitional rather than a true long-term 
engagement, with only certain actors’ institutional roles being permanent (such as the MNRE 
or the electricity regulatory commissions). Informal relationships have been important, but in 
terms of policy implementation, within the bureaucracy it has been the leadership of key 
individuals and bodies that has made the difference. 
5.3.4 Lack of common fora  
On this note, it is also interesting to see what has not happened. There are clearly many 
stakeholders in the wind sector that are pursuing similar goals, including manufacturers, 
IPPs, other investors, state nodal agencies and the MNRE. On the other hand, there are 
important stakeholders who passively or actively oppose wind (such as utilities and 
transmission companies). However, as more than one interviewee remarked, there are no 
common platforms for all the involved bodies to come together. Actors such as the Planning 
Commission and its state level counterparts, who have a removed, but respected role, are 
not even engaged with the implementation issues. There are already pockets of action 
across the industry, with talk of a Wind Task Force and a Renewable Energy Forum, and 
also talk of a National Wind Energy Mission in the latest National Five-Year Plan, but this 
has yet to emerge. 
 
Coalitions have rarely shown active cooperation unless it has been for policy reform or 
precipitating policy implementation. As such, their nature seems to be short-term and event-
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based. This is not entirely true for coalitions within the public sector and government, where 
long-term institutional relations have helped a particular world-view take shape. Even here, 
however, the longevity of actors in particular positions is a question. 
5.4 Changing nature of the wind and solar power sectors 
The policy approach, the nature of the firms engaged in the sector and the nature of 
coordination between various actors have changed considerably over the course of the past 
ten years. 
5.4.1 Policy learning 
In both wind and solar power the move toward market-based mechanisms in creating 
greater returns and widening the scope of the market is noticeable. In particular, the MNRE, 
by introducing inducements such as the renewable purchase obligation, renewable energy 
certificate and generation-based incentive (there existed a generation-based incentive for 
solar power as well, although the returns were not as attractive as bidding under the NSM), 
is trying to provide more and more options for different classes of investors, to promote scale 
and also improve the uptake of renewables within the conventional power sector. This is a 
significant shift from the depreciation and feed-in tariff-driven industry where the returns 
were stable, but not high, and there was less incentive to compete with conventional power 
producers. 
5.4.2 Changing firms 
The wind power industry, led mostly by manufacturers, is now seeing large investors emerge 
and there is greater differentiation along the value chain. In solar power, which has yet to 
stabilise, we see much more variety. There are firms, like manufacturers in wind, trying to 
integrate along the entire value chain (such as Moser Baer), then firms who are only looking 
to operate solar power plants (such as NTPC and GAIL), and then there are firms who are 
only looking to provide services (such as SunBorne). Much depends on the risk appetite of 
the parties involved; where large investors such as Tata Power or IPPs in wind, by virtue of 
their size, can negotiate with utilities and other end-customers or even think of more 
attractive group captive models to trade power on the open market, smaller players may 
prefer the security of a state-backed power purchase agreement. 
5.5 Macroeconomic tripping wire: finance 
Coalition or government activity has failed to stimulate finance for renewable energy in 
particular areas (risk capital, long credit, etc.).  
5.5.1 Supply as a bottleneck?  
The story of finance in both sectors is quite telling. In India, apart from IREDA and a few 
international banks or development finance institutions, there are no banks who lend on a 
per-project non-recourse basis,48 which is what is preferred for renewable energy assets 
worldwide. For many years, this put manufacturers in an important position as providers of 
credit for their investors. However, over time, with the focus on export markets and securing 
first-mover advantage, the strong growth models meant that manufacturers would borrow 
heavily, which was not always sustainable. Globally, Suzlon’s model of inorganic growth 
through acquisitions and Vestas’s financial difficulties in Denmark from 2008 to 2010, also 
played out in Indian markets. Unable to find enough balance sheet finance to cover their 
expenses abroad (and in Vestas’s case, to sustain their activities domestically), Suzlon is 
undergoing a period of intense corporate debt restructuring and financial consolidation and 
Vestas has pulled out of the Indian market completely.  
                                                     
48 Non-recourse funding: a loan where the lending bank is only entitled to repayment from the profits of the project the loan 
is funding, not from other assets of the borrower. 
94 
 
5.5.2 Lack of project finance 
On the other hand, project-based non-recourse finance, that is freely available in developed 
markets such as in Germany or the US, continues to elude investors in India. IREDA is the 
only body that provides loans on a non-recourse basis; however, its market share has 
declined over the years for two main reasons. Firstly, its due diligence is quite stringent for 
each project and in the face of inadequate data, as is often the case, it takes time for the 
agency to sanction loans. Secondly, investors have preferred building up long-term 
partnerships with banks. Interviews with Suzlon, SunBorne, ReNew Power, independent 
analysts and lending institutions all confirmed that, with experience and over a track record 
of good execution, banks prefer to lend to companies with whom they have previously 
executed projects so they can authorise loans quickly. This process becomes even easier 
when there is a close, formal relationship, with members of the bank’s management sitting 
as directors on the firm’s board.  
5.5.3 Nature of debt 
Despite this, on average, the terms of credit for infrastructure as a whole and particularly 
solar are stringent indeed. Not only are loan tenures extremely short (10–15 years), there 
are few avenues where firms can raise additional funds such as corporate bond markets, 
which are highly underdeveloped in India. This puts large conglomerates in a highly 
advantageous position as they can get better terms, and raise money through multiple 
channels (2008 was an excellent year for initial public offerings in India, which saw major 
firms such as Reliance Power and Shriram EPC listed on foreign and domestic capital 
markets). In addition, there are caps on channels such as external commercial borrowings 
that limit the ability of entrepreneurs to raise funds.  
 
In solar, particularly solar thermal power, there is very little risk capital that is available, and 
this is stifling growth and blocking opportunities to learn through setting up plants. 
5.5.4 Possible avenues 
The common view in the industry is that unless low-cost loans and bond markets for 
renewable energy infrastructure pick up, growth will remain stifled. Concerted action is 
required from the central government and there have been encouraging measures led by the 
Prime Minister’s Office such as the establishment of a Green Energy Fund in 2011, which 
saw an influx of capital from both bilateral agencies and the private players (although its 
efficacy has been questioned – see Paliwal and Goyal 2013), and a move by the Ministry of 
Power to set up green corridors for the transmission of renewable energy (see Saikia 2013), 
saving both utilities and renewable energy firms the cost of infrastructure. How this turns out, 
however, is yet to be seen. 
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Annex 
List of interviewees 
 
No. Organisation, individual Date 
1 Bloomberg New Energy Finance 17 October 2013 
2 Bridge to India 12 July 2013 
3 Bureau of Energy Efficiency 4 November 2013 
4 Idam Infrastructure 1 November 2013 
5 Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency 25 September 2013 
6 Indian Wind Energy Association 2 December 2013 
7 Indian Wind Energy Association 4 July 2013 
8 A prominent IPP firm 30 September 2013 
9 Maharashtra Energy Development Agency, former official  21 October 2013 
10 Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission, former official 5 November 2013 
11 Ministry of New and Renewable Energy 15 November 2013 
12 Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, former official 14 November 2013 
13 Moser Baer Ltd, former official 26 July 2013 
14 National Solar Mission stakeholders’ meeting 12 February 2013 
15 National Solar Mission phase 2 stakeholders’ meeting 27 September 2013 
16 A prominent solar power developer 22 April 2013 
17 A prominent solar power system manufacturing firm 21 June 2013 
18 ReGen Powertech 3 March 2014 
19 SunBorne Energy, CEO and founder 8 November 2013 
20 Suzlon Energy Ltd 5 August 2013 
21 Suzlon Energy (Business Development department) 10 March 2014 
22 Suzlon Energy (Regulatory Affairs department) 11 September 2013 
23 Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, former official  10 June 2013 
24 World Bank, official 28 October 2013 
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